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Linguistic framing effects occur when audiences respond differently to the same information, 
just because of the wording the speaker used. For example, empirical research suggests that if a 
risky surgery is described in terms of the chance of surviving, people are more likely to go ahead 
than if it is described in terms of the chance of dying (Wilson, Kaplan, & Schneiderman, 1987). 
Advertisers, politicians, and rhetoricians have always intuitively understood that our 
judgements and decisions can be shaped by the words we use. Over the last fifty years, though, 
framing has become the subject of extensive scientific investigation, beginning with the 
publication in 1981 of ‘The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice’ by Amos 
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. In the psychological literature, framing effects are standardly 
taken as evidence of humans’ irrationality. My research challenges that interpretation. I identify 
a handful of semantic and pragmatic features of speakers’ frames, which could explain why 
audiences form distinct representations of the situations being described. In other words, 
audiences may be tracking genuine differences in the meanings of alternative frames, rather 
than committing some sort of reasoning error. I also use framing research as an empirical case 
study, to inform philosophical understandings of the distinction between semantics and 
pragmatics. Turning to look beyond academic debates, I end by exploring speakers’ and hearers’ 
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Framing: An Introduction 
Abstract 
In this chapter, I define the concepts of ‘framing’ and ‘framing effect’ which I will be working 
with throughout the thesis. I provide a brief historical overview of the psychological 
investigations into these phenomena, and I situate my own research within the literature. I 
close by outlining the arguments I will develop in subsequent chapters. 
1. Introduction 
The publication in 1981 of ‘The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice’, by Amos 
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, marked the advent of psychological research into framing and 
framing effects. Since then a large literature has grown up around these topics, and it continues 
to expand and evolve. In its broadest sense, framing concerns the context in which information 
is presented. Of particular interest are pairs of communicative stimuli whose informational 
contents seem to be the same in all relevant respects; nevertheless, various contextual factors 
can systematically affect how the audience responds to them. In this thesis, I will restrict my 
attention to linguistic framing. I will focus on variations in the words in which information is 
packaged and conveyed. I will be concerned with pairs of uttered sentences whose 
informational contents seem to be logically equivalent to one another.1 I call such pairs of 
sentences ‘alternative frames’. The framing effects I am interested in are systematic differences 
in audiences’ responses, which are brought about by the use of one or other of a pair of 
alternative frames in an otherwise identical context. Reflecting the scope and coverage of the 
experimental literature, the audience responses I will focus on are elicited judgements and 
decisions.2 
The structure of this introductory chapter is as follows: in §2 I outline the normative principles 
of the classical ‘expected utility theory’ of decision-making under risk. In §3 I describe the 
‘prospect theory’ developed by Kahneman and Tversky, which is put forward as a descriptively 
adequate alternative. In §4 I show how prospect theory is extended to account for risky-choice 
framing effects. In §5 I focus on the theory’s assumption that recipients of alternative frames 
represent prospects differently. In §6 I explain why their doing so is standardly considered to be 
 
1 Using the terminology introduced by Druckman (2004, 2011), I will therefore be concerned with 
‘equivalency framing’ rather than ‘emphasis framing’. The latter appeals to substantively distinct 
dimensions of evaluation – for example, one might frame climate change as an environmental issue or a 
social justice issue. Frisch (1993) makes a similar distinction between framing effects considered ‘strictly’ 
or ‘loosely’. 
2 As will become clearer below, I will primarily be interested in the different mental representations 





irrational. In §7 I home in on my key research question, which concerns how – and why – 
alternative frames induce distinct representations. In §8 I introduce the paradigm of ‘attribute 
framing’. In §9 I provide an overview of the thesis. 
2. Expected Utility Theory 
Psychological research on framing began as part of a wider challenge to the classical rational-
choice model of decision-making known as ‘expected utility theory’. Expected utility theory 
(EUT) comprises of a set of axioms specifying how rational agents make decisions under 
conditions of risk. Decision-making under risk involves evaluating ‘prospects’, which are sets of 
possible outcomes. Each possible outcome is, in turn, associated with a level of utility and a 
probability of occurring, ranging from zero (impossible) to one (certain).3 To give a concrete 
example, one might (if sufficiently lucky) be faced with a choice between (i) receiving $200 for 
sure, or (ii) having a 50% chance of receiving $400 and a 50% chance of receiving $0. This 
scenario involves two prospects: the first prospect comprises a single outcome of receiving 
$200 with a probability of 1. The second prospect comprises two possible outcomes – receiving 
$400 or receiving $0 – each of which is associated with a probability of 0.5. 
According to EUT, the ‘expected utility’ of any prospect is a weighted sum of the expected 
utilities of each possible outcome. The expected utility of each outcome is the product of its 
utility and its probability of occurring. So, the expected utility of our first prospect above would 
be $200 x 1 = $200.4 The expected utility of the second prospect is also $200. We arrive at this in 
a different way; namely, by multiplying each of the two possible outcomes (winning $400 and 
winning $0) by the probabilities of their occurring (0.5 for both outcomes) and then summing 
the results: ($400 x 0.5 = $200) + ($0 x 0.5 = $0) = $200.  
Most versions of EUT assume that a prospect in which the outcome is sure to obtain should be 
preferred to a ‘risky’ prospect of equal expected utility. Therefore, even though both of our 
prospects have an expected utility of $200, EUT standardly assumes that receiving $200 for sure 
should be preferred to the ‘risky’ prospect of receiving $400 or $0. In other words, EUT 
standardly assumes that rational agents are risk-averse. 
 
3 In contrast with decision-making under risk, decision-making under uncertainty involves evaluating 
underspecified possibilities. For example, these possibilities may not be jointly exhaustive, and the 
probability of their occurring may not be known. The distinction between risk and uncertainty is 
important to those who argue that each demands a radically different decision-making strategy – see, for 
example (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). For current purposes I leave uncertainty to one side and limit 
my focus to decision-making under risk. 
4 For simplicity, I will equate utility with monetary value, so that the utility associated with receiving 





3. Prospect Theory 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) bring together a large body of experimental evidence which 
suggests that human decision-makers systematically violate key tenets of EUT. Of most 
relevance for our purposes is their finding that people tend to reason about a prospect 
differently depending on whether its expected utility is positive or negative – in other words, 
depending on whether it represents a gain or loss in utility. Specifically, while people tend to 
prefer sure gains to risky gains (as is standardly assumed by EUT), they tend to prefer risky 
losses to sure losses. For example, if offered a choice between (i) losing $200 for sure, and (ii) a 
50% chance of losing $400 and a 50% chance of losing $0, people tend to prefer option (ii). 
Thus, the empirical evidence suggests that human agents are risk-averse in the domain of gains 
but risk-seeking in the domain of losses.5 Kahneman and Tversky dub the sensitivity of people’s 
risk attitudes to gains or losses the ‘reflection effect’. The label reflects the idea that attitudes to 
risk are reversed by reflecting prospects around the zero utility point.  
In order to accurately describe human decision-making under risk, Kahneman and Tversky 
develop a model of decision-making under risk known as ‘prospect theory’. On this model, the 
value assigned to a prospect will depend in part on whether it constitutes a gain or a loss in 
utility. This allows the theory to predict risk-averse behaviour in the domain of gains and risk-
seeking behaviour in the domain of losses.6  
4. From Reflection to Framing 
Crucially, prospect theory is extended to cases where the prospects merely seem like gains or 
losses, despite their having the same overall impact on utility. These cases arise where decision-
makers have different reference points in mind when considering the prospects. As Kahneman 
and Tversky put it: 
The reference point usually corresponds to the current asset position, in which case 
gains and losses coincide with the actual amounts that are received or paid. However, 
the location of the reference point, and the consequent coding of outcomes as gains or 
 
5 The picture is further complicated by evidence that the subjective value of an outcome is not a 
straightforward product of its utility and its probability; instead, there are differences in how utilities and 
probabilities are integrated into the decision procedure depending on their respective magnitudes. 
Moreover, these differences are affected by whether the prospect is a gain or a loss. For example, people 
prefer highly improbable large gains to sure small gains; but they prefer sure small losses to highly 
improbable large losses. These details are largely tangential to my concerns so I will set them aside for 
now.  
6 Prospect theory also includes weighting components that capture sensitivities to the magnitudes of the 
utilities and probabilities of possible outcomes (as discussed in the previous footnote). Again, I will ignore 
these aspects of the model here. However, see (Kühberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, & Perner, 1999) for 
further analysis of how far they are supported by data from ‘risky choice’ framing experiments, like the 





losses, can be affected by the formulation of the offered prospects, and by the 
expectations of the decision maker. (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 274) 
One way of making prospects seem like gains or losses is by describing them in different words 
– or using alternative frames. A prime example is provided by the ‘Asian Disease Problem’ 
(ADP). Originally used in an experiment reported by Tversky and Kahneman (1981), variations 
of this problem permeate the subsequent framing literature so thoroughly that it is now 
something of a classic of the genre. In the original experiment, Tversky and Kahneman 
presented participants with the following hypothetical scenario:  
Imagine the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is 
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been 
proposed. Assume the exact scientific estimates of the consequences are as follows: 
In one condition participants received the following options:  
 If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved 
and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved. 
In another condition they received the following: 
 If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. 
If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will die and a two-
thirds probability that 600 people will die. 
Participants in each condition were then asked which of the options they would favour. 
Tversky and Kahneman found that 72% of participants in the first, ‘be saved’, condition 
favoured Program A, compared with 28% who favoured Program B. Meanwhile, in the second, 
‘die’, condition, 78% of participants favoured Program D, compared with 22% who favoured 
Program C. The pattern of responses is considered to be puzzling because Programs A and C are 
standardly taken to describe exactly the same sure prospect (of 200 people being saved and 400 
dying). Similarly, Programs B and D are standardly taken to describe the same risky prospect (of 
a one-third probability of 600 people being saved with none dying, and a two-thirds probability 
of 600 dying with none being saved).7 The only difference between the two framing conditions, 
then, is whether the options are worded positively, with the outcomes expressed in terms of the 
numbers of people who will ‘be saved’, or negatively, in terms of the numbers of people who will 
 
7 In later chapters I will challenge these apparent equivalences in various ways. However, let’s assume for 





‘die’.8 Therefore this is not a reflection effect but a framing effect: whereas reflection effects 
concern actual gains and losses (as in the earlier examples of gaining money and losing money), 
framing effects concern merely apparent gains and losses (as in the ADP, where the actual 
numbers of people living and dying remain exactly the same).9  
Even assuming that risk attitudes vary across gain and loss domains, the responses to the ADP 
remain puzzling: both pairs of options represent the same change in utility, so why didn’t 
participants consistently prefer either the sure or the risky prospect? The results demonstrate a 
reversal in preferences across framing conditions, with most participants in the ‘be saved’ 
condition favouring the sure option, and most participants in the ‘die’ condition favouring the 
risky option. It seems, then, that a mere difference in wording – or framing – affects the values 
that decision-makers assign to the prospects.  
Similar risky-choice framing effects have been observed in myriad subsequent studies, using a 
variety of scenarios and experimental designs (for surveys of the literature, see (Kühberger, 
1998; Kühberger et al., 1999; Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998; Steiger & Kühberger, 2018)). 
Note that, although not all studies find wholesale reversals in preferences, there is a very robust 
statistically significant shift in the expected direction, i.e. towards the sure option in the 
positively worded framing condition and towards the risky option in the negatively worded 
framing condition (Kühberger, 1998, p. 30; Levin et al., 1998, p. 153). I will understand framing 
effects to encompass shifts as well as wholesale reversals. This is in line with definitions 
adopted by many others in the literature, including Levin et al. (1998) and Kühberger (1998). 
Thus, for example, even if most participants preferred the sure (or risky) option in both framing 
conditions of the ADP, as long as it were preferred by a significantly larger majority in the 
positively-worded (or negatively-worded) condition, this would suffice for a framing effect to be 
present.10  
5. Editing, Representation, and Evaluation 
Tversky and Kahneman extend prospect theory to explain the pattern of responses to the ADP 
(and similar risky-choice framing scenarios). They propose that, in the ‘be saved’ condition, the 
prospects sound like gains, and in the ‘die’ condition they sound like losses. As a result, when the 
prospect is framed in terms of the number of people who will ‘be saved’, participants are 
thought to represent this as a gain (presumably relative to the expectation that 600 people will 
 
8 I return to the question of precisely what makes wording ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ below.  
9 The distinction between reflection effects and framing effects is also emphasised by Fagley (1993) and 
Kühberger et al. (1999). 
10 The distinction between reversals and shifts is also discussed by Maule (1989) and Wang (1996) (who 





be killed). Conversely, when the prospect is framed in terms of the number of people who will 
‘die’, participants are thought to represent it as a loss (perhaps relative to the most desirable 
outcome of all 600 people remaining alive).  
In order to capture these kinds of effects, Kahneman and Tversky (1979, pp. 273-274) posit an 
initial ‘editing’ phase in decision-making. This involves decision-makers mentally representing 
the prospects in particular ways – ways which can affect the values they assign to them. 
Specifically, positively-worded prospects are represented (or ‘coded’) as gains. They are 
therefore assigned positive values. Conversely, negatively-worded prospects are coded as 
losses, and are assigned negative values.11  
In a subsequent ‘evaluation’ phase, the decision-maker assesses the prospects, based on the 
values assigned to them. Where prospects have been coded as gains and assigned positive 
values, decision-makers will tend to be risk-averse. In contrast, where they have been coded as 
losses and assigned negative values, decision-makers will tend to be risk-seeking. This can 
explain the observed pattern of responses to the ADP: in the ‘be saved’ condition, where 
participants treat the prospects as gains, there is a shift towards the sure option. In the ‘die’ 
condition, where participants treat the prospects as losses, there is a shift towards the risky 
option. 
As is clear from the summary above, it is essential to the prospect theoretic account of framing 
effects that the use of positive or negative wording cues audiences to represent prospects as 
gains or losses. However, there is limited discussion in the literature of what counts as positive 
or negative wording.12 In what follows, I will think of the positivity or negativity of linguistic 
expressions as depending straightforwardly on the typical evaluative valence of what the 
expressions denote. Thus, for example, being saved is typically considered good, other things 
being equal, whereas dying is typically considered bad.  
Several theorists have noted that risky-choice framing paradigms like the ADP conflate two 
factors: first, whether the positively- or negatively-valenced predicate expression is used (for 
example, ‘be saved’ or ‘die’); and, second, whether it is used affirmatively or under negation. For 
example, the positive wording of ‘be saved’ can be used affirmatively to describe the number of 
people who will be saved, or under negation, to describe the number of people who will not be 
saved. In affirmative contexts, the valence of the overall predicate is reinforced; in negational 
 
11 Kahneman and Tversky discuss various other operations that may occur during the editing phase: for 
example, probabilities may be combined in order to simplify a problem, and shared components of the 
prospects may be subtracted out. However, these operations are less relevant for my concerns and I will 
not discuss them further here.  
12 Indeed, there is a risk of confusing evaluative polarity with something like ‘markedness’, as will be 





contexts, the valence of the overall predicate becomes ‘mixed’, potentially weakening the 
framing effect.13 Levin et al. (1998, pp. 153-158) make similar remarks about confounding or 
conflicting ‘hedonic tones’ within a single framing condition. While mixed-valence cases 
constitute an interesting topic for future research, my focus here will be on the more 
straightforward and clear-cut affirmative uses. It is hoped that a better understanding of these 
will provide the foundation for further investigation of more linguistically complex structures. 
6. (Ir)rationality 
An upshot of the prospect-theoretic explanation of framing effects is that human decision-
making behaviour is doubly divergent from EUT’s prescription for rational agents. First, in the 
editing phase described above, prospects are coded as gains or losses purely in virtue of their 
being described in positive or negative terms, rather than due to their actual effects on overall 
utility. Standardly, this representational effect is taken to violate the normative principle of 
description invariance, which specifies that rational agents will respond in the same way to the 
same outcomes, regardless of how they are described.14 This first point of divergence from the 
rational model is peculiar to framing effects. The second point of divergence is common to both 
framing and reflection effects: in the evaluation phase, decision-makers are risk-averse or risk-
seeking depending on whether prospects have been coded as gains or losses. In reflection 
paradigms, the coding of the prospects corresponds to actual changes in utility; in framing 
paradigms it does not, since the change in utility is supposed to be identical under each 
condition.  
According to prospect theory, then, people generally fall short of the rational ideal embodied by 
EUT. Psychologists working in the prospect theoretic tradition have treated this rational failure 
 
13 There is some empirical evidence to suggest that risky-choice framing effects may depend on predicate 
expressions being used affirmatively in the sure options. Kühberger (1995) presents data from two 
experiments which show that the standard framing effect disappears when the sure options include 
explicit information about the number of people who will not be saved, or will not die. Moreover, he finds 
that the standard framing effect is reversed when the sure options only include information about the 
numbers who will not be saved, or will not die: in these manipulations, participants were risk-seeking in 
the ‘be saved’ framing condition, and risk-averse in the ‘die’ framing condition. The findings suggest that 
it is not merely the use of the positively- or negatively-valenced predicate expression that makes an 
outcome seem like a gain or a loss but its being used affirmatively rather than under negation. Building on 
Kühberger’s analysis, Mandel (2001) investigates additional combinations of affirmative and negated 
uses of ‘be saved’ and ‘die’, across both the sure and risky options of a risky-choice scenario. His results 
support the hypothesis that framing effects depend on root expressions being used affirmatively (a 
hypothesis which is further developed and by Tombu and Mandel (2015)). These studies also seem 
consistent with an earlier set of results published by Van Schie and Van Der Pligt (1995), although those 
authors describe their findings rather differently. 
14 Tversky and Kahneman (1986, p. 253) describe this principle as “so basic that it is tacitly assumed in 
the characterization of options rather than explicitly stated as a testable axiom”. In chapter 9 I will 





as a deep fact about human cognition, not merely the result of our limited knowledge, memory, 
and computational abilities. For example Tversky and Kahneman (1986, p. 252) write:  
We argue that the deviations of actual behavior from the normative model are too 
widespread to be ignored, too systematic to be dismissed as random error, and too 
fundamental to be accommodated by relaxing the normative system. 
Some further evidence that framing effects are counter-normative comes from the fact that 
alternative framing conditions are typically understood to be equivalent once both conditions 
are made available.15 Implicit evidence is obtained from within-subjects experimental designs, 
in which the same participants receive both framing conditions (usually not simultaneously but 
interspersed with other tasks). Typically, participants give consistent answers once they have 
the opportunity to see both of the alternative frames, not just one. In other words, participants 
tend to choose either the sure option or the risky option under both frames. Some studies which 
obtain this result with respect to the ADP, or similar scenarios, include (Frisch, 1993; 
Kühberger, 1995; Stanovich & West, 1998).16  
Other experiments have elicited explicit evidence that people understand alternative framing 
conditions to be equivalent. They have done so by presenting both frames simultaneously (often 
after participants have completed a choice task based on one or both frames) and asking 
participants whether they think the frames are relevantly different. Frisch (1993) finds that 
most people who responded differently to the two framing conditions of ADP in a within-
subjects design nevertheless said that both pairs of prospects should be treated the same, once 
they had a chance to view them side by side.17 The within-subjects data suggest that people are 
capable of understanding the alternative framing conditions to be equivalent. And it is 
standardly held that it would be rational for them to do so. On that view, forming distinct 
representations under each framing condition seems clearly irrational.18   
 
15 In chapter 9, however, I will question the status of this evidence. 
16 However, there is typically an effect of the order in which framing conditions are presented: 
participants receiving the positively-worded frame first tend to choose the sure option under both 
frames, whereas those receiving the negatively-worded frame first tend to choose the risky option under 
both frames. In other words, when first presented with one or other framing condition, participants’ 
responses typically pattern according to the standard framing effect. However, when they view the 
second framing condition, they tend to treat it as relevantly similar to the first one. That said, substantial 
minorities of participants still exhibit the standard framing effect even in within-subjects designs (around 
30% in both Frisch’s and Stanovich and West’s ADP-based experiments). And Kahneman and Tversky 
describe experiments in which a majority do: they report that “[the failure of invariance] is not eliminated 
even when the same respondents answer both questions within a few minutes” (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1984, p. 343). 
17 The remainder maintained that the framing conditions should be treated differently and gave various 
reasons for this. As Frisch notes, though, the experimental design makes it possible that they were merely 
trying to justify their earlier preference reversal.  





7. Investigating Representational Effects 
My research will address the question of how framing affects the representation of prospects in 
the initial ‘editing’ phase (although the conclusions will also feed through to a different 
interpretation of the responses produced during the subsequent ‘evaluation’ phase). Prospect 
theory has little to say about how and why differences in wording might induce different mental 
representations. Indeed, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) seem to treat the effects of framing on 
representation as a brute fact of imperfect human decision-making. They compare such effects 
to cases of perceptual illusion like the Müller-Lyer paradox (in which two lines of equal length 
appear different because of the direction of the arrows – see below); or the relative heights of 
two mountains appearing to change when viewed from different angles (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981, p. 453).  
 
 
Accordingly, Tversky and Kahneman make the following observation about their experiments 
using the ADP: 
On several occasions we presented both versions to the same respondents and 
discussed with them the inconsistent preferences evoked by the two frames. Many 
respondents expressed a wish to remain risk averse in the “lives saved” version and risk 
seeking in the “lives lost” version, although they also expressed a wish for their answers 
to be consistent. (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986, p. 260) 
As in the perceptual illusions mentioned above, surface cues in linguistic form are 
conceptualised as pulling participants towards representations of reality which they know to be 
inconsistent. However, little more is said to develop the analogy into a concrete explanation of 
how frames are interpreted. The researchers are aware of this gap in their account, noting: 
Because the framing of decisions depends on the language of presentation, on the 
context of choice, and on the nature of the display, our treatment of the process is 
necessarily informal and incomplete. (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986, p. 273)  
The question of how frames are represented has come into sharper focus over the last fifteen to 
twenty years, as Teigen (2016) points out in surveying developments in quantitative framing 
research. Nevertheless, it remains understudied. The aim of this thesis is to contribute to filling 
this gap in our understanding of framing. Before outlining the shape of my argument, I continue 
tracing the evolution of the framing literature, in order to introduce the distinct paradigm of 





8. Attribute Framing 
A survey of the framing literature by Levin et al. (1998) rounds up the first two decades of 
framing research. The authors helpfully distinguish three kinds of framing paradigm. Alongside 
the ‘risky-choice’ framing discussed above, their typology identifies ‘attribute framing’ and ‘goal 
framing’. My research will address only the first two of these; I will set goal framing aside.19  
Levin et al. describe attribute framing as follows: 
Attribute framing represents perhaps the simplest case of framing, making it especially 
useful for gaining a basic understanding of how descriptive valence influences 
information processing. We label this elementary form of framing “attribute framing” 
because only a single attribute within any given context is the subject of the framing 
manipulation. Here, the dependent measure of interest is not choice between 
independent options, but it is instead a measure of the more basic process of evaluation. 
(Levin et al., 1998, p. 158) 
Below is an example of an attribute framing scenario, taken from an experimental study by 
Leong, McKenzie, Sher, and Müller‐Trede (2017):20  
Imagine that you are a recruiter for a college basketball team. Your job is to search for 
promising high school basketball players and try to recruit them to your college. You are 
looking through files for players from local high schools, and you are especially 
interested in players who can score many points.  
The file you are currently looking at shows a player whose performance is quite 
unusual.  
Participants in one condition were presented with the following target sentence: 
This player made 40% of his shots last season. 
 
19 Goal framing involves describing an act in terms of the positive or negative consequences of performing 
it or not performing it. For example, information about breast self-examination (BSE) could be presented 
in either of the following ways, taken from (Meyerowitz & Chaiken, 1987):  
(i) Research shows that women who do BSE have an increased chance of finding a tumor in the 
early, more treatable stages of the disease. 
(ii) Research shows that women who do not do BSE have a decreased chance of finding a tumor 
in the early, more treatable stages of the disease. 
The second, negatively worded, frame is found to be more effective than the first in encouraging women 
to do BSE. A similar pattern is observed in a handful of other studies. However, this framing paradigm 
introduces a number of complexities, including the use of negation in one frame but not the other. In 
general, goal framing experiments constitute a relatively heterogeneous class and are not as well studied 
or as well understood as the other two categories.  





Participants in a separate condition were presented with the following alternative sentence: 
 This player missed 60% of his shots last season. 
Participants in both conditions were then asked: “How valuable do you think this player would 
be to your basketball team?” They answered by rating the player on a scale ranging from ‘Not at 
all valuable’ to ‘Extremely valuable’.  
In this paradigm, both frames are understood to attribute to the player the same property of 
having made 40% and missed 60% of his shots. However, they do so by explicitly specifying 
either the proportion ‘made’ or the proportion ‘missed’. Leong et al. found that the player was 
judged to be more valuable to the team in the ‘made’ condition than in the ‘missed’ condition. 
This is in line with a catalogue of other attribute framing effects, whereby entities tend to be 
evaluated more favourably when they are described using positive wording than when they are 
described using negative wording. The attribute framing effect, then, is a shift in the evaluation 
of an entity due to its being described using alternative frames.21  
Similarly to the standard prospect theoretic account of risky-choice framing effects, it has been 
hypothesised that recipients of attribute frames tend to represent an entity positively or 
negatively in line with the valence of the words used to describe it (Levin & Gaeth, 1988; Levin 
et al., 1998). Again, though, theories about how and why the difference in wording affects 
mental representations are still in their infancy.22  
What is common between risky-choice and attribute framing effects, then, is the idea that they 
depend on audiences forming different representations of prospects or entities, due to these 
being framed in different ways. The thesis will explore and develop this basic insight.23 I will 
consider exactly how the information in alternative framing conditions is represented. I will 
argue that, in explaining why frames produce different representations, it becomes possible to 
rationalise framing effects.24  
 
21 In chapter 6 I will refine the definitions of attribute framing and attribute framing effects. My 
definitions will be more specific about the linguistic structures involved in these paradigms, and will 
accommodate structurally similar evaluatively neutral cases, where the framing effect does not depend 
on the alternative frames having opposing, positive or negative, valence. 
22 See chapter 6 for further discussion of the two main competitors: the associationist account and the 
information leakage account. 
23 Therefore, I will not consider the possibility that non-representational mechanisms underlie framing 
effects (or cognition more generally). Instead, I will work within a broadly representational tradition.  
24 My research is thus allied with theories that reinterpret the kind of data marshalled by Kahneman and 
Tversky as being consistent with rational behaviour. For a helpful survey of the wider debate, see 
(Kühberger, 2002). Of particular relevance are those who have appealed to linguistic pragmatics in 
providing rationalising explanations, including Hilton (1995) and Schwarz (1996). Interestingly, 
Kahneman and Tversky themselves acknowledge that “the conversational aspect of judgment studies 





9. Thesis Overview 
Applying a philosophical perspective to psychological investigations of framing, I will argue that 
a handful of semantic and pragmatic features can explain why the representation of a prospect 
or entity depends on the words used to describe it. Working in the opposite direction, I will also 
use framing effects as an empirical case study to inform ongoing philosophical debates about 
the semantics-pragmatics divide. Specifically, I will suggest that the framing data support a 
relatively minimal conception of semantics and a broadly Gricean conception of pragmatics. 
Turning to look beyond academia, I will end by exploring speakers’ and hearers’ responsibilities 
for the problematic effects of framing in public discourse. 
The structure of the thesis is as follows: in chapter 2 I will map out a spectrum of approaches to 
contextual variability in meaning, signposting the ways in which these approaches will inform 
my subsequent discussions of the semantics and pragmatics of frames. In chapter 3 I will 
consider a deflationary explanation of framing effects, according to which frames are 
represented differently because of their inequivalence at a basic semantic level – specifically, 
because contrasted predicate expressions like ‘be saved’ and ‘die’ fail to jointly exhaust the 
logical space of possibilities. In chapter 4 I will consider whether framing effects could be 
explained on the basis of number expressions obtaining lower-bounded interpretations, such 
that, for example, ‘200’ is understood as denoting at least 200. These chapters will raise 
important methodological points, showing the need for greater care in setting up alternative 
framing conditions. Nevertheless, I will conclude that it is still possible for framing effects to 
arise even when the alternative frames are genuinely logically equivalent. Before embarking on 
a different explanation, in chapter 5 I will address a possible objection to the claim that frames 
qua sentences can be logically equivalent to one another. This claim presupposes that sentences 
can be truth-evaluable, which is prominently denied by proponents of Radical Contextualism. I 
will defend a liberal understanding of ‘truth-evaluability’, according to which contents count as 
truth-evaluable as long as they can map at least one possible world to at least one truth-value. 
On this understanding, alternative frames would count as truth-evaluable and capable of logical 
equivalence.  
In chapter 6 I will introduce the ‘information leakage’ account of attribute framing effects, 
endorsing a version of the view known as the ‘reference point hypothesis’. In chapter 7 I will 
argue that the ‘reference point information’ typically conveyed by frames can be analysed as a 
Gricean conversational implicature. In chapter 8 I will suggest that there is little plausibility or 
 
& Tversky, 1982, p. 135). However, this point is often lost in the standard interpretation of framing effects 






parsimony in taking reference point information to ‘intrude’, in one sense or another, on what is 
‘said’. Finally, in chapter 9 I will show how my analysis shifts the responsibility for framing 
effects away from hearers. I argue that they may behave perfectly rationally in forming different 
representations on the basis of alternative frames. Responsibility will be shifted, instead, 
towards speakers. In this chapter, I seek to apply the theoretical framework developed 
throughout the thesis to real-world cases of framing. In this way, the philosophical and 
psychological conclusions of my research will be connected with issues of contemporary social 








Within the philosophy of language, there is now a well-established spectrum of views about 
whether, when, and how the meanings associated with linguistic utterances depend on extra-
linguistic factors. At one end of the spectrum, ‘Semantic Minimalism’ seeks to carve out a set of 
minimal semantic meanings, which attach to sentences in a language largely (or entirely) 
independently of how they are used. These meanings are distinguished from the wider 
pragmatic meanings a sentence is used to convey on each occasion of its use. At the other 
extreme, ‘Occasion-sensitivity’ treats the meanings of uttered sentences as being richly and 
essentially dependent on extra-linguistic features of the wider context. In this initial set-up 
chapter, I sketch how each approach could be brought to bear in explaining framing effects, and 
I signpost the more detailed discussions coming up in later chapters. 
1. Introduction 
The philosophical debate with which I wish to engage concerns variations in meaning, broadly 
construed, which arise when the same linguistic expression is used on different occasions. After 
all, expressions can be used at different times, by different speakers, in addressing different 
audiences, and with a variety of different goals. Changes in these wider extra-linguistic 
circumstances can cause a given expression to acquire very different interpretations.  
Unlike examples of meaning variation that are standardly discussed in the philosophical 
literature, framing effects arise from the use of distinct linguistic expressions, on occasions that 
are qualitatively identical (since, in experimental studies at least, wider contextual factors are 
controlled for). Nevertheless, there are important parallels between both kinds of case. In 
particular, alternative frames are still supposed to express the same meaning as one another in 
some sense (the nature of which will be explored throughout the thesis). It is the precise words 
chosen to convey that meaning which plays the role of an occasion-specific variable here. In 
later chapters, I will demonstrate how the case study of framing effects sheds new light on 
philosophical debates about meaning variation, informing our conceptions of semantics, 
pragmatics, and the boundary between the two. The purpose of this initial chapter, however, is 
to survey the current state of that debate, thereby laying the groundwork for my contribution to 
it.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows: in §2 I set up the debate by outlining a simplified 
model of the linguistic interpretation process. I then describe how certain aspects of this 





communication:25 Semantic Minimalism (discussed in §3); Indexicalism (discussed in §4); 
Conventionalism (discussed in §5); Contextualism (discussed in §6); Semantic Relativism 
(discussed in §7); and Occasion-sensitivity (discussed in §8). Throughout the discussion, I will 
consider the resources available to each theory for describing the effects of framing on meaning.  
2. Interpretation 
Upon encountering a linguistic stimulus, the audience is faced with a stream of perceptual input 
(phonological, orthographic, or gestural, depending on the format in which the stimulus is 
presented).26 I will assume that hearers aim to recover the meaning(s) that the speaker 
intended to communicate (which is nevertheless compatible with their also having a range of 
other aims). In pursuing this aim, hearers need to transform perceptual inputs into meaningful 
information. As a first-pass characterisation of this process, perceptual inputs can be thought of 
as being mapped by hearers to certain linguistic types, i.e. expressions in a natural language like 
English. Thus, for example, the following set of marks corresponds to the English word, 
‘survive’: 
s u r v i v e 
And the following (partly overlapping) set of marks is mappable to the English sentence ‘John 
survives’: 
J o h n   s u r v i v e s. 
Expressions generated via this process can then be thought of as being mapped to their 
conventional meanings in the language. Conventional meanings are understood here as lexical 
entries for linguistic expressions, stored in a hearer’s ‘mental lexicon’ – a kind of memorised 
database of such entries. Thus, for example, the English expression, ‘survive’ is mappable to the 
concept survive. Concepts – however exactly they should be characterised – can be thought of as 
having certain denotations. For example, the concept survive would denote a set of entities that 
survive (where this set might be relativised to possible worlds, times, and perhaps other 
parameters).  
Where the linguistic stimulus is a complex expression, containing multiple simple expressions, 
the meanings of its constituent expressions will need to be combined in accordance with the 
 
25 Five of these are drawn from the typology developed by Borg (2012). I add a sixth – ‘Conventionalism’ – 
which has been gaining in prominence in recent years. 
26 For ease of exposition, I will use ‘utterance’ as a catch-all term for any use of a linguistic stimulus, and 





compositional rules for the language.27 For example, the sentence ‘John survives’ is mappable to 
a representation that we might write as survive(John), where the concept survive takes John as 
its argument. Standardly, the mental representations to which sentences ultimately get mapped 
are held to be truth-conditional: thus, for example, survive(John) should output TRUE if John is a 
member of the set of entities that survives, and FALSE if he is not (and, perhaps, some third 
truth-value if it is indeterminate whether or not he survives). 
This simplistic reconstruction of the interpretation process is immediately complicated, 
however, by cases in which the representations hearers form are clearly not – and cannot be – 
merely the result of combining the conventional meanings of constituent expressions but 
depend instead on extra-linguistic factors.28 Taking the exchange below as an example, imagine 
that A and B are discussing an unseeded pair of tennis players, Kris and Marta, who are about to 
face the world number ones in the first round of the Wimbledon doubles tournament. 
A. There’s a lot of hype surrounding the match this afternoon. 
B. They won’t survive. 
A’s interpretation of B’s utterance of (1) is likely to be affected by the wider discourse context. 
(1) They won’t survive. 
First, the pronoun ‘they’ is an ‘indexical’ expression, meaning that its denotation varies across 
different occasions of its use. In our imagined scenario it obviously refers to the unseeded pair 
of players, Kris and Marta. However, this fact is not determined purely by the conventional 
meaning of ‘they’. Instead, it is determined partly by the fact that A and B have been discussing 
those players.29 Second, the expression ‘survive’ concerns the players’ progress through the 
tournament, not their continued existence as living beings. This suggests that ‘survive’ may 
need to be mapped to a concept that is more specific, or different, than its conventional 
meaning, in a process that is known as ‘modulation’ of the conventional meaning. Third, 
presumably what is meant by the utterance of (1) in this scenario is that the players will not 
progress through to the next round of the tournament. This is despite the fact that (1) contains 
 
27 As we will see below, views differ as to whether composition takes place before or after occasion-
specific modulation or enrichment of conventional meanings. In setting out the first-pass account of 
interpretation, I set that issue aside; however, I will begin to problematise this overly simplistic account 
immediately below. 
28 Any effects on interpretation beyond those of conventional meanings and compositional rules I will 
label ‘extra-linguistic’, even though they will sometimes relate to other linguistics aspects, such as the 
surrounding discourse. 
29 I will remain neutral as to whether the denotations of indexical expressions like ‘they’ are constitutively 
determined by the speaker’s intentions or by purely objective features of the utterance situation. This 
issue is the subject of ongoing debate. For a prominent intentionalist account, see Neale (2016); for the 





no corresponding explicit component. That points to the need for some further enrichment of 
the interpretation, perhaps to include an ‘unarticulated constituent’ (Perry, 1986).30 Overall, 
then, a hearer of (1) might form the following representation:31 
(1a) Kris and Marta won’t progress to the next round of the tournament. 
The utterance of (1) might also bring various other informational contents to mind, for example 
that the supporters of the unseeded players will be disappointed. Again, such representations 
cannot be derived merely by composing the conventional meanings of (1)’s surface 
constituents. Instead, they depend in large part on hearers making inferences on the basis of 
their wider knowledge (for example, by inferring that the hype will have led the supporters to 
raise their expectations, and recalling that supporters are usually disappointed when their team 
loses). It is generally agreed that wider representations of this kind are pragmatic ‘implicatures’, 
along the lines discussed by Grice (1989). I will describe the defining features of implicatures in 
much more detail in chapter 7. For now, I will proceed with an intuitive grasp of the distinction 
between relatively indirect implicated meanings and meanings which seem to be expressed 
more directly, like the one captured by (1a). 
It is relatively uncontroversial that extra-linguistic factors will affect hearers’ interpretations of 
linguistic stimuli. Far more contentious is the question of how far anything characterisable as 
the meaning of an utterance might depend on these factors. Some theorists have sought to 
isolate minimal semantic meanings that remain (largely or entirely) independent of extra-
linguistic factors. Others have rejected any appeal to such entities, arguing that meanings 
inevitably depend on wider contextual phenomena. This is the crux of the debate between 
Minimalism and Contextualism, which I survey throughout the next six sections.  
3. Semantic Minimalism 
According to one family of theories, every component of a complex linguistic expression’s 
semantic meaning must be traceable back to the conventional meanings of its constituents or 
the compositional rules that govern their combination. Theories in this camp bifurcate into 
Semantic Minimalism and Indexicalism. In this section I will discuss Semantic Minimalism (also 
known as ‘Insensitive Semantics’, ‘Invariant Semantics’ or, simply, ‘Minimalism’). As we will see, 
 
30 Borg (2016, pp. 341-342) proposes that modulation and the addition of unarticulated constituents may 
be, in principle, interchangeable. 
31 Of course, the precise structure of a language user’s mental representation of (1) may turn out to be far 
less like a sentence of English than (1a) is; however, I will continue to work with this kind of intuitive 





Minimalists recognise only a relatively small set of context-sensitive elements in language. In §4 
I will discuss how Indexicalists have been moved to enlarge that set. 
3.1. Context-sensitivity 
Minimalists standardly recognise a set of context-sensitive expressions, the denotations of 
which vary across different occasions of use. The set of context-sensitive expressions includes 
‘indexicals’ (like ‘I’) and ‘demonstratives’ (like ‘this’ and ‘that’). Such expressions must be paired 
– through a process known as ‘saturation’ – with suitable contextual parameters, such as 
particular individuals (as in ‘I’ or ‘you’) or objects (as in ‘this’ or ‘that’).32 Returning to sentence 
(1), Minimalists would standardly accept that the English expression ‘they’ is context-sensitive.  
Different versions of Minimalism have proposed different criteria for inclusion in the set of 
context-sensitive elements of language. Cappelen and Lepore (2005) describe a ‘Basic Set’ of 
such elements, which is more or less exhausted by those enumerated by Kaplan (1989): 
personal pronouns, demonstrative pronouns, syntactic markers of tense, and a small number of 
open-class words. In contrast, Borg (2012) allows that the set of context-sensitive elements 
could potentially be enlarged, so long as there are formal semantic or syntactic justifications for 
adding further members. It is expected, though, that the linguistic evidence will continue to 
support the presence of relatively limited context-sensitivity in language.   
Minimalists typically argue that genuinely context-sensitive expressions like ‘they’ demand an 
extra-linguistic contribution to the semantic meaning of an utterance like (1).33 This is because 
the influence of extra-linguistic factors can be traced back to the expression’s conventional 
meaning. Thus Borg writes:  
[W]hat minimalism should be held to claim is that the route to semantics runs along 
exclusively lexical and syntactic footholds (Borg, 2012, p. 206).   
We might therefore represent the minimal semantic meaning of (1) as follows: 
(1b) Kris and Marta won’t survive. 
 
32 Although I use the terminology of ‘context-sensitivity’, I intend to remain neutral about whether the 
extra-linguistic factors that constitutively determine denotations are speakers’ intentions or features of a 
(formal or situational) context, as noted in footnote 29. I will also defer questions about the extent to 
which conventional meanings constrain the role of extra-linguistic factors. For example, the conventional 
meaning of ‘I’ might be thought to require, quite specifically, that the referent be the speaker (although 
see (Predelli, 1998) for discussion of some complicating factors). In contrast, the conventional meanings 
of the demonstratives ‘this’ and ‘that’ may seem to provide far looser constraints on the referent. Since 
this issue is orthogonal to my project, I will simply set it aside for now. 






Minimalists are also united in denying that semantics should capture modulated meanings, 
which depend on wider aspects of the discourse situation (such as the modulation of ‘survive’ to 
mean something like progress). Neither will minimal semantic meanings incorporate any 
unarticulated constituents (as in the inclusion of ‘to the next round of the tournament’ in (1a)). 
And, of course, Minimalists exclude from semantics any wider implicatures that hearers may 
derive from a speaker’s utterance. In sum, extra-linguistic effects on semantic meaning are 
limited just to those which are required by constant, fixed features of language.34 
3.2. Propositionalism 
Another distinction between the cluster of views in the Minimalist camp concerns 
‘propositionalism’, the claim that all well-formed declarative sentences express complete, truth-
evaluable, propositions. Borg (2004, 2012) argues that they do (at least, once sentences 
containing context-sensitive elements have been suitably relativized to extra-linguistic facts). In 
contrast, Bach (2001, 2006a) advocates a ‘radical’ form of Minimalism, according to which 
semantic meanings will sometimes be incomplete. He writes: 
If the semantic content of a sentence is capable of being true or false, is a possible 
content of thought, and is the possible content of an assertion, then the sentence 
expresses a proposition, otherwise only a propositional radical. (Bach, 2006a, p. 440)35 
Bach’s view is sometimes categorised as Contextualist, rather than Minimalist, on the grounds of 
this incompleteness claim (Borg, 2012; Borg & Fisher, forthcoming). However, to the extent that 
Bach believes ‘propositional radicals’ play an important theoretical role, that would set him 
apart from other Contextualists, who generally consider such entities to be theoretically inert 
(as will be discussed in §6 below).  
3.3. Theoretical Role 
On one hand, Minimalists acknowledge that minimal semantic meanings need not correspond to 
what ordinary language-users judge to have been communicated (including whether the 
speaker has said something true or false). For example, they may accept that (1) intuitively 
 
34 Borg (2012) calls these ‘lexico-syntactic’ features; I will sometimes refer to them as ‘linguistic’ here. In 
later chapters I will want to distinguish linguistic effects that depend on conventional meaning from those 
which depend on properties of use. 
35 Cappelen and Lepore are harder to pin down on this issue. In their ‘Reply to Bach’ they avoid 
committing themselves to propositionalism (Cappelen & Lepore, 2006). However, they clearly do take 
many sentences to have complete, truth-evaluable semantic meanings, where non-Minimalists would 






communicates something like (1a). However, they deny that this must be captured in full by the 
minimal semantic meaning. In general, as Borg writes: 
[M]inimalists are happy to reject the idea that a semantic theory should limn our 
intuitive judgements of what is said by the utterance of a sentence in a given context 
(Borg, 2012, p. 49). 
Nevertheless, it is maintained that minimal semantic meanings play some important role in 
theorising. This has been cashed out in a handful of different ways. Cappelen and Lepore (2005) 
have argued that minimal semantic meanings are invariably part of what is communicated. They 
write: 
In short: the proposition semantically expressed is our minimal defense against 
confusion, misunderstanding, mistakes and it is that which guarantees communication 
across contexts of utterances. (Cappelen & Lepore, 2005, p. 185) 
They go on to say: 
If there’s a difference between having a cognitive function and corresponding to a stage 
in processing or having a psychological reality, we don’t know what that difference 
consists in. (Cappelen & Lepore, 2005, p. 186) 
Borg (2004, 2012) denies that minimal semantic meanings need be psychologically realised in 
the way Cappelen and Lepore suggest. Instead, she allows, for example, that a hearer of (1) 
might represent (1a) without first deriving (1b) in full. According to Borg, there is a mental 
module which has the teleological function of generating minimal semantic meanings during 
comprehension. Following Fodor (1983), Borg proposes that linguistic processing is modular 
(see, especially, chapter 2 in (Borg, 2004)). In other words, it is undertaken by a discrete 
cognitive system, operating independently of – despite being situated within – a wider set of 
predominantly non-modular thinking and reasoning processes. A mental module is understood 
here as “an encapsulated body of information with deductive, computational rules operating 
only over that information” (Borg, 2004, p. 78). The language processing module operates over 
linguistic inputs (simple or complex expressions of language) and transforms them in 
accordance with classical computational operations into further representations. Importantly, 
Borg departs from Fodor in arguing that the module can provide truth-conditional semantic 
meanings of natural language sentences, rather than being restricted to syntactic and phonetic 
processes. Borg maintains that a linguistic input “can be processed, up to and including 





141). In other words, it is claimed that a world-involving representation is derivable in the 
absence of any extra-linguistic information.36 
Borg argues that a hearer will derive the minimal semantic meaning of an utterance just in case 
the semantic module completes its processing on that occasion. That will depend on two 
conditions obtaining: first, the hearer must possess “adequate lexical resources” to understand 
the conventional meanings of the constituent expressions (Borg, 2012, p. 63). Second, it is 
necessary that “attentional resources are not diverted from processing literal meaning” (ibid). 
This ensures that semantic processing unfolds in accordance with the hearer’s underlying 
linguistic competence. In sum, although the semantic module has the function of transforming 
utterances into minimal semantic meanings, its doing so on any given occasion is defeasible. In 
some instances, no minimal semantic meaning is psychologically realised and will not, 
therefore, be consciously accessible. This distinguishes Borg’s minimal semantic meanings from 
those of Cappelen and Lepore (and also from Recanati’s notion of ‘what is said’, as we will see in 
§6). Nevertheless, the counterfactual claim remains: a minimal semantic meaning would have 
been derived under suitable conditions. This is taken as a psychological justification for positing 
minimal semantic meanings.  
Harris (forthcoming) presents a similarly modular analysis of semantic processing. Like Borg, 
he grounds semantics in the operations and representations of an informationally encapsulated 
psychological system. However, Harris allows that the outputs of semantic processing may be 
incomplete, non-truth-evaluable, sub-propositional representations. In particular, he does not 
believe that the denotations of context-sensitive elements of language contribute to semantic 
meanings; instead, semantics merely involves the composition of invariant conventional 
meanings.37 Although the resulting picture shares some features with Contextualist accounts, 
Harris assigns an important psychological role to the minimal semantic meanings he posits. 
Indeed, seen from a certain perspective, his view of semantics is even more minimal than that of 
most Minimalists: it requires not only that semantic meanings be traceable back to conventional 
meanings and composition rules but that they depend solely on these.  
As well as their having reality in individual psychology, minimal semantic meanings have been 
argued to play other roles, including in our interpersonal communicative practices. For 
 
36 This point is, at least prima facie, in tension with the claim that context-sensitive elements in language 
contribute occasion-specific, extra-linguistically determined denotations to minimal semantic meanings. 
Borg (2004, 2012) seeks to resolve any apparent tension by arguing that the denotations of context-
sensitive elements may contribute to semantic meanings without the hearer being able to recognise what 
the denotations are. This response has been challenged, for example by Harris (forthcoming). Since the 
dispute is not directly relevant to my argument, I will not attempt to resolve it here. 





example, as is evident from the earlier quote, Cappelen and Lepore (2005) see them as the 
meanings interlocutors fall back on when they hit obstacles in communicating with one another. 
More recently, Borg has argued that minimal semantic meanings have practical import in 
communicative contexts (such as legal contexts) which require speakers to assume ‘strict 
liability’ for their words (Borg, 2017; Borg & Connolly, forthcoming).  
3.4. Pragmatic Meaning 
Minimalists readily acknowledge the importance of contents like (1a), which result from further 
modulation or enrichment of the minimal semantic meaning. However, they consider these to 
be pragmatic meanings, which concern what speakers do when they use words – the 
communicative effects they aim to bring about.38 Thus, as Borg puts it, “minimalism drives a 
wedge between literal sentence meaning and pragmatic speaker meaning” (Borg, 2012, p. 215). 
She characterises the distinction as follows: 
[S]emantic content is one kind of thing (a repeatable, codifiable, rule-governed kind of 
thing) while speech act content is another kind of thing altogether (a potentially 
unrepeatable, nebulous, context-governed kind of thing) (Borg, 2012, p. 15). 
In particular, Borg (2004, 2012) links pragmatics to non-modular processes of central cognition, 
which can potentially draw on the full range of information available to an interpreter.39 The 
sharp distinction between semantics and pragmatics is complemented by an important 
continuity between different pragmatic processes and meanings. That said, it remains open to 
Minimalists to further differentiate among varieties of pragmatic effects. Indeed, Borg (2017) 
proposes that speakers can be ‘conversationally liable’ for some (asserted) pragmatic contents 
but not others (which are merely implicated). 
3.5. Minimalism and Framing 
A Minimalist approach to explaining framing effects could proceed in two ways: first, the 
alternative frames might be argued to express inequivalent minimal semantic meanings; and 
 
38 The literature is not always clear about whether pragmatic meanings should be thought of as what the 
speaker intended to communicate, what the hearer understood, or both. I will remain neutral on this 
point, although see chapter 7 for further discussion. 
39 Relatedly, Borg maintains that whenever the conventional meaning of a context-sensitive expression 
specifies that the denotation depends on the speaker’s intended referent, the hearer’s ability to recognise 
that referent will be the result of pragmatic interpretation, not semantic processing. The idea is that 
reasoning about others’ mental states paradigmatically involves competences that are not language-
specific but integrate wider information. Cappelen and Lepore (2005), who do not link their Minimalist 
account to a modular cognitive mechanism, are more flexible on this point: they allow that semantic 






this could explain why each sentence gets represented differently.40 Alternatively, the 
Minimalist might argue that alternative frames have equivalent minimal semantic meanings but 
are represented differently due to their being pragmatically enriched in different ways.  
In chapter 3 I will explore a proposal that is consistent with the first approach. I consider there 
whether framing effects could arise from features of the conventional meanings of predicate 
expressions substituted across framing conditions (like ‘be saved’ and ‘die’) – specifically, their 
failure to jointly exhaust the logical space. The discussion in chapter 4 could also be cast in a 
Minimalist light: I discuss there the extent to which framing effects are driven by lower-
bounded representations of number expressions (so that, for example, ‘200’ is represented as 
denoting at least 200). For those who consider number expressions to be semantically lower-
bounded, this effect would be traceable back to conventional meaning.  
In chapters 6-8 I will consider a hypothesis that falls within the second, pragmatic approach. 
This predicts that the use of one or other frame typically results in its minimal semantic 
meaning being pragmatically enriched with ‘reference point information’. In fact, in chapter 8 I 
will argue that the framing data provide some independent support for Minimalism. For now, 
however, I proceed to outline five competing approaches to Minimalism. 
4. Indexicalism 
In one way or another, all non-Minimalists argue that the effects of extra-linguistic features are 
more pervasive and penetrating than Minimalists allow. A popular strategy for trying to show 
this is by appeal to what Cappelen and Lepore (2005) label ‘context shifting arguments’. As 
Hansen and Chemla (2013) point out, context shifting arguments (CSAs) in fact include two 
distinct steps: 
It is helpful to think of a context shifting argument as consisting of two parts: (i) a 
context shifting experiment, which elicits intuitions about uses of an expression e in 
different imagined contexts, and (ii) an argument that the best way to explain the 
intuitions generated in response to the experiment involves semantic features of e. 
(Hansen & Chemla, 2013, p. 287) 
In the first step, then, context shifting experiments aim to show that, when a sentence is 
evaluated for truth against a fixed state of affairs, it may be judged true in some contexts and 
false in others. Take, for example, the following sentence: 
 
40 The explanation would need to be combined with an explanation of why people typically judge the 
frames to be equivalent when both are presented. Presumably, that would involve their being further 
pragmatically enriched in such contexts. My focus in the thesis will be primarily on separate presentation 





(2) John was old when he died. 
Imagine that (2) is used of King John of England, who died at the age of 49 in the year 1216. In 
many contemporary discourse settings, an utterance of (2) would be judged to express 
something false: after all, current life expectancy for English men is around 80 years. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to imagine situations in which an utterance of (2) intuitively states 
something true. For example, imagine that the interlocutors are discussing average male life 
expectancy in the middle ages (which was far below 49 years) and the relative longevity of 
those born into royalty. An utterance of (2) in such a setting might intuitively be judged to 
express something true. Note that, in both scenarios, the age at which John died remains fixed; it 
is only the change in the circumstances in which (2) is uttered that results in the shift in its 
truth-value.  
In the second step of the CSA strategy, non-Minimalists argue that sentences like (2) must fail to 
express constant semantic meanings; and they argue that many sentences are like (2) in this 
respect.41 Moved by the CSA data, a group of theorists whom Borg (2007, 2012) describes as 
‘Indexicalists’ have posited a far larger set of context-sensitive elements in language than 
Minimalists standardly allow. I follow Borg in including under the banner of Indexicalism a 
cluster of overt and covert approaches, which are discussed briefly below. 
Advocates of an overtly Indexicalist stance include Szabo (2001) and Rothschild and Segal 
(2009). They argue for large amounts of hitherto unnoticed indexicality in language, claiming, 
for example, that many ordinary predicate expressions specify a role for extra-linguistic factors 
in fixing their denotations. These expressions include colour terms like ‘red’ and, possibly, 
gradable adjectives like ‘old’. It is held that such expressions function similarly to ‘I’, ‘you’ and 
‘here’, having (sometimes multidimensionally) context-sensitive lexical entries.  
A different, covertly Indexicalist account has been put forward by Stanley and others (King & 
Stanley, 2005; Stanley, 2002, 2005; Stanley & Szabo, 2000). These theorists argue that the 
underlying logical forms of sentences contain covert variables, which call for extra-linguistically 
determined values. Stanley writes: 
On this approach, we may discover that the ‘real’ structure of a natural language 
sentence is in fact quite distinct from its surface grammatical form. Talk of logical form 
in this sense involves attributing hidden complexity to sentences of natural language, 
complexity which is ultimately revealed by empirical inquiry. It is in this sense that I 
 
41 In particular, Travis (2006, 2008) provides a wealth of examples to show how ubiquitously truth-value 





intend the thesis that all context-dependence is traceable to logical form. (Stanley, 2000, 
p. 392) 
Stanley posits a variety of covert variables. Sentence (2), for example, is analysed as having 
something like the following underlying structure: 
(2a) John was old(x) when he died. 
In (2a) the variable ‘x’ is a placeholder for a class of entities against whom John is implicitly 
being compared. Returning to our earlier scenario in which ‘John’ refers to King John of England, 
in many contexts the comparison class will be something like English males alive at the time of 
utterance. The semantic meaning of (2), as uttered in 2020, can then be represented roughly as 
follows:  
(2b) John was old when he died, relative to English males alive in 2020. 
Clearly, (2b) is false. However, we can also imagine discourse situations in which the value of x 
is set to something different, such as English males living in the middle ages. That would generate 
the following (true) representation: 
(2c) John was old when he died, relative to English males living in the middle ages. 
The suggestion, then, is that the hidden comparison class variable can take on different values 
on different occasions, accounting for the way in which truth-value judgements shift across 
utterances of (2).  
Similarly, Stanley has sought to deal with cases of ‘domain restriction’ by arguing for covert 
domain variables. For example, an utterance of ‘Every bottle is in the fridge’ may naturally be 
understood as concerning only a small subset of all the bottles in the universe. To capture that 
fact, Stanley analyses the logical form of the sentence as ‘Every bottle(x) is in the fridge’, where 
‘x’ acts as a placeholder for some contextually relevant set of bottles.42 Elsewhere, Stanley 
appeals to covert location variables in weather reports like ‘It is raining’ to capture the intuition 
that such reports concern particular locations, rather than just any possible location. 
In general, then, the Indexicalist strategy seeks to trace semantic meanings back to constant 
linguistic features at the same time as aligning them with our intuitive judgements about the 
meanings and truth-conditions of utterances. As Stanley and Szabό put it:  
 
42 In fact, the variable Stanley proposes is a more complex function, which can map an object to a 
property (Stanley, 2005; Stanley & Szabo, 2000). However, the technical details of his analysis are not 





[A]ccounting for our ordinary judgments about the truth-conditions of various 
sentences is the central aim of semantics (Stanley & Szabo, 2000, p. 240).  
This motivation is precisely what the Minimalist objects to, preferring instead to tie semantics 
purely to linguistic rules and conventions. Indeed, the Indexicalist’s attempt to do justice to both 
the linguistic data and intuitive truth-value judgements leads to difficulties which I will discuss 
briefly in §6 below. 
4.1. Indexicalism and Framing 
Taking inspiration from Indexicalism, we might be tempted to argue that frames include 
(overtly or covertly) context-sensitive elements, which can acquire distinct values in use; and 
perhaps this causes alternative frames to be semantically inequivalent.43 I will consider – but 
reject – this possibility in chapter 8, when I assess whether the ‘reference point information’ 
conveyed by alternative frames might intrude on truth-conditional semantic meaning.  
5. Conventionalism 
I now move on to consider a cluster of views put forward during the last decade, which I group 
together under the heading of ‘Conventionalism’. Somewhat similarly to Minimalists and 
Indexicalists, Conventionalists consider semantics to be associated with linguistic rules and 
conventions. However, these are understood more expansively, to include properties of 
language use.  
5.1. Ambiguous Conventions 
A prominent account falling under the Conventionalist umbrella is put forward by Lepore and 
Stone (2015) (and is further developed in (Stojnić, Stone, & Lepore, 2017)). The authors identify 
a class of ‘interpretive effects’ that are standardly classified as pragmatic but which, they argue, 
in fact depend on linguistic conventions.44 It is argued, for example, that the English expression 
‘can’ is conventionally used to make requests, as well as to ask about what is possible. So, for 
example, sentence (3) is held to be ambiguous between asking whether John is capable of 
choosing and requesting that John choose. 
(3) Can John choose? 
 
43 Presumably, these can also be set to the same value in certain situations, to capture instances where the 
frames are treated as equivalent. 
44 Lepore and Stone are thinking of conventions here in Lewisian terms, as arbitrarily selected solutions 





Both uses are considered to be determined by the linguistic conventions of English, with extra-
linguistic, pragmatic considerations bearing only on the task of selecting which interpretation is 
appropriate on that occasion (as in standard cases of linguistic ambiguity).  
In contrast with mainstream semantic theory, Lepore and Stone jettison the distinction between 
conventions of meaning and conventions of use. Instead, they lump both together within a broad 
category of conventional linguistic effects. They map this category to what gets onto the 
conversational ‘scoreboard’ or ‘record’, which captures the information that is made publicly 
available to interlocutors during communication. This conventionally-determined information, 
which is held to coincide with what appears on the conversational record, is treated as 
‘semantic’ in their account.  
It seems possible, though, that Lepore and Stone wish to retain a distinction between truth-
conditional and non-truth-conditional conventional semantic effects. They write:  
Semantics, on our view, can be taken to include all the linguistic information that we use 
to recover the content that speakers contribute to a conversation through their 
utterances. We have argued that many different kinds of conventional linguistic 
information are recruited in the interpretation of an utterance in addition to its 
grammatical structure and the conventional specification of its truth-conditional 
content. (Lepore & Stone, 2015, p. 265) 
Depending how closely any distinction between truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional 
effects tracks the distinction between conventions of meaning and conventions of use, the 
resulting view may turn out to carve up the terrain in substantively the same way as other 
approaches (the difference being purely terminological). Nevertheless, the way 
Conventionalists expand the concept of semantics at least reveals an important difference in 
emphasis: the suggestion is that the important joint to be carved lies between conventional and 
non-conventional effects, not between conventional meanings and other effects on 
interpretation. 
5.2. Biases 
Another example of Conventionalism is Predelli’s theory of ‘bias’ (Predelli, 2013). Predelli 
argues that many expressions have conventional ‘biases’ in addition to their conventional 
meanings (or ‘characters’). These biases constrain the situations in which the expressions may 





The conventional meanings of some expressions, so I suggested, exceed their characters, 
and impose restrictions on the class of context of use which are independent of the 
peculiarities of this or that type of use. (Predelli, 2013, p. 78) 
To take one of his examples, the expression ‘hurray’ can only be felicitously used in situations 
where (roughly speaking) the speaker has a favourable attitude towards the state of affairs 
being described. Conversely, ‘alas’ can only be used where the agent has an unfavourable 
attitude.45 According to Predelli, then, sentence (4) requires that the speaker be happy that John 
survived; sentence (5) on the other hand, requires that the speaker regret that fact.   
(4) Hurray, John survived. 
(5) Alas, John survived. 
The biases Predelli posits are not taken to affect the truth-conditions of an uttered sentence. 
Instead, sentences like (4) and (5) are held to share a single set of truth-conditions.46  
Nevertheless, their distinct (indeed, opposing) biases result in their having different use-
conditions, and this is taken to be part of their semantics.  
5.3. Conventionalism and Framing 
The Conventionalist might seek to explain framing effects semantically, by appealing to distinct 
conventions applying to alternative frames.47 In chapter 7 I will open up the possibility that 
alternative frames are conventionally used in different ways. However, in chapter 8 I will argue 
that, even if they are, this should not be thought of as affecting their semantics. Instead, the 
framing data are more parsimoniously explained by holding apart meaning conventions (which 
contribute to semantics) from use properties (which affect what can be pragmatically 
conveyed). 
 
45 In fact, the biases of ‘alas’ and ‘hurray’ are held to exhaust their meaning entirely; such expressions are 
therefore ‘purely biased’ (Predelli, 2013, p. 67). Note that, in this example, the relevant use-conditions 
concern the speaker’s attitude. However, in principle, biases could invoke various other conditions. 
46 In this respect, biases are similar to how some have conceptualised presuppositions, which will be 
discussed in relation to framing in chapter 8. Predelli argues that biases survive in syntactic 
environments where presuppositions are blocked, including under attitude operators (Predelli, 2013, p. 
75). However, it is worth noting that the logical tests for presupposition are disputed, and their behaviour 
under attitude operators is particularly controversial (Beaver & Geurts, 2014, §5). Thus, some theorists, 
like Potts, argue that presuppositions are ‘plugged’ by attitude predicates (Potts, 2015). Others argue that 
presuppositions can project from such contexts (Geurts, 1998). Therefore, it may ultimately be difficult to 
hold biases and presuppositions apart, although I will not pursue the point here. 
47 Presumably, though, there would need to be other conventions that allow the frames to be interpreted 






A challenge for Indexicalists is to demonstrate that the effects they seek to capture semantically 
are genuinely traceable back to language itself, rather than arising purely from contextual 
factors. Stanley attempts to meet this challenge by appealing to formal semantic data. He argues 
that hidden variables must be posited in order to generate certain bound readings of the 
constructions he considers, and he generalises from these to unbound cases. However, this 
‘binding principle’ has been widely criticised (Borg, 2012; Cappelen & Lepore, 2002; Collins, 
2007; Hall, 2008; Neale, 2007b; Recanati, 2004; Rothschild & Segal, 2009). A similar obstacle 
looks set to face Lepore and Stone’s Conventionalist position, insofar as they claim that anything 
affecting the ‘conversational scoreboard’ can be traced back to linguistic conventions.  
The difficulties involved in tying intuitive judgements about truth and meaning directly to 
constant features of language have led many to take a different approach to context shifting 
arguments. In this section, I will focus on Contextualism. Contextualists allow that the meanings 
tracked by our intuitive truth-value judgements may be ‘freely’ affected by extra-linguistic 
factors. Free effects cannot be traced back to conventional meanings or compositional rules, 
arising instead from wider features of the context.  
Moderate forms of Contextualism accept the coherence of positing minimal semantic meanings, 
at least sometimes. For example, Recanati (2010) takes his ‘Truth Conditional Pragmatics’ (TCP) 
to be compatible with a form of Minimalism he dubs ‘S*-Minimalism’: 
S*-Minimalism is still compatible with TCP; for the level of meaning it posits, which 
satisfies the minimalist constraint by definition, need not be the same level of meaning 
as that which concerns TCP, namely the intuitive truth-conditions of the utterance (what 
is saidint); hence there need be no contradiction between TCP's nonminimalist 
characterization of what is saidint and S*-Minimalism (Recanati, 2010, p. 13).48  
Nevertheless, Moderate Contextualists deny that minimal semantic meanings are of any 
theoretical value in their own right, and argue that they are often entirely irrelevant. In 
particular, minimal semantic meanings are held to play no privileged role in the individual 
psychologies of speakers and hearers, not being the product of any discrete mental system. 
Related to this, Contextualists have argued that modulation and enrichment can take place in 
between the retrieval of conventional meanings and the composition process (Recanati, 2010). 
It is argued that those processes happen alongside the saturation of any context-sensitive 
 
48 Carston (2009) similarly allows that sentences may express minimal semantic meanings. However, she 





elements. Thus, pragmatic processes are allowed to permeate what Minimalists standardly take 
to be semantic processes. 
Like Minimalists and Indexicalists, most Contextualists reserve the descriptor ‘semantic’ for the 
processing of purely linguistic information, with all subsequent modulation and enrichment 
being treated as pragmatic.49 However, they hold that semantic processing will typically 
generate only the ‘blueprint’ for a theoretically relevant meaning (Neale, 2007a). Thus, even 
though we can sensibly talk about sentences having minimal semantic meanings, these will 
typically play no role in our theorizing. Instead, Moderate Contextualists argue that the 
meanings of primary importance are the ones which speakers and hearers actually have in mind 
during communication. These ‘psychologically real’ meanings, which are reflected in our 
intuitive truth-value judgements, will typically depend on free pragmatic effects (although, on 
the odd occasion where no modulation or enrichment is required, they will coincide with 
minimal semantic meanings; however, this will be merely incidental – the exception rather than 
the rule).  
The pragmatically enriched meanings posited by Contextualists have been conceptualised in 
various ways. In the next two sub-sections I will discuss Relevance Theory’s ‘explicatures’ 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1995) and Recanati’s notion of ‘what is said’ (Recanati, 2004, 2010). Both 
approaches classify a further set of meanings as pragmatic implicatures (thus Borg (2004) 
describes Contextualism as a form of ‘dual pragmatics’, positing two separate iterations of 
pragmatic effects). The question of precisely how to keep implicatures distinct from what is 
‘said’ or ‘explicated’ will also briefly be considered.  
6.1. Explicatures 
Relevance Theory (RT) offers a psychological account of communication, according to which a 
modular process of linguistic decoding is distinguished from a pragmatic process of 
interpretation. Linguistic decoding is thought to generate an expression’s ‘logical form’ (LF), 
which includes the conventional meanings of its constituent expressions.50 Crucially, Relevance 
Theorists claim that pragmatic processing operates on logical form in accordance with a 
 
49 The status of the composition process is rather unclear – is this supposed to be a semantic process that 
is interleaved with pragmatic ones, or is it seen as part of pragmatic processing? Although this is an 
interesting question, it lies beyond the scope of the current discussion.  
50 There is ongoing debate about the precise nature of these conventional meanings, including how 
information-rich they are. Carston proposes that they are extremely ‘thin’ (Carston, 2012, 2013, 2019). 
This represents a departure from the classic Fodorian conception of meanings as atomic concepts (Fodor, 






principle of cognitive efficiency, known as the (communicative) principle of relevance.51 This 
principle states: 
Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal 
relevance. (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 158) 
‘Relevance’ here is a technical term. To get a grasp on it we need to define two more basic 
notions. The first is the notion of an ‘assumption’, which can be thought of roughly as a belief: in 
Sperber and Wilson’s words, assumptions are “thoughts treated by the individual as 
representations of the actual world (as opposed to fictions, desires, or representations of 
representations)” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 2). Second, ‘contextual effects’ are additions or 
changes to an individual’s set of assumptions. With these concepts on the table, relevance is 
defined by the following ‘extent conditions’: 
Extent condition 1: an assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that its contextual 
effects in this context are large.  
Extent condition 2: an assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that the effort 
required to process it in this context is small. 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 125) 
In less technical terms, an utterance’s relevance depends (directly) on its impact on the hearer’s 
beliefs and (inversely) on the effort she must expend in its interpretation.  
The ‘presumption of optimal relevance’ that every utterance communicates is then defined by 
the following conditions (where intending to make an assumption manifest to someone can be 
thought of, roughly, as intending that they come to believe its content): 
(a) The set of assumptions I which the communicator intends to make manifest to the 
addressee is relevant enough to make it worth the addressee’s while to process the 
ostensive stimulus. 
(b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one the communicator could have used 
to communicate I.  
(Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 158) 
In other words, RT claims that utterances should be treated as though whatever the speaker 
intended to communicate is sufficiently informative to be worth the hearer’s cognitive effort to 
 
51 According to the separate cognitive principle of relevance, human cognition tends, in general, to be 





derive it. And, moreover, hearers can expect speakers to have packaged the information in such 
a way as to minimize the work required to retrieve it. This gives us a picture of relevance-based 
pragmatic processing as delivering the most readily available interpretation of an utterance that 
is compatible with its being informative enough to warrant the effort. We can think of hearers, 
then, as cycling through various possible interpretations of an utterance, beginning with those 
which are the most readily accessible and stopping as soon as they reach one that delivers 
cognitive effects worthy of the energy expended up to that point.  
Relevance Theorists argue that both explicatures and implicatures are generated by relevance-
based processing. Explicatures are conceptualised as ‘developments’ of the logical forms of 
uttered sentences, modulating and enriching these in accordance with the principle of 
relevance.52 Implicatures, on the other hand, are relatively unconstrained by logical forms; what 
is important is just that they can be inferred from the explicature, together with other 
background premises. To show how this is supposed to work, consider again the exchange 
considered earlier: 
A. There’s a lot of hype surrounding the match this afternoon. 
B. They won’t survive. 
Given the scenario described above, in which A and B have been discussing the unseeded 
doubles team, A will derive Kris and Marta as the optimally relevant denotation of ‘they’ in B’s 
utterance. Similarly, A will derive the optimally relevant meaning of ‘survive’, as something like 
progress through the tournament. Given that A was talking about that afternoon’s match, the 
relevance principle will also result in the logical form being enriched with an unarticulated 
constituent, specifying that the pair won’t progress through to the next round. Thus, A derives 
the explicature in (1a), reproduced below.  
(1a) Kris and Marta won’t progress through to the next round of the tournament. 
Given an additional background assumption, along the lines that supporters are disappointed 
when their team is knocked out, (1a) justifies the implicature that the supporters of the unseeded 
players will be disappointed.  
In Relevance Theory, both explicatures and implicatures are derived in parallel, with mutual 
adjustment between the two (Carston, 2002, pp. 142-152). In one direction, explicatures act as 
premises for implicatures. In the opposite direction, any implicature a hearer immediately hits 
 
52 Bach (1994) identifies a similar class of meanings as ‘implicitures’ (note the third ‘i’: implic-i-tures, not 
implic-a-tures). These incorporate extra-linguistic effects aimed at delivering, first, complete propositions 






on will require an explicature to be posited as a supporting premise. Thus, explicatures and 
implicatures are held to be importantly intertwined. 
Although Relevance Theory allows both explicatures and implicatures to be affected by all kinds 
of extra-linguistic factors, operating freely of linguistic requirements, the two kinds of meaning 
are held apart by various criteria. As mentioned, explicatures are closely related to logical 
forms, being ‘developments’ or ‘expansions’ of these, whereas implicatures are not (Sperber & 
Wilson, 1995, p. 182). Explicatures have also traditionally been understood to survive certain 
logical embeddings that are supposed to block implicatures, including in the antecedents of 
conditionals. The associated diagnostic tool is known as the ‘scope test’ (Carston, 1998; 2002, 
pp. 191-194; Recanati, 1989). More recently, Hall (2008) and Carston and Hall (2012) have 
argued for a ‘locality constraint’ on explicatures, whereby modulation and enrichment must 
operate on sub-propositional constituents. In contrast, implicatures are held to be derived on 
the basis of complete propositional meanings. Carston (1998) also proposes a functional 
difference between explicatures and implicatures: whereas explicatures can act as premises 
from which implicatures are inferred, the reverse is not true – explicatures cannot be entailed 
by implicatures (Carston, 1988; 2002, pp. 189-190). The effectiveness of each of these tests has 
been disputed. For example, Borg (2016, 2017) argues that none of them manages to isolate the 
category of meaning that Relevance Theorists want to capture. She proposes instead that 
explicatures are pragmatic meanings for which speakers are held conversationally liable. 
Although I will not take a view on this debate, I will deploy each of the proposed tests in chapter 
8 in considering whether the information conveyed by a frame could be classified as an 
explicature.  
6.2. What is Said 
Another prominent Contextualist account is that of Recanati (2010). According to his ‘Truth-
Conditional Pragmatics’ (TCP), the truth-value judgements that underlie context shifting 
arguments are tracking what is ‘said’ by an utterance. He argues that what is ‘said’ is derived via 
‘primary’ pragmatic processes, whereas implicatures are derived via ‘secondary’ pragmatic 
processes. Primary pragmatic processes are held to take place at a sub-personal, unconscious 
level. Crucially, they include the free effects of modulation and enrichment, in addition to the 
mandatory ‘saturation’ of context-specific elements in language. As Recanati puts it:  
[Truth-Conditional Pragmatics] says that truth-conditional content may be affected not 
only by saturation (as when an indexical is assigned a contextual value) but also by free 





According to Recanati’s ‘availability principle’, “what is said must be consciously available to the 
interpreter” (Recanati, 2004, p. 17). This prevents minimal semantic meanings from counting as 
what is ‘said’, except on the odd occasion where nothing more than mandatory saturation is 
required to retrieve what the speaker intuitively ‘said’; in all other instances, hearers only have 
conscious access to some richer representation. 
According to Truth Conditional Pragmatics, secondary pragmatic processes operate on what is 
‘said’. These processes are conceptualised as being consciously accessible and more richly 
inferential than primary processes.53 Thus, although Recanati has appealed to some of the same 
criteria as Relevance Theory, discussed above, he ultimately grounds the distinction between 
what is ‘said’ and implicated in a difference of psychological processing. His view has also 
attracted criticism, though, from those who doubt whether it can ground a distinction between 
what is ‘said’ and what is implicated (Borg, 2016, 2017; Carston, 2002, pp. 166-170).  
6.3. Radical Contextualism 
Radical Contextualists make an in-principle objection to Minimalism: they claim that sentences 
themselves fail to express complete, truth-evaluable propositions.54 Instead, it is argued, extra-
linguistic factors always play a substantial and pervasive role. Thus, Travis writes:  
The new view might be called the speaking‐sensitive view of words, or 
language…[Words’] fixed, language‐contributed semantics must, in general, be 
supplemented if they are to be properly assessable as to truth; that is, if they are to 
count either as true or as false. Nor is such supplementation provided automatically by 
some fixed stock of ‘indexical features’. (Travis, 2008, p. 70)  
In chapter 5 I will explore this view in detail and argue against the Radical Contextualist’s in-
principle rejection of minimal semantic meanings. I will conclude there that the more pertinent 
objection to Minimalism is the one made by Moderate Contextualists, that minimal semantic 
meanings are theoretically otiose. In chapter 8, however, I will argue against that claim too, on 
the basis that minimal semantic meanings are necessary for explaining framing puzzles.  
 
53 Carston (2009) interprets Recanati as claiming that reasoning about speaker intentions never comes 
into primary pragmatic processing, only secondary pragmatic processing. I think this interpretation must 
be mistaken, though, since Recanati takes even mandatory saturation to involve appeal to speaker 
intentions. For example, he writes: “the semantic value of context-sensitive expressions cannot be 
determined without appealing to fully-fledged pragmatic factors (e.g. speaker’s intentions)” (Recanati, 
2010, p. 2). 
54 Both Carston and Recanati appear to endorse this more radical stance in some of their writings: see for 





6.4. Contextualism and Framing 
From a Contextualist perspective, it might be proposed that alternative frames generate distinct 
explicatures (or, in Recanati’s terminology, ‘say’ different things). In chapter 8 I will consider – 
and reject – this possibility. I will argue there that the distinction we need is one that separates 
a frame’s minimal truth-conditional semantic meaning from the additional information it 
pragmatically implicates.  
7. Semantic Relativism 
Semantic Relativism (or, simply, ‘Relativism’) takes a different approach to context shifting 
arguments: rather than positing enriched meanings, it expands the set of parameters relative to 
which those meanings are evaluated for truth or falsity. This kind of approach has been 
advocated by Lasersohn (2005), Predelli (2005), and MacFarlane (2009, 2014). While 
Relativists recognise a set of meaning entities similar to minimal semantic meanings, they deny 
that these have constant truth-conditions. To clarify the idea, I will first outline the standard 
view in formal semantics to which relativists are reacting.   
Following Kaplan, formal semanticists have tended to conceptualise propositions as functions 
from a set of contextual parameters to a set of truth-conditional contents.55 Truth-conditional 
contents, in turn, are understood as functions from possible worlds (or, perhaps, world-time 
pairs) to truth-values (i.e. TRUE, FALSE, and perhaps some third value). The set of parameters 
relative to which propositions are evaluated for truth are known as ‘circumstances of 
evaluation’ (Kaplan, 1989).  
Relativists have sought to expand the circumstances of evaluation to include various non-
standard parameters, which are freely brought into play by extra-linguistic, occasion-specific 
features. For example, consider again the following sentence, used of King John of England: 
(2) John was old when he died. 
The Relativist might analyse the proposition expressed by (2) as a function from circumstances 
of evaluation that include a comparison class parameter. If the value of this parameter is set to 
English males alive in 2020, (2) is mappable to FALSE. However, if the value is set to English 
males alive in the middle ages, (2) is mappable to TRUE. This is despite the fact that (2) itself is 
thought to have a constant meaning. According to the most extreme versions of Relativism, 
truth-conditions can be relativized to individual assessors, or point of assessment, not merely to 
 
55 As we have seen, the set of contextual parameters is conceptualised in different ways under different 
theories: for Minimalists and Indexicalists they include only what is required to saturate context-sensitive 





certain non-standard parameters determined by the utterance context (Lasersohn, 2005; 
MacFarlane, 2014).  
7.1. Relativism and Framing 
Adopting a Relativist approach, it might be argued that the truth-conditions of alternative 
frames can differ, even while they share the same propositional meaning. In chapter 8 I will 
consider – and reject – this view. I will argue that, ultimately, it turns out to be either 
implausible or unparsimonious to appeal to such a parameter in explaining framing effects. 
8. Occasion-Sensitivity  
Both Contextualists and Relativists standardly assume that it is possible to represent a ‘sharp’ 
or ‘precise’ truth-conditional content, which captures what is intuitively expressed by a 
speaker’s utterance. Their opponents have sought to problematise this claim, pointing out that 
there is no principled way to establish how precise the representation ought to be. Instead, we 
could go on sharpening it indefinitely, in order to address ever more inventive context shifting 
arguments (Borg, 2012, pp. 35-38). Consider an utterance of (6): 
(6) Mitch opened a book and began to read out loud. 
In most contexts, (6) is intuitively true just if Mitch began to read out loud from the book he 
opened. Thus, the Contextualist may identify the following enriched content as the explicature of 
(6) (or what is ‘said’): 
(6a) Mitch opened a book and began to read out loud from it. 
However, now imagine that what Mitch actually did was select one word from each page and 
articulate it (perhaps starting with the final letter and proceeding backwards to the first letter, 
so that ‘about’ would be pronounced ‘t-u-o-b-a’). The sharpened formulation in (6a) may be 
judged true or false of this state of affairs, depending on the context. In many contexts, (6a) 
would be judged false, given that Mitch’s behaviour is not what we would normally think of as 
reading. In some contexts, though, it might be judged true – say, if it is a response to the 
question ‘What caused the disruption in the library today?’. This points to a need to further 
sharpen the content in order to capture exactly what Mitch did. It is unclear, though, how the 
Contextualist can ever terminate the sharpening process, in order to specify once and for all the 
communicated content. 
This kind of worry is avoided by the more radical position of Occasion-sensitivity advocated by 
Travis (2000, 2006, 2008). According to Occasion-sensitivity, extra-linguistic factors play an 





represent what is said linguistically (or in any other representational format). Instead, 
meanings are always constituted in part by the wider situation. Specifically, Travis understands 
them to be essentially related to what speakers are trying to do. The theory thus draws heavily 
on the Wittgensteinian conception of meaning as use. Travis endorses the following claim, which 
he ascribes to Wittgenstein:  
Content is inseparable from point. What is communicated in our words lies, inseparably, 
in what we would expect of them. How our words represent things is a matter of, and 
not detachable from, their (recognizable) import for our lives (Travis, 2006, p. 33, 
emphasis in original). 
In this way, he rejects altogether the standard conception of utterances, as casting propositional 
‘shadows’ that could be represented in language – or, at least, in thought (Travis, 2000).  
Ultimately, the question of whether it is possible to accurately represent the communicated 
meaning of an uttered sentence is one which falls outside the scope of the thesis (as will be 
discussed again towards the end of chapter 5). I will therefore end up focusing, in chapter 8, on 
a less radical claim that is shared between Contextualism and Occasion-Sensitivity – namely 
that meanings with theoretical import will generally be context-dependent (whether or not they 
could, in principle, be captured representationally). 
9. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to survey the spectrum of philosophical approaches to 
contextual variations in meaning. I will now begin to apply these approaches to the case study of 
framing. I begin in the next chapter by considering whether framing effects can be traced back 









In this chapter, I examine a deflationary approach to framing effects, which attempts to resolve 
framing puzzles by dissolving them. The hypothesis is that alternative frames provoke distinct 
representations in hearers because of their basic semantic inequivalence, traceable back to the 
conventional meanings of their constituent expressions. I observe that the supposedly 
contradictory predicate expressions substituted across pairs of framing conditions in the classic 
‘Asian Disease Problem’ – ‘be saved’ and ‘die’ – are not jointly exhaustive. I report on two new 
experiments that investigate whether this fact could be driving the framing effect. The results 
suggest that the framing effect remains robust even with jointly exhaustive predicate 
expressions. Moreover, framing effects have been shown to arise in various other studies that 
use genuinely contradictory predicate expressions. I conclude by rejecting the deflationary 
hypothesis.  
1. Introduction 
In chapter 1, I introduced a classic risky-choice framing paradigm known as the ‘Asian Disease 
Problem’ (ADP), which was first presented in (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). This is reproduced 
below: 
Imagine the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is 
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been 
proposed. Assume the exact scientific estimates of the consequences are as follows: 
Framing condition 1: 
 If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved 
and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved. 
Framing condition 2: 
 If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. 
If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will die and a two-





I will now examine more closely the properties of the sentences used in the two framing 
conditions. These are supposed to comprise two pairs of alternative frames, which describe the 
same prospects. I reorganise the four sentences below, to pair up (1) with (2), and (3) with (4):  
(1) If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
(2) If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. 
(3) If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved and a 
two-thirds probability that no people will be saved. 
(4) If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will die and a two-
thirds probability that 600 people will die. 
The equivalence of the alternative frames depends on two factors working in tandem: first, the 
meanings of the predicate expressions ‘be saved’ and ‘die’ are supposed to be contradictory, 
denoting sets that are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. Second, the number expressions 
in corresponding clauses are supposed to be complementary, denoting numbers that sum to 
600.56 Together, these factors are supposed to ensure that the meanings expressed by the 
alternative frames are logically equivalent to each other. In other words, they are supposed to 
share a single set of truth-conditions, such that (1) will be true just in case (2) is; and (3) will be 
true just in case (4) is. 
In this chapter, I will challenge the assumption that the predicate expressions have 
contradictory conventional meanings. Specifically, ‘be saved’ and ‘die’ denote sets of entities 
that are not jointly exhaustive.57 In the next chapter, I will challenge the assumption that the 
number expressions are complementary. For now, though, I will simply assume that they are.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows: in §2, I briefly survey various respects in which the 
alternative frames in the ADP fail to be logically equivalent. In §3 I focus on the fact that ‘be 
saved’ and ‘die’ are not jointly exhaustive, and I explain how this fact could potentially be 
driving the classic framing effect. In §4 I discuss existing experimental findings, which offer 
some prima facie support for such a deflationary hypothesis. However, in §§5-6 I present new 
data that suggests the hypothesis is false. In §7, I provide examples of frames that are not 
 
56 So, for example, with respect to (1) and (2) 200 + 400 = 600. Meanwhile, in the first clauses of (3) and 
(4), 600 + 0 = 600; and in the second clauses, 0 + 600 = 600. 
57 This deflationary challenge is incompatible with Occasion-sensitivity and radical forms of 
Contextualism and Relativism, which deny that expressions can conventionally denote sets of entities at 
all. I will confront that issue in chapter 5. The hypothesis discussed in the current chapter remains 





subject to the deflationary challenge. Finally, in §8, I argue that framing effects cannot be 
analysed as ‘Frege puzzles’.  
2. Clearing the Way 
Before getting to the heart of the deflationary challenge, I will briefly discuss a series of related 
concerns about the frames used in the ADP. It is fairly clear that, out of context, the meanings of 
(1) and (2) are not logically equivalent.58 First, the number expressions can only be considered 
complementary once the domain is restricted to the 600 people who are expected to be killed 
by the disease. This is not guaranteed by the frames themselves, taken out of context. It is 
possible, then, that when these sentences are presented, hearers represent the domain as being 
larger or smaller than 600. Indeed, Okder (2012) proposes that some participants fail to think of 
‘200’ and ‘400’ in (1) and (2) as subsets of the 600 people referred to in the vignette. Although 
this is an interesting hypothesis, I will not consider it further here.59 I will assume instead that 
(1) and (2) are straightforwardly elliptical, with the vignette supplying the additional 
information shown in italics below: 
(1a) If Program A is adopted, 200 people out of 600 expected to be killed by the outbreak of an 
unusual Asian disease will be saved. 
(2a) If Program C is adopted, 400 people out of 600 expected to be killed by the outbreak of an 
unusual Asian disease will die. 
I assume, then, that the predicate expression ‘be saved’ denotes a subset of the 600 people 
expected to be killed by the disease – namely those who are saved. And I assume that ‘die’ 
denotes the subset who die.  
A further issue, though, is that the two subsets are not mutually exclusive. After all, given that all 
people die eventually, anyone who is saved is also someone who dies. In other words, the set of 
individuals who are saved is a subset of those who die. This prevents the conventional meanings 
of ‘be saved’ and ‘die’ from being straightforwardly contradictory. That said, I take it to be 
sufficiently clear from the vignette that what is meant is expressible as in (1b) and (2b):  
(1b) If Program A is adopted, 200 people out of 600 expected to be killed by the outbreak of an 
unusual Asian disease will be saved from the disease. 
 
58 Similar points apply to (3) and (4). However, I will focus on (1) and (2) since they are linguistically 
simpler. 
59 I believe there are methodological and interpretational problems with Okder’s experiments. Moreover, 
the hypothesis is inapplicable to the studies I discuss in §7 below. Therefore, even if it helps explain the 





(2b) If Program C is adopted, 400 people out of 600 expected to be killed by the outbreak of an 
unusual Asian disease will die from the disease. 
I will proceed as though the experimenters had presented their participants with the linguistic 
stimuli in (1b) and (2b). However, I will now suggest that even these more specific formulations 
remain logically inequivalent. 
3. The Deflationary Hypothesis 
The observation I want to pursue is that the sets denoted by ‘be saved’ and ‘die’ need not jointly 
exhaust the domain. Specifically, some of the 600 people expected to be killed by the disease 
could end up staying alive without being saved by the relevant program. That might be, for 
example, because they do not contract the disease in the first place, or because they 
unexpectedly recover from it, without the assistance of the proposed intervention. In any 
possible world that contains such individuals, (1b) and (2b) will have different truth-values: 
(1b) would express something true (since it is consistent with 200 people being saved that 
some or all of the remaining 400 stay alive), whereas (2b) would express something false (since 
it is inconsistent with 400 people dying that any of these 400 stay alive). This shows that the 
truth-conditions of the two sentences must diverge: they must have different intensions on 
account of having different extensions in some possible worlds. In sum, since more people could 
live under Program A than Program C, the sure option in the ‘be saved’ condition is strictly 
better than the sure option in the ‘die’ condition.60  
The same reasoning applies to the risky options in (3) and (4).61 Specifically, the second 
complements of those options, in the final clauses of the sentences, are inequivalent. Under (3), 
there is a two-thirds probability that none of the 600 people will be saved; however, it remains 
possible that some (or all) may nevertheless stay alive, for the reasons set out above. Under the 
second complement of (4), however, this is impossible, since there is a two-thirds probability 
that all 600 will die. This means that (the second complement of) the risky option in the ‘be 
saved’ condition is strictly better than that in the ‘die’ condition. In sum, both the sure and risky 
options in the ‘be saved’ condition are strictly better than their counterparts in the ‘die’ 
condition.  
 
60 A similar point is made by Berkeley and Humphreys (1982). However, they focus on the possibility that 
more than 200 end up being saved, rather than the possibility that some of the remaining 400 might live 
without needing to be saved. Their critique is therefore more closely allied to the proposal I discuss in the 
next chapter. 
61 Note that I am assuming ‘no people’ in the ‘be saved’ condition to be straightforwardly co-extensional 





Note that the wider discourse context does not obviously secure the joint exhaustivity of ‘be 
saved’ and ‘die’. No doubt it was the experimenters’ intention to constrain the problem in this 
way. However, it does not follow from the vignette that people will certainly die if they are not 
saved; otherwise the following argument should hold: 
Premise 1: A disease is expected to kill 600 people. 
Premise 2: Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. 
Conclusion: Any of the 600 people who are not saved by one of the two programs will 
die. 
On the contrary, this argument is clearly invalid. It fails on two separate counts: first, given that 
expectations need not be met, it is not possible to conclude from the first premise that any 
number of people will die in the absence of intervention. There is nothing in the vignette which 
instructs participants to treat the expected death toll as a certainty.62  
Relatedly, the second premise does not require that the two alternative programs are the only 
possible factors affecting patterns of survival. Instead, other deliberate interventions, or 
accidental events, could change the expected death toll.  
This basic semantic asymmetry between the conditions of the ADP opens up the possibility that 
the apparent framing effect is being driven purely by the fact that more lives might be saved in 
the ‘be saved’ condition than in the ‘die’ condition. The wider literature provides some grounds 
for predicting this. First, a meta-analysis of risky choice framing effects, conducted by 
Kühberger et al. (1999), finds that risk aversion is positively correlated with the size of the 
payoff, especially in the gain domain. In other words, as the number of lives to be saved 
increases, people tend to become more risk-averse. 
Perhaps, then, the standard pattern of responses to the ADP might be glossed as follows: 
regardless of framing condition, participants represent the options as potential gains (relative 
to 600 people being killed by the disease). However, the potential gain is larger in the ‘be saved’ 
condition than in the ‘die’ condition, since more people could stay alive. Due to the potential gain 
being larger in the ‘be saved’ condition, participants are more risk-averse in that condition, 
explaining their greater preference for the sure option. Conversely, in the ‘die’ condition, where 
 
62 Bohm and Lind (1992) make a similar point. They test a manipulation of the ADP which recasts the 
options in terms of expectations, in line with the vignette, rather than certainties (as in the original 
conditions of the ADP). For example, the sure option in the ‘be saved’ frame is rephrased as follows: ‘If 
Program A is adopted, it is expected that 20 people will be saved.’ (Note that the experimenters relocated 
the ADP scenario from the US to Sweden and reduced the number of lives by a factor of ten, to reflect the 






the potential gain is smaller, they are less risk-averse, and tend to shift towards the risky option. 
This hypothesis could potentially explain the standard pattern of ‘shifty’ responses to the ADP. 
It therefore serves as a competitor to the prospect theoretic account, which assumes that 
outcomes are represented as gains in the ‘be saved’ condition and losses in the ‘die’ condition. 
Rather than the shift in preferences being a genuine framing effect, it could be explained purely 
in terms of the magnitude of the potential gain. 
An alternative hypothesis that makes the same prediction is that recipients of the ADP tend to 
focus on the sure option rather than the risky one, as Kühberger and Gradl (2013) suggest. 
These researchers replicate earlier findings that framing affects how participants rate the 
attractiveness of the sure option but not the risky option. In a series of further experiments, 
they present evidence that framing effects are driven mainly by the contrast between the sure 
options in each condition.63 Since, as I have argued, the sure option in the ‘be saved’ condition 
outperforms the sure option in the ‘die’ condition, this could explain why it is evaluated more 
positively in the ‘be saved’ condition than in the ‘die’ condition.  
It is also worth noting that there is now a categorical difference between the outcomes afforded 
by each framing condition: in the ‘be saved’ condition, both the sure and risky options are 
strictly consistent with all 600 people staying alive. In contrast, in the ‘die’ condition, only the 
risky option is consistent with that outcome. Thus, if participants were motivated to leave this 
possibility open, they would be forced to select the risky option in the loss condition. That could 
be another reason to expect that the sure option will be more popular in the ‘be saved’ condition 
than in the ‘die’ condition.  
Each of these three hypotheses might explain the standard pattern of responses generated by 
the ADP, without making any appeal to the (positive or negative) valence of the wording in each 
framing condition. In this sense they would dissolve the framing effect. That is not to say that 
there would be no interesting behaviour left to explain, of course, since we would still need to 
build the effects of payoff size and so on into our model of decision-making.64 The point is just 
that the explanation would not appeal to wording choices, which characterise framing effects.  
 
63 This effect may be exacerbated by the sure option typically being presented before the risky option. In 
other words, there could be a primacy effect, whereby participants focus on whichever option is 
presented first. However, there is mixed evidence for a primacy effect: while Kühberger & Gradl find an 
order effect in their second experiment, their third experiment suggests that this is not the main driver of 
the framing effect.  
64 It would also be necessary to explain why frames tend to be represented as equivalent when both are 






Interestingly, this particular challenge does not appear to have been explored in the framing 
literature. Instead, a plethora of studies following in the wake of Tversky and Kahneman’s 
continue to contrast ‘be saved’ with ‘die’: these include, for example, (Chick, Reyna, & Corbin, 
2016; Frisch, 1993; Jou, Shanteau, & Harris, 1996; Kühberger, 1995; Mandel, 2001, 2014; Van 
Schie & Van Der Pligt, 1995). This leaves a large portion of the framing literature potentially 
vulnerable to the deflationary challenge. It is therefore important to establish whether that 
challenge could succeed. The first step is to test whether the ‘shifty’ responses to the ADP really 
do depend on the semantic asymmetry between the two framing conditions. If they do, the 
framing effect ought to be eliminable by using predicate expressions with genuinely 
contradictory conventional meanings. 
4. Negation 
Perhaps the most obvious way of ensuring that pairs of predicate expressions have jointly 
exhaustive denotations would be to use straightforward negation: for example, ‘be saved’ could 
be contrasted with ‘not be saved’; or ‘die’ with ‘not die’. Mandel (2001) manages to eliminate 
framing effects using exactly this strategy. 
Mandel tests various re-wordings of the ADP options, four of which are relevant to the current 
discussion. The first presents the options purely in terms of the numbers of people who will ‘be 
saved’. The second describes the numbers who will ‘not be saved’. The third presents the 
options in terms of the numbers of people who will ‘not die’. The fourth describes the numbers 
who will ‘die’. The re-worded conditions are set out below: 
(1) If Plan A is adopted, it is certain that 200 people will be saved. 
If Plan B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that all 600 people will be saved. 
(2) If Plan A is adopted, it is certain that 400 people will not be saved. 
If Plan B is adopted, there is a two-thirds probability that all 600 people will not be 
saved. 
(3) If Plan A is adopted, it is certain that 200 people will not die. 
If Plan B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that all 600 people will not die. 
(4) If Plan A is adopted, it is certain that 400 people will die. 
If Plan B is adopted, there is a two-thirds probability that all 600 people will die. 
There are two important points to note about Mandel’s reformulations: first, each includes only 





This is an unavoidable consequence of limiting the linguistic construction to be either 
affirmative or negative, rather than being a mixture of each. Second, Mandel adds the phrase ‘it 
is certain that’ into each sure option. This is intended to discourage participants from thinking 
that the actual numbers being saved or dying could be different from those specified.  
Crucially, Mandel finds no significant differences between participants’ responses in conditions 
(1)-(4). In other words, framing effects were eliminated by straightforwardly negating the 
predicate expressions. The data are therefore consistent with the deflationary hypothesis: the 
apparent framing effect may depend on the asymmetry in the classic ADP between conditions 
that contrast ‘be saved’ with ‘die’.  
There are, however, several obstacles to treating Mandel’s data as supporting the deflationary 
hypothesis. First, his inclusion of the phrase ‘it is certain that’ in the sure options introduces a 
new confound; perhaps this is what eliminates the framing effect (for example by reducing the 
possibility that more people could be saved – I will discuss this possibility in detail in chapter 4). 
Second, the curtailment of the risky options could also be doing some work, by failing to 
constrain the alternative outcomes. Third, negated constructions are morphologically more 
complex, and therefore potentially harder to process, than affirmative ones. This may prevent 
Mandel’s conditions (2) and (3) from being directly comparable to (1) and (4). In sum, it is 
difficult to provide a robust explanation of why framing effects were eliminated in this 
experiment.65  
It is also notable that Mandel found no evidence of a framing effect arising from the use of ‘be 
saved’ (in conditions (1) and (2)) as opposed to ‘die’ (in conditions (3) and (4)). This looks like a 
troubling result for the proponent of the deflationary strategy, since the original effect is 
hypothesised to depend on those terms failing to be jointly exhaustive.  
Clearly, Mandel’s data cannot be straightforwardly marshalled in support of the deflationary 
challenge. A better way to test the hypothesis directly would be to replace the pair of predicates 
used in the classic ADP with ones that are more plausibly contradictory. In order to plug a gap in 
the framing literature, this strategy is pursued in two new experiments, the details of which are 
reported below. The experiments were conducted in collaboration with Nat Hansen and 
Kathryn B. Francis. Since the findings have not been published elsewhere, I will provide a full 
description of the experimental method and results in the next two sections.66 Before getting 
 
65 This is not a criticism of Mandel’s study, since he conducted it with different objectives in mind: 
specifically, he was interested in establishing the extent to which framing effects depend on the use of 
affirmative or negated constructions, as opposed to positively- or negatively-valenced predicate 
expressions. 






into the details, it is worth emphasising the philosophical motivation of the research upfront. 
The experiments are designed to investigate whether a basic semantic asymmetry between the 
framing conditions, resulting in a potentially important logical distinction, can explain why 
people respond differently under each condition.  
5. Experiment 1 
In the first experiment, which acted as a pilot study, two additional conditions were tested 
alongside the two classic conditions of the ADP. The new conditions used the expressions ‘live’ 
and ‘survive’ in place of ‘be saved’. When contrasted with ‘die’, these expressions more plausibly 
denote exhaustive sets.67 The reformulated options are thus designed to bring the two 
conditions of the ADP closer to equivalence. For example, if only 200 out of 600 people will live, 
or survive, this now implies that the remaining 400 will certainly die. To the extent that the 
framing effect depends on the semantic mismatch between ‘be saved’ and ‘die’, this 
manipulation ought to undermine it. Therefore, the hypothesis to be tested is that the standard 
cross-condition shift in preferred option will be attenuated or eliminated where the first 
framing condition uses ‘live’ or ‘survive’ in place of ‘be saved’. 
5.1. Method 
5.1.1. Participants  
An a priori power analysis indicated that a total of 273 participants would be required in order 
to detect a medium to large framing effect (of Cramer’s V = 0.2).68 To account for screening 
processes, an additional 10-15% were recruited. As such, a total of 305 participants were 
recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk and paid $0.40 for their participation. However, 63 
responses (comprising 21% of the data) were screened out for one or more of the following 
reasons: 
• Participants said they had encountered the ADP before (35 responses). 
• They failed the screener question (14 responses).69 
 
67 This is perhaps less clear with ‘survive’ than with ‘live’, since it is possible that some people never 
contract the disease in the first place, and therefore can’t be said to ‘survive’ it. I return to this point later. 
68 In line with Cohen (1988, p. 222), when df=3, effect sizes are interpreted as follows: an effect of 
Cramer’s V=0.06 counts as small; an effect of Cramer’s V=0.17 counts as medium; and an effect of 
Cramer’s V=0.29 counts as large. We expected the ADP to generate a relatively large overall framing 
effect, based on the meta-analysis by Kühberger (1998). However, we expected the effects to be a little 
smaller for the pairwise comparisons between the individual conditions. Since there were no clear 
precedents for this in the literature, we decided in the first instance to target a medium-large effect size of 
Cramer’s V=0.2.  
69 After completing the main task, all participants received the following screener question, which 





• They said they did not have English as a first language (7 responses). 
• They did not complete the survey (4 responses: 2 dropped out prior to consent; 2 
afterwards). 
• They completed the survey too fast (1 response, which was completed in 17 seconds).70 
• They were responding from a VPS, non-US, or unknown IP type and their responses to 
the open-ended question was irrelevant or nonsensical, or the responses were probable 
duplicates (10 further responses) – see Appendix A for further details of this screening 
procedure. 
This left 242 participants.71 The numbers in each experimental condition were as follows: 
• ‘be saved’ condition: 55 participants. 
• ‘survive’ condition: 62 participants. 
• ‘live’ condition: 62 participants. 
• ‘die’ condition: 63 participants. 
The final dataset therefore ended up being slightly under-powered, due to more responses 
needing to be screened out than expected. 
5.1.2. Design 
There were four between-subjects framing conditions (‘be saved’, ‘survive’, ‘live’, and ‘die’) and 
an independent variable of option (sure vs. risky). 
5.1.3. Procedure and materials.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four framing conditions, in roughly equal 
proportions. The only variation from the original problem was the addition of two new versions 
of the first condition, using ‘survive’ or ‘live’ instead of ‘be saved’, as follows: 
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will (survive) (live). 
 
Now imagine you are considering two jobs.   
If you take job A, you will be paid $9 per hour. 
If you take job B, you will be paid $15 per hour. 
Which job pays more per hour? [Job A/ Job B] 
70 The minimum response time for this experiment was set at 20 seconds, based on a reading speed of 
250-300 words per minute. This figure was derived from Human Interaction Speeds published at the 
following link (accessed in October 2017): https://www.brainkart.com/article/Human-Interaction-
Speeds_9017/. 





If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will (survive) 
(live), and a two-thirds probability that no people will (survive) (live). 
The experiment was run online, using Qualtrics/ Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants were 
required to complete each question before they could advance. They could not go back to 
review or change answers on previous pages. 
5.1.4. Analysis 
Statistical analyses were performed in SPSS. A Chi-square test was performed in order to 
examine the overall relationship between framing condition and option selection. Cramer’s V 
was also calculated to establish the size of this effect. Adjusted residuals were calculated for 
each option in each condition, in order to see what was driving the overall association. Six 
pairwise comparisons were run, using two-way Chi-square tests with Bonferroni corrections, to 
establish which conditions were significantly different from one another. Odds ratios were 
calculated manually to compare the sizes of the differences. 
It was hypothesised that there would be a significant overall association between framing 
condition and option, driven mainly by the classic ADP framing conditions. It was further 
hypothesised that the framing effect would be larger with respect to the classic (‘be saved’) 
version of the first framing condition relative to the new (‘survive’/ ‘live’) versions, such that 
there would be a greater tendency to select the sure option in the classic version than in these 
other two versions. 
5.2. Results 






A Chi-square test was performed to determine whether there was an association between 
framing condition and option (sure vs. risky). The analysis revealed a significant association 
(χ2=28.59), p<.005, df=3). The effect was large (Cramer’s V=.34).  
















Be Saved Count 46 9 
Expected Count 36.6 18.4 
Adjusted Residual 3.1* -3.1* 
Survive Count 48 14 
Expected Count 41.2 20.8 
Adjusted Residual 2.1* -2.1* 
Live Count 41 21 
Expected Count 41.2 20.8 
Adjusted Residual -.1 .1 
Die Count 26 37 
Expected Count 41.9 21.1 
Adjusted Residual -4.9* 4.9* 
Total 161 81 
*indicates counts that are significantly different from expected counts (z>1.96). 
In order to assess which conditions were driving the overall association between framing 
condition and option, ‘adjusted residuals’ were calculated. These tell us whether the proportion 
of participants choosing each option in each framing condition differed significantly from the 
‘expected’ proportion. Expected proportions are, in turn, generated by assuming that each 
condition follows the overall distribution (in which 66.5% of respondents favoured the sure 
option, and 33.5% favoured the risky option).  
As shown in the table above, the adjusted residuals were significant in three conditions: the ‘be 
saved’, ‘survive’, and ‘die’ conditions. In the ‘be saved’ and ‘survive’ conditions, significantly 
more people than expected chose the sure option (z=3.1 in the ‘be saved’ condition; z=2.1 in the 
‘survive’ condition). By the same token, significantly fewer people than expected chose the risky 
option in those conditions. In the ‘die’ condition, significantly more people than expected chose 
the risky option (z=4.9), with significantly fewer than expected choosing the sure option. In the 
‘live’ condition the differences were not significant (z<1.96). In summary, the association 
between framing condition and option was mainly driven by three of the four conditions: the ‘be 
saved’, ‘survive’, and ‘die’ conditions. 
Follow-up analysis was performed to directly compare pairs of conditions. Six pairwise 
comparisons were conducted using two-way Chi-square tests with Bonferroni corrections. The 





Comparison χ2 Cramer’s V p-value 
‘Be saved’ vs ‘die’ 22.16 .43 <.008 
‘Survive’ vs ‘die’ 16.91 .37 <.008 
‘Live’ vs ‘die’ 7.76 .25 <.008 
‘Be saved’ vs ‘Live’ 4.69 .20 .04 
‘Be saved’ vs ‘Survive’ .71 .08 .49 
‘Survive’ vs ‘Live’ 1.95 .13 .23 
 
The first three pairwise comparisons were significant at the Bonferroni-adjusted level of 
p=.008. This suggests that, in each version of the first framing condition (using ‘be saved’, 
‘survive’ and ‘live’), the pattern of responses differed significantly from those observed in the 
second condition (using ‘die’). In other words, framing effects were observed regardless of 
which version of the first framing condition was used. However, the size of the framing effects 
differed between the three versions. This is shown by the odds ratios in the first three rows of 
the table below. The largest effect was observed for the classic (‘be saved’) gain condition, 
followed by the ‘survive’ condition and then the ‘live’ condition. 
Comparison Odds ratio (i.e. how much higher were the odds of participants 
choosing the sure option)  
‘Be saved’ vs ‘die’ 7.3 
‘Survive’ vs ‘die’ 4.9 
‘Live’ vs ‘die’ 2.8 
‘Be saved’ vs ‘Live’ 2.6 
‘Be saved’ vs ‘Survive’ 1.5 
‘Survive’ vs ‘Live’ 1.8 
 
The remaining three pairwise comparisons, among the ‘be saved’, ‘survive’, and ‘live’ conditions 
themselves, showed no significant differences at the Bonferroni-adjusted level. However, the 
odds of participants choosing the sure option were highest in the ‘be saved’ condition, followed 
by the ‘survive’ condition, then the ‘live’ condition, as shown in the last three rows of the table 
above. Most notably, participants were more than twice as likely to choose the sure option in 
the ‘be saved’ condition than in the ‘live’ condition. These results provide some evidence that 
the framing effect is attenuated – although not entirely eliminated – when ‘be saved’ is replaced 
with ‘live’ or (to a lesser extent) with ‘survive’. 
5.3. Discussion 
The experiment found an overall framing effect: in the ‘die’ condition, preferences shifted 
towards the risky option, as compared with the other three conditions. However, the effect was 
smaller with respect to the new versions of the first framing condition, which used ‘survive’ and 





framing effect. As such, the results offer some preliminary support for the deflationary 
hypothesis, according to which framing effects are driven by the fact that ‘be saved’ and ‘die’ fail 
to jointly exhaust the logical space.  
There is also some evidence to suggest that the framing effect is attenuated to a greater extent 
under the ‘live’ condition than under the ‘survive’ condition. This can also be explained 
consistently with the deflationary hypothesis. Describing people as ‘surviving’ suggests that 
they do, in fact, contract the disease; there is something they need to ‘survive’ rather than their 
simply continuing to stay alive. Therefore, even if only 200 ‘survive’, some of the remaining 400 
people might be thought to stay alive, if they never contract the disease in the first place – if 
there is nothing they have to ‘survive’. In contrast, if only 200 of the 600 people ‘live’ then it is 
impossible for any of the remaining 400 to stay alive. 
In summary, the results of the first experiment provide some preliminary evidence that the ADP 
framing effect arises, at least partly, due to the inexhaustive conventional meanings of ‘be saved’ 
and ‘die’. However, the data in this experiment did not show significant differences in direct 
comparisons between the ‘be saved’ condition and the ‘survive’ and ‘live’ conditions. This may 
have been due to the relatively large number of pairwise comparisons performed, which 
required the level of significance to be reduced to p=.008. Therefore, a second experiment was 
run, which removed the intermediate ‘survive’ condition and retained the other three 
conditions (resulting in the number of pairwise comparisons being reduced from six to three). 
The purpose of this experiment was to establish whether there was a genuine difference 
between the ‘be saved’ and ‘live’ conditions. 
6. Experiment 2 
6.1. Method 
6.1.1. Participants 
An a priori power analysis indicated that a total sample size of 241 would be required to detect 
a medium sized framing effect (of Cramer’s V = 0.2).72 To account for screening processes, an 
additional 25-30% were recruited. As such, 308 participants were recruited through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk and paid $0.40 for their participation. However, 112 responses (comprising 
36% of the data) were screened out for one or more of the following reasons: 
 
72 In line with Cohen (1988, p. 222), when df=2, effect sizes are interpreted as follows: an effect of 
Cramer’s V=0.07 counts as small; an effect of Cramer’s V=0.21 counts as medium; and an effect of 
Cramer’s V=0.35 counts as large. Based on the pilot study, we were targeting a medium effect size of 





• Participants said they had encountered the ADP before (69 responses). 
• They failed the screener question (31 responses).73 
• They said they did not have English as a first language (2 responses). 
• They were responding from a VPS, non-US, or unknown IP type and their responses to 
the open-ended question were irrelevant or nonsensical (30 further responses) – see 
Appendix A for further details of the screening procedure. 
This left 196 participants.74 The numbers in each experimental condition were as follows: 
• ‘be saved’ condition: 60 participants. 
• ‘live’ condition: 70 participants. 
• ‘die’ condition: 66 participants. 
Again, then, the final dataset ended up being slightly under-powered, due to more responses 
needing to be screened out than expected. 
6.1.2. Design 
There were three between-subjects framing conditions (‘be saved’, ‘live’, and ‘die’) and an 
independent variable of option (sure vs risky). 
6.1.3. Procedure and materials 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three framing conditions, in roughly equal 
proportions. The only variation from the original ADP was the addition of a version of the first 
condition which used ‘live’ instead of ‘be saved’ in the options, as follows: 
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will live. 
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will live, and a 
two-thirds probability that no people will live. 
The experiment was run online, using Qualtrics/ Amazon Mechanical Turk. Again, participants 
had to complete each question before they could advance, and they could not go back to review 
or change answers on previous pages. 
 
73 After completing the main task all participants were asked the same screener question as in the 
previous experiment. 






As before, statistical analyses were performed in SPSS. A Chi-square test was performed to 
examine the overall relationship between framing condition and option selection. Cramer’s V 
was calculated to establish the size of this effect. Adjusted residuals were calculated for each 
option in each condition, in order to see what was driving the overall association. Three 
pairwise comparisons were run, using two-way Chi-square tests with Bonferroni corrections, to 
establish which conditions were significantly different from one another. Odds ratios were 
calculated manually to compare the sizes of the differences. 
It was hypothesised that there would be a significant overall association between framing 
condition and option, driven mainly by the classic ADP framing conditions. It was further 
hypothesised that the framing effect would be larger with respect to the classic (‘be saved’) 
version of the first framing condition than the new (‘live’) version, such that there would be a 
greater tendency to select the ‘sure’ option in the classic version than in the new version. 
6.2. Results 
The results are summarised in the chart below: 
 
The Chi-square test was performed to determine whether there was an association between 
framing condition and (sure vs. risky) option. The analysis revealed a significant association 
(χ2=12.94, p<.005, df=2). The effect was medium-sized (Cramer’s V=.26). 




















Be Saved Count 42 18 
Expected Count 39.8 20.2 
Adjusted Residual .7 -.7 
Live Count 55* 15* 
Expected Count 46.4 23.6 
Adjusted Residual 2.7 -2.7 
Die Count 33* 33* 
Expected Count 43.8 22.2 
Adjusted Residual -3.4 3.4 
Total 130 66 
*indicates counts that are significantly different from expected counts (z>1.96). 
As in the previous experiment, adjusted residuals were calculated to assess which conditions 
were driving the overall effect.75 As shown in the table above, the adjusted residuals were 
significant in the ‘live’ and ‘die’ conditions. In the ‘live’ condition, significantly more people than 
expected chose the sure option (z=2.7). By the same token, significantly fewer people than 
expected chose the risky option (z=-2.7).  In the ‘die’ condition, significantly more people than 
expected chose the risky option (z=3.4), with significantly fewer than expected choosing the 
sure option. In the ‘be saved’ condition the differences were not significant (z<1.96). In 
summary, in the second experiment the association between framing condition and option was 
mainly driven by the ‘live’ and ‘die’ conditions. This finding conflicts with that of the first 
experiment, and with the deflationary hypothesis. 
As before, pairwise comparisons were conducted using two-way Chi-square tests with 
Bonferroni corrections. The results are shown in the table below: 
Comparison χ2 Cramer’s V p-value 
‘Be saved’ vs ‘die’ 5.22 .20 .03 
‘Live’ vs ‘die’ 12.14 .30 <.017 (.001) 
‘Be saved’ vs ‘Live’ 1.25 .10 .31 
 
Only the second pairwise comparison was significant at the Bonferroni-adjusted level of p=.017. 
In other words, in the ‘live’ condition the pattern of responses differed significantly from that in 
the ‘die’ condition (i.e. a framing effect was observed) whereas there was no evidence of a 
framing effect between the ‘be saved’ and ‘die’ conditions. This was a slightly surprising result, 
 
75 Again, these tell us whether the proportion of participants choosing each option in each framing 
condition differed significantly from the ‘expected’ proportion, where these ‘expected’ proportions are 
generated by assuming that each condition follows the overall distribution (in which 66.3% of 





since the classic ADP framing effect was not replicated (although the trend was in the expected 
direction).   
6.3. Discussion 
As in the first experiment, a framing effect was observed: in the ‘die’ condition, preferences 
shifted towards the risky option as compared with the other two conditions. However, in the 
second experiment, this effect was driven mainly by the ‘live’ and ‘die’ conditions, not the ‘be 
saved’ condition. Therefore, the results of the second experiment were contrary to the 
deflationary hypothesis, which predicts that the framing effect should be eliminated (or 
attenuated) by replacing ‘be saved’ with ‘live’. Accordingly, that hypothesis is not supported by 
the new data presented here. I conclude that it is unlikely that the ADP framing effect depends 
on ‘be saved’ and ‘die’ failing to conventionally denote jointly exhaustive sets.  
To round up the discussion of the two experiments, there is little evidence that the framing 
effect produced by the ADP can be explained away in a deflationary manner, merely by appeal 
to a logical asymmetry between the framing conditions, resulting from the predicates ‘be saved’ 
and ‘die’ failing to be contradictory. In the remainder of this chapter, I broaden my scope to 
consider how other framing paradigms escape the deflationary challenge. 
7. Exhaustive Alternatives 
Compounding the lack of direct support for a deflationary account of the ADP framing effect, 
other framing studies have used pairs of predicate expressions that are more plausibly 
contradictory. I switch my focus here from risky-choice framing (given that the ADP casts its 
shadow over so much of that literature) to attribute framing (which also has the benefit of being 
rather a more straightforward paradigm). In this section, I present a couple of examples of 
attribute framing studies that use genuinely contradictory predicate expressions. 
First, in a study by Wilson et al. (1987) participants are presented with a hypothetical scenario 
in which they are offered a risky surgery to treat terminal liver disease. In the event that the 
surgery does not prove fatal, it will extend life expectancy from one year to five years. In one 
framing condition, the outcome of the surgery is described in terms of the probability of 
‘surviving’ the operation (at various probability levels of 10%, 20%, 40%, 60% and 80%). In the 
other framing condition, the outcome is described in terms of the probability of ‘dying’ during 
the operation (at the complementary levels of 90%, 80%, 60%, 40% and 20%). Participants are 
then asked whether or not they would opt for surgery. 
In line with the standard ‘valence-consistent’ shift, the researchers find that participants in the 





those in the negatively-worded (‘dying’) conditions. This is despite the fact that ‘surviving’ and 
‘dying’ here plausibly denote sets that are mutually exclusive (since one cannot both survive an 
operation and die during it) and jointly exhaustive (one either survives or dies, with no third 
possibility). In this example, the framing effect cannot depend on inexhaustive alternatives. 
In a more recent study (briefly discussed in chapter 1), Leong et al. (2017) ask participants to 
imagine that they are recruiting players for a college basketball team. In one framing condition a 
player is described in terms of the proportion of shots he ‘made’ last season (at probability 
levels of 40% or 60%). In another, the player is described in terms of the proportion of shots he 
‘missed’ (at the complementary levels of 60% or 40%).  
Again, in line with the standard attribute framing effect, participants in the positively-worded 
(‘made’) condition rated the player as more valuable to their basketball team than those in the 
negatively-worded (‘missed’) frame. Here again, ‘made’ and missed’ seem genuinely 
contradictory, being mutually exclusive (since shots that are made are not missed, and vice-
versa) and jointly exhaustive (shots are either made or missed, with no third possibility). 
Accordingly, the sentences do not suffer from the kind of semantic asymmetry that afflicts the 
ADP.     
These examples (and several others like them, some of which will be discussed at later points in 
the thesis) show that the deflationary challenge is not applicable to all experiments in which 
framing effects are observed. Crucially, then, even if we could dissolve the particular puzzle of 
the ADP framing effect (notwithstanding the evidence presented in the previous two sections), 
we cannot dissolve the general puzzle of framing effects. Wider empirical research points to the 
presence of a substantive phenomenon that remains in need of explanation. In subsequent 
chapters I will consider what the explanation might be. For now, though, I want to consider a 
potential objection to the argument I have presented. 
8. Conventional Meaning and Representation 
One might worry that, even where alternative frames use predicates with genuinely 
contradictory conventional meanings, hearers may still fail to represent them as such. Instead, 
the representations they form might be compatible with the denoted sets overlapping (thus 
failing to be mutually exclusive) or omitting some entities in the domain (thus failing to be 
jointly exhaustive). The idea here is reminiscent of classic ‘Frege puzzles’ in which, for example, 
the meaning of ‘Hesperus’ may be represented in a way that would be compatible with its 
having a different denotation from ‘Phosphorus’, even though both expressions actually denote 





8.1. Fregean Sense and Reference 
Frege (1948) famously argued for a distinction between two components of the meaning of a 
linguistic expression: its sense (‘Sinn’) and its reference, or extension (‘Bedeutung’). He was led 
to do so by considering pairs of identity statements, which are extensionally identical but 
appear to have different epistemic implications. For example, although a true statement of ‘a=b’ 
has the same truth conditions as ‘a=a’, ‘a=b’ seems capable of being informative in the way that 
‘a=a’ is not. Moreover, this difference appears to have truth-conditional implications when co-
extensional expressions are substituted for one another in certain syntactic environments.  For 
example, at a certain point in history, many astronomers would not have assented to the claim, 
‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, despite the fact that they would (presumably) have assented to the 
claim, ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’. Intuitively, then, (5), below, expresses something true of these 
astronomers, while (6) expresses something false of them.  
(5) The astronomers believed that Hesperus was Hesperus.  
(6) The astronomers believed that Hesperus was Phosphorus. 
However, both sentences identify one and the same entity with itself, since ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorus’ share a single extension (unbeknownst to the astronomers). It seems, then, that 
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ must contribute something other than their extensions to the 
truth-conditional meanings of sentences like (5) and (6). Frege was moved to posit ‘senses’ to 
play that role. Precisely what Fregean senses are supposed to be is a question that has occupied 
philosophers of language throughout the last century. In the next section, I will appeal to some 
of their proposals in arguing that the notion of sense will not help explain framing effects. 
First, though, it is important to note a disparity between framing puzzles and Frege puzzles: 
pairs of expressions like ‘survive’ and ‘die’, or ‘made’ and ‘missed’, do not have identical 
denotations. In this respect, they are unlike ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’. Rather, their 
denotations are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. Nevertheless, the expressions might 
still be thought to have Fregean senses, which mediate – and potentially obscure – the 
relationship between their denotations. Therefore, the disparity does not prevent us from 
hypothesising that what is being observed in the psychology lab is a kind of Frege-puzzle. 
Although this is an initially intriguing idea, I will argue that it cannot be the case: whether or not 
such expressions have Fregean senses, such senses would remain irrelevant to the 





8.2. Why Framing Puzzles are not Frege Puzzles 
Recall, first, that pairs of predicate expressions like ‘survive’ and ‘die’, or ‘made’ and ‘missed’ do 
not just happen to denote mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive sets in the actual world but 
in all possible worlds. This shows that the sense-reference distinction can be of no use if it is 
thought of as a distinction between extensions and intensions. That approach might resolve 
some Frege-type cases (although probably not the ‘Hesperus’/ ‘Phosphorus’ case). For example, 
although ‘Boris Johnson’ and ‘The UK prime minister’ do, in fact, share an extension at the time 
of writing, there are possible worlds in which the current UK prime minister is someone else. In 
contrast, ‘Boris Johnson’ refers to the same individual in all of these possible worlds. Therefore, 
there are some possible worlds in which the identity does not hold, meaning that ‘Boris 
Johnson’ and ‘The UK prime minister’ differ in their intensions. In contrast, there are no worlds 
in which someone might both survive and die, or neither survive nor die (nor in which a shot 
might be both made and missed, or neither made nor missed). Therefore, these expressions 
have contradictory intensions as well as contradictory extensions. Appealing to Fregean sense 
would be futile, then, if sense were thought of merely as an expression’s intension.  
Moreover, the contradictory intensions of predicate expressions like ‘survive’ and ‘die’, or 
‘made’ and ‘missed’, depend on real-world properties that are mutually exclusive and jointly 
exhaustive. Therefore, it will not help to appeal to hyperintensions either. By way of contrast, 
consider the pair of predicate expressions, ‘cordate’ and ‘renate’, building on the discussion of 
Quine (1951). Although these are applicable to exactly the same entities in the actual world 
(and perhaps also in all possible worlds, if having a heart and having kidneys are necessary 
concomitants), the predicates concern distinct properties: namely, having a heart vs. having 
kidneys. In other words, the expressions depend in a fine-grained way on different real-world 
properties. In contrast, pairs of expressions like ‘survive’ and ‘die’, or ‘made’ and ‘missed’, have 
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive denotations in virtue of real-world properties that are 
themselves mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. Therefore, appealing to Fregean senses 
will not help if the sense of an expression is thought of as its hyperintension.76 
Evans cashes out the notion of sense by appealing to Frege’s ‘Intuitive Criterion of Difference’, 
which he characterises as follows: 
[T]he thought associated with one sentence, S as its sense must be different from the 
thought associated with another sentence S’ as its sense, if it is possible for someone to 
 
76 For similar reasons, we can set aside Dummett’s (1978, 1981) conception of sense, which takes 
differences in sense to be manifested in differences in the procedures for establishing real-world 
extensions. Whether we are talking in terms of ‘surviving’ or ‘dying’, ‘making’ or ‘missing’, the procedures 





understand both sentences at a given time while coherently taking different attitudes 
towards them, i.e. accepting (rejecting) one while rejecting (accepting), or being 
agnostic about, the other. (Evans, 1982, pp. 18-19, emphasis in original) 
This criterion doesn’t apply to frames either. Importantly, framing effects do not trade on a 
mere lack of knowledge on the part of hearers. It would clearly be unreasonable to expect 
people to represent the meanings of ‘survive’ and ‘die’, or ‘made’ and ‘missed’ as contradictory if 
they did not know them to be so (just as it seems unreasonable to expect people to represent 
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’, or ‘cordate’ and ‘renate’ as co-extensional if they do not know they 
are). However, I submit that ordinary speakers of English do know that ‘survive’ and ‘die’, or 
‘made’ and ‘missed’ have contradictory meanings. Framing cases are therefore quite unlike 
Frege cases where, for example, the astronomers simply don’t know that ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorus’ denote the same entity.77 Arguably, understanding the meanings of ‘survive’ and 
‘die’, or ‘made’ and ‘missed’ requires understanding them to be contradictory. Therefore, if 
distinct senses are posited in accordance with the intuitive criterion of difference, such that 
competent speakers can fail to know the relation between the two expressions’ denotations, 
they will be irrelevant to framing cases.78 
Incidentally, it is worth noting that hearers of frames are not expected to be logically 
omniscient. They are not required to draw a logical inference from, for example, the fact that a 
subset of individuals will die, to the fact that the remainder will survive. Rather, it should be 
sufficient that they represent one or other of those subsets. Since, in fact, the subsets are 
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive (and this is required by the conventional meanings of 
the predicates), the issue of which subset is represented cannot make a difference to one’s 
subsequent judgements. In effect, the point is not that x% of people surviving entails 100-x% 
dying; the point is that this is one and the same thing.  
The preceding discussion suggests that, when hearers form distinct representations in response 
to alternative frames, these representations cannot be traced back purely to the conventional 
meanings of the frames (which generate logically equivalent representations) but depend on 
wider factors. This is an idea I pick up in the second half of the thesis.79 
 
77 Bermúdez (2018) similarly points out that framing cases do not depend on mere ignorance. I will 
consider his positive proposal below. 
78 Relatedly, we can set aside the conception of sense endorsed by Taschek (1992). Taschek understands 
senses as potentials for reorganising a thinker’s beliefs about entities. However, since the thinkers in 
question already know that expressions like ‘survive’ and ‘die’, or ‘made’ and ‘missed’ have contradictory 
conventional meanings, there is no reason to posit senses that obscure those facts. 
79 The idea may be compatible with pragmatic interpretations of Fregean sense. For example, 
Bezuidenhout (1997) thinks of senses as context-dependent modes of presentation rather than as 





In sum, although, by assumption, alternative frames are represented differently, I do not believe 
the relevant representational differences can be traced back to the conventional meanings of 
predicate expressions that are substituted across framing conditions – regardless of whether we 
focus on sense or reference. There is every reason to think that hearers represent these 
expressions as having genuinely contradictory conventional meanings. Before concluding, 
though, I want to briefly consider a proposal currently being developed by Bermúdez. 
8.3. Ultraintensionality 
Bermúdez (2009, 2018) suggests that, even when alternative frames are known to describe the 
same outcome, hearers can sometimes be rational to respond to them differently. He proposes 
that the scenarios used in framing studies (and, more broadly, in valuation tasks) establish 
‘ultraintensional contexts’. These are related to intensional and hyperintensional contexts in the 
following way: 
The defining feature of an intensional context is that it allows for (truth- and/ or 
rationality-preserving) failure of substitution of materially equivalent sentences. By 
extension, a hyperintensional context allows for (truth- and/ or rationality-preserving) 
failure of substitution of logically equivalent sentences… An ultraintensional context is a 
context that allows for (truth- and/ or rationality-preserving) failure of substitution of 
known identities. (Bermúdez, 2018, p. 184) 
The idea, then, is that alternative frames, in spite of their being known to describe the same 
state of affairs, can make different features of a situation more readily available to reasoners; 
and this licenses systematically different responses. Bermúdez writes: 
In sum, there is a range of frame-sensitive factors that are rationally relevant to how an 
agent values outcomes. One might reasonably expect them to emerge more clearly on 
some frames than on others. In particular, it seems perfectly reasonable to think that 
they might rationally attach to an outcome when it is framed one way, but not when it is 
framed another way – even when the agent is aware that the two frames correspond to a 
single outcome. If all that is true, then valuation is an ultraintensional context. 
(Bermúdez, 2018, p. 202) 
 
effects can be traced back to the conventional meanings of predicate expressions substituted across 
framing conditions (and thus deflated or dissolved). Therefore, I have not yet addressed pragmatic 





Bermúdez does not say much about exactly what it is that makes certain factors ‘frame-
sensitive’, i.e. why frames should induce different representations of a situation.80 This is the 
question with which I am primarily concerned in the thesis. I believe that the explanations I will 
explore in forthcoming chapters can circumvent the appeal to ultraintensional contexts 
altogether. I therefore suggest that this may prove to be the better path to follow. 
9. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have considered – and rejected – one attempt to dissolve the puzzle of framing 
effects. The deflationary challenge I have addressed appeals to the semantic inequivalence of 
alternative frames used in the classic ‘Asian Disease Problem’, which results from the 
conventional meanings of the substituted predicates (‘be saved’ and ‘die’) failing to have jointly 
exhaustive denotations. I have shown that this is unlikely to explain the framing effect 
associated with the ADP, and that the deflationary challenge does not extend to other framing 
paradigms. In the next chapter, I shift my focus to consider whether the number expressions 
used in alternative frames are genuinely complementary. 
  
 
80 In personal communication, he confirms that this issue will be covered in more detail in his 








In this chapter, I focus on the interpretation of number expressions that appear in alternative 
frames. Specifically, I investigate whether framing effects could result from these expressions 
being assigned lower-bounded (‘at least’) readings. Based on my analysis of recent experimental 
data, both from the framing literature and wider psycholinguistic research, I argue that this 
could well be a contributory factor (although it seems unlikely to explain framing effects in their 
entirety). In parallel, I argue that there is relatively limited support for a competing account of 
framing effects, based on ‘fuzzy trace theory’. I end by discussing whether lower-boundedness 
should be thought of as a semantic or a pragmatic phenomenon, and what that implies for a 
rationalising explanation of framing effects. 
1. Introduction 
Equivalency frames standardly include number expressions. Consider again the ‘Asian Disease 
Problem’ (ADP), reproduced below: 
Imagine the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is 
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been 
proposed. Assume the exact scientific estimates of the consequences are as follows: 
Framing condition 1: 
 If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved 
and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved. 
Framing condition 2: 
 If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. 
If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will die and a two-
thirds probability that 600 people will die. 
As in the previous chapter, I reorganise the four sentences that appear in the framing 
conditions, to pair up (1) with (2), and (3) with (4): 
(1) If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 





(3) If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved and a 
two-thirds probability that no people will be saved. 
(4) If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will die and a two-
thirds probability that 600 people will die. 
Each of these sentences includes one or more number expressions, used to denote subsets of 
the 600 people expected to be killed by the disease. 81 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
logical equivalence of each pair of frames – (1) and (2), (3) and (4) – depends on the number 
expressions in the corresponding clauses having complementary meanings. So, for example, the 
quantities denoted by ‘200’ in (1) and ‘400’ in (2) are supposed to sum to 600 (the number of 
people expected to be killed by the disease).  
In this chapter, I will challenge the complementarity assumption. I will argue that framing 
effects depend, at least in part, on number expressions being interpreted lower-boundedly: for 
example, ‘200’ would be represented as denoting at least 200, and ‘400’ as at least 400.82 The 
structure of the chapter is as follows: in §2 I introduce the notion of a ‘scalar expression’. In §3 I 
describe the assumption, standardly made in the framing literature, that the number 
expressions in alternative frames have ‘bilateral’ (‘exactly’) meanings. In §4 I discuss 
experiments that suggest the framing effects in the ADP depend on lower-bounded (‘at least’) 
interpretations of number expressions. In §5 I discuss some counterevidence, and a competing 
account of framing effects based on ‘fuzzy trace theory’. In §6 I argue that a modest version of 
the lower-bounding hypothesis is better supported than the fuzzy trace account. In §7, I 
describe a spectrum of approaches to the semantics and pragmatics of number expressions, and 
indicate how each could support a rationalising explanation of framing effects.  
2. Scalar Expressions 
Number expressions are a species of ‘scalar’ expression. Scalar expressions (or ‘scalars’) can be 
thought of as denoting points or regions along a linear ordering (or ‘scale’). Numbers form one 
such scale, points along which are denoted by number expressions.  Later in the chapter, I will 
be concerned with other kinds of scalar expression too, specifically the existential quantifier, 
‘some’, and the universal quantifier, ‘all’.  
Scalars have received attention from many philosophers and linguists, prominently Horn 
(1989). It is well-established that these expressions can generate different interpretations in 
 
81 Frames (3) and (4) also include number expressions in the probabilities. I will largely ignore these, 
aside from a brief discussion in §5. 
82 My focus in the chapter will be mainly on quantifier uses of number expressions. However, I will briefly 





different contexts, denoting regions on a scale that are lower-bounded, upper-bounded, or 
bounded on both sides. Take, for example, an utterance of sentence (5) below: 
(5) With these 12 letters it is possible to make 600 words. 
Imagine that the speaker continues by uttering (5a): 
(5a) Anyone who identifies 200 words can go through to the next round.     
In (5a), ‘200’ is most naturally read lower-boundedly, as denoting at least 200. After all, 
someone who identified 300 words could presumably go through to the next round too 
(whereas someone who identified 100 could not).  
In other possible continuations, such as (5b), ‘200’ is naturally read bilaterally, as denoting 
exactly 200:83 
(5b) The world record holder identified 200 words in two minutes. 
On this interpretation, the denotation of ‘200’ is taken to be have both a lower bound and an 
upper bound. Somewhat less commonly, scalar expressions can also generate purely upper-
bounded readings, as in the continuation in (5c), where ‘200’ is naturally read as denoting at 
most 200:  
(5c) There will only be time to find 200. 
It remains controversial which, if any, of these denotations corresponds to number expressions’ 
conventional meanings, and which are the result of pragmatic enrichment. I return to that 
question in §7, having first argued that framing effects may be driven, at least in part, by 
number expressions being interpreted lower-boundedly. This fact stands in contrast to an 
assumption, standardly made by framing researchers, that they should be interpreted 
bilaterally. 
3. The Bilateral Assumption 
In order for the number expressions appearing in (corresponding clauses of the) alternative 
ADP frames to have complementary conventional meanings, these meanings must be bilateral 
and precise. For example, ‘200’ in (1) must denote exactly 200, and ‘400’ in (2) must denote 
exactly 400, in order for their denotations to sum to exactly 600 (the number of people expected 
to be killed by the disease).84 Accordingly, the logical equivalence of the alternative frames 
 
83 Or, perhaps, approximately 200. This would still be a bilateral reading, just a less precise one.  
84 Tversky and Kahneman may have been attempting to secure this reading by referring to ‘exact 
scientific estimates’ in the vignette. However, it is not obvious that this is successful and, as far as I am 





depends on the number expressions having bilateral meanings. Nevertheless, it has been 
suggested that they are often interpreted unilaterally – specifically, lower-boundedly. 
If the number expressions appearing in frames were interpreted lower-boundedly, then they 
would no longer be understood as having complementary denotations. Specifically, ‘200’ in (1) 
would be interpreted as denoting at least 200, while ‘400’ in (2) would be interpreted as 
denoting at least 400. Taken together, these denotations need not sum to exactly 600.85 
Crucially, that could explain the standard framing effect. This is because (1) would be 
interpreted as in (1a) and (2) as in (2a): 
(1a) If Program A is adopted, at least 200 people will be saved. 
(2a) If Program C is adopted, at least 400 people will die. 
It is consistent with (1a) that more than 200 people will be saved under Program A, whereas 
(2a) ensures that no more than 200 people can be saved under Program C. Therefore, Program 
A could have a better outcome than Program C. If number expressions were being interpreted 
lower-boundedly, that could explain the shift towards the sure option in the ‘be saved’ framing 
condition, and away from the sure option in the ‘die’ condition.86 According to the lower-
bounding hypothesis, then, the ADP framing effect depends on the number expressions in the 
sure options being assigned ‘at least’ readings.87 Hypotheses in this ballpark have been put 
forward on a number of occasions since the early days of framing research, including by 
Macdonald (1986). However, it is only recently that empirical investigations have been 
conducted. 
4. Mandel’s Experiments 
I will first describe three experiments reported by Mandel (2014). To give an overview of the 
results, he was able to eliminate framing effects entirely by encouraging bilateral readings of the 
number expressions. He also found evidence that framing effects are facilitated by lower-
bounded readings. Since the details will be important, I will describe the experiments in some 
depth. 
 
85 I assume that the number expressions in (3) and (4) are straightforwardly complementary: since ‘600’ 
exhausts the number of people domain, it cannot be read as ‘at least 600’. 
86 In contrast, if hearers formed upper-bounded representations of number expressions, we would predict 
a reversal of the standard framing effect.  
87 It remains to be explained why alternative frames are typically represented as being equivalent when 
both are presented. Perhaps it might be argued that bilateral interpretations of the number expressions 
become more readily available in such contexts, as compared to when only one framing condition is 





Mandel’s first experiment deployed the ADP in a within-subjects design, such that participants 
received both framing conditions. The order in which the two framing conditions were 
presented was counterbalanced between subjects, and all participants received a series of 
unrelated, intervening tasks. For one group of participants, the sure options in each framing 
condition were presented with the modifier ‘exactly’ appearing before the number expression, 
as in (1b) and (2b) below. Mandel takes this to secure the co-extensionality of the framing 
conditions.88 
(1b) If Program A is adopted, exactly 200 people will be saved. 
(2b) If Program C is adopted, exactly 400 people will die. 
For the remaining participants, the sure options contained the modifier ‘at least’ before the 
number expression, as in (1a) and (2a) above. 
Before reporting the results of this experiment, I will describe Mandel’s closely related second 
experiment. This experiment deployed a similar risky-choice paradigm but used a between-
subjects design.89 As in the first experiment, participants were divided into ‘at least’ and 
‘exactly’ conditions. The second experiment also included a pair of conditions in which no 
modifier was included in the sure options, thus mirroring the classic ADP. 
In line with the lower-bounding hypothesis, no framing effects were observed in the ‘exactly’ 
conditions, in either experiment. In other words, once the modifier ‘exactly’ was added, no 
statistically significant difference was observed between the choices made in the ‘be saved’ and 
‘die’ conditions. Specifically, in the first experiment, most participants in the ‘exactly’ condition 
(73.3%) chose the same option in both framing conditions; there was therefore no within-
 
88 As discussed in the previous chapter, that is not strictly right, since ‘be saved’ and ‘die’ are imperfect 
antonyms. As will be discussed, Mandel found no framing effects across the ‘exactly’ conditions. This 
provides some further evidence against the deflationary hypothesis discussed in the previous chapter 
(which predicts that framing effects should still be observed in the ‘exactly’ conditions).  
89 The modified scenario, taken from (Mandel, 2001), was intended to make it more plausible that the 
number of lives under threat could be accurately forecast. The scenario reads: 
In a war-torn region, the lives of 600 stranded people are at stake. Two response plans with the 
following outcomes have been proposed. Assume that the estimates provided are accurate.  
The options are then phrased similarly to those in the ADP, except that: (i) the sure options include the 
phrase ‘it is certain that’ before the number expressions; (ii) the risky options remove reference to 
‘people’, instead referring either to ‘all 600’ or ‘nobody’; (iii) in the risky option of the ‘die’ framing 
condition, the order of the complements is switched; and (iv) each of the options refers to ‘Plans’ rather 
than ‘Programs’. Additionally, Mandel uses the following wording in the question to participants: ‘Which 
of the two plans would you choose – A or B?’ whereas the original ADP – and, it seems, Mandel’s first 
experiment – asked ‘Which of the two programs would you favour?’. I think it is unlikely that these 
changes are responsible for the pattern of results Mandel obtains, most notably the elimination of framing 
effects in the ‘exactly’ conditions (particularly since framing effects were observed in the other conditions 





subjects framing effect.90 Meanwhile, in the second experiment, adding ‘exactly’ eliminated the 
standard between-subjects framing effect. The sure option was chosen by 59% of participants 
in the ‘exactly 200 people will be saved’ condition and by 43.2% in the ‘exactly 400 people will 
die’ condition. This difference was not statistically significant.  
Conversely, the ‘at least’ conditions led to large framing effects in the standard direction. In the 
first experiment, 67.7% of participants in the ‘at least’ group preferred the sure option in the ‘be 
saved’ framing condition, and the risky option in the ‘die’ condition. In the second experiment, 
91.7% of participants in the ‘at least 200 people will be saved’ condition preferred the sure 
option, compared with 32.5% of those in the ‘at least 400 people will die’ condition. This was a 
statistically significant difference. 
The no-modifier conditions in the second experiment yielded a medium-sized framing effect: 
57.9% of participants in the ‘be saved’ condition preferred the sure option, compared with 
26.3% of participants in the ‘die’ condition. This is consistent with the hypothesis that some 
participants spontaneously adopt lower-bounded readings of the number expressions in the 
sure options, when no modifier is present. 
In his final experiment, Mandel probed participants’ interpretations of the number expressions 
by manipulating what he calls the ‘explication’ of the sure and risky options. He notes that the 
sure options in the classic ADP are only ‘partially explicated’, leaving implicit the fate of the 
remaining 400 people (in the ‘be saved’ condition) or 200 people (in the ‘die’ condition).91 
Mandel formulates ‘fully explicated’ versions of the sure options as follows: 
(1c) If Plan A is adopted, it is certain that 200 people will be saved and 400 people will not be 
saved.  
(2c) If Plan C is adopted, it is certain that 400 people will die and 200 people will not die. 
Correspondingly, he formulates partially-explicated versions of the risky options, as follows: 
(3a) If Plan B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that all 600 will be saved. 
(4a) If Plan D is adopted, there is a 2/3 probability that all 600 will die. 
 
90 Mandel does not report on order effects, which might have indicated that some kind of framing effect 
was still operating, i.e. if participants who initially received the ‘be saved’ framing condition tended to 
choose the sure option in both conditions; whereas those who initially received the ‘die’ framing 
condition tended to choose the risky option in both conditions. 






Combinations of fully- and partially-explicated options were deployed in a between-subjects 
experiment, with participants being divided between the six conditions represented in the rows 
of the table below: 
Framing condition Explication of sure option Explication of risky option 
‘Be saved’ Partial Full 
Full Full 
Full Partial 




Following the usual choice task, Mandel asked recipients in ‘be saved’ conditions the following 
questions (the versions used in the ‘die’ conditions are shown in square brackets):  
1. Did you interpret Plan A to mean (a) at most, (b) exactly, or (c) at least 200 will be 
saved [400 will die]?  
2. Did you interpret Plan B to mean there was (a) at most, (b) exactly, or (c) at least a 
1/3 probability that all 600 people will be saved [2/3 probability that all 600 people will 
die]? 
The results of this experiment show, first, an ‘explication effect’ on choice.92 A standard framing 
effect arose from the classic ADP conditions, in which the sure options were partially-explicated 
and the risky options were fully explicated (rows 1 and 4 in the table above). Specifically, 68% 
of participants in the ‘be saved’ condition chose the sure option, compared with 20% in the ‘die’ 
condition. In contrast, the framing effect was eliminated when both options were fully 
explicated (rows 2 and 5 in the table above): 59.1% of participants in the ‘be saved’ condition 
chose the sure option, compared with 50.0% in the ‘die’ condition (a non-significant difference). 
Responses even trended in the direction of a reverse framing effect when the sure options were 
fully explicated and the risky options were partially explicated (rows 3 and 6 in the table 
above): 42.3% of participants in the ‘be saved’ condition chose the sure option, compared with 
68.0% in the ‘die’ condition. However, this effect fell short of statistical significance. 
In addition to the effect on choice, Mandel found an effect of explication on the interpretation of 
number expressions. Partial explication of the sure options was correlated with participants 
 
92 They thus provide some further support for the idea that classic risky-choice framing effects are driven 





reporting lower-bounded, ‘at least’ readings of the number expressions (in both the ‘be saved’ 
and ‘die’ conditions). Specifically, 64% of participants receiving partially-explicated sure 
options reported that they interpreted the number expressions lower-boundedly. Conversely, 
full explication of the sure options was correlated with participants reporting bilateral, ‘exactly’ 
readings of the number expressions: 62% of those who received the fully-explicated versions of 
the sure options reported adopting bilateral readings.93 
There was also an interaction between the choice patterns and the interpretations of the 
number expressions: an overall framing effect was observed for the sets of participants 
reporting lower-bounded readings of the number expressions in the sure options. Conversely, 
no framing effect was observed for the sets of participants reporting bilateral readings. A 
reverse framing effect was observed for the small sets of participants reporting upper-bounded 
readings.94  
To summarise Mandel’s results, framing effects were eliminated under bilateral interpretations 
of the number expressions in the sure options, but the effects re-emerged under lower-bounded 
interpretations. This suggests that, in classic risky-choice framing experiments, the results may 
be driven by many of the participants interpreting number expressions lower-boundedly. 
Mandel concludes: 
In short, the findings indicate that, for most people, Options A and C in the ADP are 
descriptions of different events, and not merely re-descriptions of the same event. 
Although effects of the usual ADP positive-negative manipulation are description effects, 
strictly speaking, they are not framing effects, and thus should not be labeled as such. 
(Mandel, 2014, p. 1193)95 
 
93 With respect to the risky options, most participants reported bilateral interpretations of the 
probabilities, regardless of explication, although larger minorities reported lower-bounded 
interpretations when the risky option was only partially explicated (37%) compared with when it was 
fully-explicated (22%) (this was a statistically significant difference). For now, I set aside the 
interpretation of the probabilities but I return to this point briefly in §5. 
94 There was also some evidence of the converse pattern emerging in relation to the interpretations of the 
probabilities in the risky options. A framing effect in the standard direction was observed for the sets of 
participants reporting upper-bounded readings of the probability fraction. However, the reverse framing 
effect for the sets of participants reporting lower-bounded readings did not reach statistical significance. 
95 Mandel may not be right to conclude that lower-bounded interpretations would show the framing 
effect to be dissolved. As discussed in chapter 1, framing effects are standardly taken to depend on 
hearers forming distinct representations of states of affairs described by alternative frames (albeit this is 
usually thought to be triggered by the positive or negative wording used, rather than the number 
expressions). The key question is whether hearers are licensed to form distinct representations. I do not 
believe Mandel has shown that they are. In §7 I will discuss some possible arguments to that effect, which 
would trace lower-bounded interpretations to the conventional meanings of number expressions, or 
pragmatic enrichments of these. Although he cites the associated literature, Mandel explicitly defers 





Although Mandel’s findings are striking, it may be a little premature to draw firm conclusions 
from them. Others have failed to replicate his experiments. Two subsequent studies, by 
Simmons and Nelson (2013) and Chick et al. (2016), present contradictory findings.96 I explore 
the latter study next. 
5. Chick et al.’s Experiments 
Chick et al. (2016) present results from two experiments conducted in response to Mandel’s 
study. They observe a methodological flaw in Mandel’s third experiment: participants only 
reported their interpretations of the number expressions after completing the choice task. It is 
therefore possible that they were offering a post-hoc justification of their earlier response, 
rather than giving a reliable account of how they initially understood the options. In other 
words, it is plausible that the causation was running in the wrong direction: reports of lower-
bounded interpretations might have been caused by the presence of a framing effect, rather than 
causing it. Chick et al. address this issue in their own experiments, by providing participants 
with comprehensive instructions to adopt bilateral interpretations of the number expressions, 
and probing these both before and after the choice tasks are completed. In the next two 
subsections I will describe each experiment in turn. 
5.1. Experiment 1 
In the first experiment, participants were initially trained on how to interpret partially-
explicated options in ADP-style risky-choice framing scenarios. They were told that the 
numbers of people who will ‘be saved’ or ‘die’ were exact and would not increase or decrease. It 
was also explained that the probabilities in the risky options would always be complementary 
(adding to 1) and would range over all-or-nothing alternatives: for example, either no people 
would be saved or all would be. The clauses which specify these alternatives are termed the 
‘zero complement’ and the ‘non-zero complement’, respectively. An ‘initial ambiguity 
questionnaire’ tested whether participants were interpreting the stated information as 
instructed. The questionnaire presented a single framing problem, either in the positively-
worded or negatively-worded condition. Each of the sure and risky options were only partially 
explicated. Participants were then asked three questions: two relating to the interpretation of 
 
Although a specification of how various types of context (e.g., conversational, semantic, and 
sentential) affect the interpretation of [numeric quantifiers] is beyond the aims of this article, the 
present research…suggests the need for a comprehensive psycholinguistic account of numeric 
quantifier use and interpretation. (Mandel, 2014, p. 1196) 
Ultimately, the lower-bounding hypothesis cannot provide a rationalising explanation of framing effects 
until its linguistic and philosophical foundations have been further developed. 
96 See (Mandel, 2013) for a response to Simmons and Nelson, which points to some methodological and 





the number expression in the sure option; and one relating to the interpretation of the 
probability in the risky option. An example is provided below (with the ‘correct’ interpretations 
in bold): 
1. Did you assume that more than 300 people would be saved in option A?  
Yes/ No 
 
2. Which of the following did you assume about option A? 
a) Exactly 300 saved 
b) At least 300 saved 
c) Some of the other 200 saved 
 
3. Which of the following did you assume about option B? 
a) 2/5 probability some saved 
b) 2/5 probability all saved 
c) 2/5 probability none saved 
 
After responding, participants were given the correct responses, together with detailed 
explanations that reiterated the earlier instructions. They also received an additional set of 
worked examples. 
Following this initial training stage, the choice trials consisted of 60 framing problems relating 
to 20 different ADP-style risky choice scenarios (where either lives or money were at stake). 
Each problem required participants to make the usual choice between a sure option and a risky 
option. The set of 60 framing problems received by each participant included an equal split of 
positively- and negatively-worded conditions. The sure options were partially explicated 
throughout, whereas risky options were manipulated to present (with equal frequency) either 
the zero complement only, the non-zero complement only, or both complements. No participant 
received both the positively- and negatively-worded conditions of a given problem with the 
same manipulation of the risky option. After each response, participants rated their confidence 
in their decision on a five-point scale. In the final phase of the experiment, a post-framing 





Participants were removed from the analysis if they answered any of the questions on either 
ambiguity questionnaire incorrectly. This reduced the number of participants from 81 to 41.97  
The crucial result was the observation of a standard framing effect, despite the participants 
apparently adopting bilateral interpretations of the number expressions. Participants’ 
confidence ratings also tracked the framing effect: the sure option was chosen with greater 
confidence in the positively-worded frame, and the risky option with greater confidence in the 
negatively-worded frame.98 The results of the first experiment suggest that lower-bounded 
interpretations are not necessary for risky-choice framing effects to occur, pace Mandel.99  
5.2. Experiment 2 
The second experiment by Chick et al. used a similar procedure, with an initial training stage 
and pre- and post-framing questionnaires. However, participants received only a single framing 
problem rather than 60. In an attempt to replicate as closely as possible the ‘exactly’ condition 
of Mandel’s second experiment, the experimenters used the same scenario and included the 
modifier ‘exactly’ in each of the sure options. For each participant, the target trial was 
administered in the same (positively- or negatively-worded) framing condition as the problem 
in the preceding ambiguity questionnaire. And each participant received one of the three 
manipulations of the risky option that were used in Chick et al.’s first experiment. In addition, 
time limits on decision making and confidence ratings were removed; and a question was also 
added into the ambiguity questionnaires that tested participants’ ability to apply their 
interpretations of partially-explicated options in a deductive reasoning task. 
 
97 I return to discuss the high attrition rate in §5.4. 
98 Both effects were largest when only the zero complement of the risky option was presented, and were 
eliminated when only the non-zero complement was presented. I discuss this in §5.4. 
99 I take Mandel and Chick et al. to be making directly conflicting claims about whether lower-bounded 
interpretations are necessary for framing effects to arise in ADP-style risky-choice framing paradigms. 
However, Chick et al. sometimes write as though their claims are compatible with Mandel’s, ascribing to 
him a mere sufficiency claim. For example:  
Although Mandel’s findings demonstrate that a lower-bounded interpretation is sufficient to 
produce framing effects, they do not demonstrate that such an interpretation is necessary to 
produce framing effects. (Chick et al., 2016, p. 240) 
Later, they add: 
In contrast to Mandel’s argument about sufficiency, we make an argument about necessity: Our 
results are novel in demonstrating that linguistic ambiguity is not necessary to risky choice 
framing effects. (Chick et al., 2016, p. 251)  
Yet, as the authors also note, “if disambiguation such as “exactly” eliminated framing effects, this would be 
evidence that ambiguity is necessary to framing” (Chick et al., 2016, p. 248). This, I take it, is precisely 
what Mandel finds with respect to a set of ADP-style risky-choice framing paradigms. As such, he does 
make the necessity claim that Chick et al. seek to refute. Indeed, Chick et al. acknowledge elsewhere that 
their results “contradict the conclusions reported by Mandel (2014)” (Chick et al., 2016, p. 251). The 
dialectic is therefore rather muddled, and the necessity/ sufficiency distinction seems to be something of 
a red herring. As stated, then, I understand both studies to concern the claim that lower-bounded 
interpretations of number expressions are necessary for framing effects to arise in certain ADP-style 





Again, framing effects persisted among the 154 participants (of an original 291) who answered 
both ambiguity questionnaires entirely correctly. As in the first experiment, confidence ratings 
patterned with the observed framing effect.100 The results of the second experiment provide 
further support for the authors’ claim that lower-bounded interpretations of number 
expressions are unnecessary for framing effects to arise in ADP-style risky choice paradigms. 
Instead, such effects are also observed under bilateral interpretations.101 In the next sub-
section, I introduce the alternative account of framing effects that Chick et al. advocate. 
5.3. Fuzzy Trace Theory 
Fuzzy trace theory (henceforth FTT) was originally developed in the mid-1980s in the context 
of memory research (Brainerd & Kingma, 1984, 1985). Its central claim is that people 
simultaneously encode information in precise and ‘gist-like’ ways. Of most relevance for the 
current discussion, the proponents of FTT have provided an account of how numbers are 
represented during numerical reasoning tasks, including risky-choice framing paradigms (Chick 
et al., 2016; Reyna & Brainerd, 1991, 2011; Reyna, Chick, Corbin, & Hsia, 2014). They propose 
that multiple mental representations are activated in parallel, ranging along a continuum of 
precision, from verbatim representations (like ‘exactly 200’) to the most ‘gist-like’ 
representation, ‘some’. During episodes of reasoning, thinkers are held to deploy the least 
precise representation that would be compatible with completing the task. It is predicted, then, 
that thinkers will operate with a representation of any positive number as ‘some’, whenever 
that enables sufficient differentiation between alternative possibilities.  
Of course, ‘some’ will not always be sufficient: for example, if one wishes to establish whether it 
is better to have £200 or £300 then comparing ‘some pounds’ with ‘some pounds’ won’t help. In 
such scenarios, thinkers must ascend the precision hierarchy. Proceeding stepwise, they are 
held to deploy incrementally sharper representations (for example, ‘more’ and ‘less’) in order to 
complete the task at hand. It is predicted that the maximally precise, verbatim representations 
will be used only in the last resort.102 
 
100 Again, both effects were increased by presenting only the zero complements of the risky options, and 
eliminated by presenting only the non-zero complements. I return to this in §5.4. 
101 In places, Chick et al. seem to suggest that their results refute all ‘linguistic ambiguity’ hypotheses, 
which propose that risky-choice framing effects arise from the partial explication of the sure options. I do 
not believe they have shown this. Indeed, in chapter 9 I will suggest that the ‘information leakage 
account’, to be introduced in chapter 6 of the thesis, can be extended to risky-choice framing paradigms. I 
therefore restrict discussion here to the more specific lower-bounding hypothesis.  
102 Note that this is different from merely hypothesising that number expressions are interpreted 
approximately (whereby, for example, ‘200’ is represented as denoting about 200). That hypothesis would 
not necessarily get us any further towards explaining framing effects since the framing conditions would 





On FTT’s analysis of the ADP, framing effects are explained in terms of the categorical contrast 
between ‘some’ people in the sure options and ‘no’ people in the zero complements of the risky 
options. Spelling this out, in the ‘be saved’ condition, FTT predicts that the sure option is 
represented as guaranteeing that some people will be saved. According to the risky option, 
though, there is some probability of some people being saved (the non-zero complement) and 
also some probability of no people being saved (the zero complement). Since an outcome in 
which some people are saved for sure is preferable to the possibility of no people being saved, 
FTT predicts that the sure option will typically be preferred in this framing condition.  
The converse story can be told for the ‘die’ condition: under the sure option, some people will 
die. Under the risky option, there is some probability of some people dying but also some 
probability of no people dying. In this case, a possibility of no people dying is preferable to the 
certainty that some people will die, making the risky option preferable. Taken together, these 
hypotheses can potentially explain the classic ADP framing effect.  
Before moving on, I want to raise a conceptual problem with FTT. As far as I am aware, its 
proponents nowhere provide an explicit semantics for the ‘gist-like’ representation ‘some’ – 
specifically, they do not say whether it is meant to have a lower-bounded meaning (denoting 
some and possibly all) or a bilateral one (denoting some but not all). This is unfortunate given 
the linguistic controversy that surrounds the meanings of scalar expressions, and the central 
role the term ‘some’ plays in the FTT account.  
On closer inspection, it seems that the ‘gist-like’ representation, ‘some’, must be taken to have a 
lower-bounded meaning, denoting some and possibly all. Otherwise, if ‘some’ meant ‘some but 
not all’ the fuzzy trace theorists could not claim that the non-zero complements of the risky 
options, in which all 600 people will be saved/ will die, are represented as some people being 
saved/ dying. 
Interestingly, it follows that the sure options in each framing condition become inequivalent 
again: in the ‘be saved’ frame, some and possibly all people will be saved; in the ‘die’ frame, some 
and possibly all will die. It will thus be difficult for FTT to maintain that participants do not 
naturally form lower-bounded representations of number expressions. Presumably, however, 
they would continue to deny that their doing so is causally responsible for framing effects. 
According to FTT, the framing effect produced by the ADP arises purely as a result of the 
categorical contrast between some people and no people.  
 
we will see, the FTT account depends crucially on the stronger claim that number expressions are 





A more nuanced position seems available here. On the one hand, the experimental evidence 
presented by Chick et al. does suggest that lower-bounded representations are not necessary for 
framing effects to arise. On the other hand, the lower-bounding hypothesis could still provide 
part of the explanation of framing effects. In the remainder of the chapter I present further 
arguments for this modest version of the lower-bounding hypothesis. 
5.4. Weighing the Evidence 
Given the failure by Chick et al. to replicate Mandel’s results, it seems advisable to treat with 
caution the claim that risky-choice framing effects depend entirely on lower-bounded 
interpretations of number expressions. However, I will argue that such interpretations are at 
least likely to contribute to framing effects, even if they cannot explain them in full. It is notable, 
for example, that nearly half of Chick et al.’s participants still failed to adopt the ‘correct’ 
bilateral interpretations of the partially explicated options in the ambiguity questionnaires, 
despite having received comprehensive instructions and training (as discussed, the responses of 
these individuals were removed from the final analysis). The authors do not speculate about 
why this was. Plausibly, it may have proved difficult to dispel lower-bounded readings of the 
number expressions. If so, these readings can be expected to arise spontaneously in other 
framing studies where experimenters make little or no attempt to secure bilateral 
interpretations. And, where they do arise, it makes sense that they would contribute to framing 
effects.103  
That said, it must be acknowledged that FTT provides a nice explanation of why framing effects 
are eliminated or reversed when the risky options are only partially-explicated. As discussed, 
the theory places crucial importance on the contrast between the sure options and the zero 
complements of the risky options. In the classic ADP, these are the clauses which state that no 
people will be saved (in the ‘be saved’ frame); or that no people will die (in the ‘die’ frame). In 
contrast, the non-zero complements (which state that 600 people will be saved/ will die) are 
predicted by FTT to be represented as being on a par with the sure options, since some people 
will be saved/ will die either way. FTT thus predicts that framing effects will only be observed 
when zero complements are presented, either alone or together with the non-zero complement; 
and that the effects will be strongest when the zero complements are presented alone. This 
 
103 Indeed, in providing a gloss of Mandel’s results, Chick et al. write:  
Adding “at least” to the sure option makes the value of the sure option higher than that of the 
risky option in the gain frame, and lower than that of the risky option in the loss frame. Naturally, 
subjects choose the option with the higher value, resulting in most subjects choosing the sure 
option in the gain frame and the risky option in the loss frame. (Chick et al., 2016, p. 251) 
By the same logic, subjects working with the gist-like representation ‘some and possibly all’ should 





prediction is borne out by the findings of Chick et al. and a number of other studies: for a 
review, see (Kühberger & Tanner, 2010); see also (Reyna et al., 2014).  
Although FTT provides a good account of these results, I believe the lower-bounding hypothesis 
can explain them too. After all, if the probabilities in the partially explicated risky options are 
represented as lower-bounded, then the zero complement in the ‘die’ frame is potentially better 
than the zero complement in the ‘be saved’ frame. This is because an at least one-third 
probability that no people will die is potentially better than an at least two-thirds probability 
that no people will be saved. The first is consistent with the probability of everyone being saved 
being greater than one third. In contrast, under the second, the probability of everyone being 
saved cannot exceed one third (and may be less than that). This could explain why the framing 
effect is strengthened when only the zero complements are presented: it is not only that the 
sure option in the ‘be saved’ condition is better than the sure option in the ‘die’ condition, but 
that the risky option in the ‘die’ condition is better than the risky option in the ‘be saved’ 
condition. In other words, participants would end up with two, mutually reinforcing reasons to 
err towards the sure option in the ‘be saved’ condition and the risky option in the ‘die’ 
condition.104  
By the same reasoning, when only the non-zero complement is presented, the incentives are 
less clear. The non-zero complement in the ‘be saved’ frame is potentially better than the non-
zero complement in the ‘die’ frame: an at least two-thirds probability that all 600 will be saved 
is potentially better than an at least one-third probability that all 600 people will die. The first is 
consistent with a higher probability of everyone staying alive. This could explain why the 
framing effect is weakened when only the non-zero complements are presented: participants 
have less reason to favour different options under each condition. 
Overall, then, while the lower-bounding hypothesis can be expected to explain, at least in part, 
the framing effects observed in ADP-style risky-choice framing experiments, it may not be 
necessary to appeal to FTT’s ‘gist-like’ representations in order to account for the data. In the 
next section, I will show how wider psycholinguistic research lends further credence to the 
lower-bounding hypothesis over FTT.  
6. Precise Representations 
As discussed in §2, it is well understood that number expressions (among other scalars) can 
generate lower-bounded interpretations in some contexts. In contrast, there is no obvious 
 
104 I note that this explanation depends on number expressions being interpreted lower-boundedly when 
they are used as degree modifiers, as well as when they are used as quantifiers. That might not be 





linguistic support for FTT’s claim that number expressions are represented as denoting some. Of 
course, FTT emerged as a psychological theory of memory, not of language; nevertheless, its 
application to risky-choice framing depends on a distinctively linguistic claim about how 
number expressions are interpreted. It is worth noting, then, the presence of linguistic 
counterevidence to the claim that number expressions are interpreted as being equivalent to 
‘some’. I will focus on a study by Panizza, Huang, Chierchia, and Snedeker (2015). 
Using the ‘visual world paradigm’ devised by Huang and Snedeker (2009), Panizza et al. tasked 
their participants with matching spoken descriptions to items presented in a visual display. At 
the beginning of each trial, the (adult) participants were told a story by a teacher figure about 
four children (two boys and two girls), who were depicted in separate quadrants of the visual 
display. Participants were then asked by a cook figure, who could not hear this story, to help 
find a child to assist in the kitchen. The child for whom the cook was looking was described in 
terms of the quantity of an object s/he had, using either a quantifier (‘some’ or ‘all’) or a number 
expression (‘two’ or ‘three’). For example, participants might be told: ‘A boy has two of the 
paperclips. Point to him.’ They would then respond by selecting the matching image from the 
visual display or, if there was no match, by clicking on a marked box to reject the sentence. 
Panizza et al. used a within-subjects experimental design; each participant heard eight 
sentences in each of the four conditions (‘some’, ‘all’, ‘two’ and ‘three’).105 
For current purposes, two types of trial were of critical importance: in the first type of trial, 
participants were asked to look for a boy (or girl) with ‘some’ of a given object, where one boy 
(or girl) had all three and the other had none. In this scenario, a lower-bounded reading of 
‘some’ would enable a match with the child who had all three, whereas a bilateral reading would 
require the sentence to be rejected. In the second critical trial type, participants were looking 
for a boy (or girl) with ‘two’ of a given object but, again, one boy (or girl) had all three while the 
other had none. Again, a lower-bounded reading of ‘two’ would allow for a match with the child 
who had all three, whereas a bilateral reading would require the sentence to be rejected. 
Panizza et al. found that, in the first critical trial type, using ‘some’, participants typically did 
match the description to the child who had all three items (74% did this in ‘upward-entailing’ 
grammatical contexts; 93% in ‘downward-entailing’ contexts). This suggests that the lower-
 
105 Subjects were further split between conditions in which the scalar expression appeared in ‘upward-
entailing’ or ‘downward-entailing’ grammatical contexts. ‘Upward-entailing’ contexts license inferences 
from sets to supersets; for example, ‘200 women were saved’ entails ‘200 people were saved’, where 
‘woman’ is a subset of ‘person’. In contrast, ‘downward-entailing’ contexts license inferences from sets to 
subsets; for example, ‘It is not the case that 200 people were saved’ entails ‘It is not the case that 200 





bounded reading, ‘some and possibly all’ was typically adopted, whereas a bilateral, ‘some but 
not all’ interpretation was either cancelled or never adopted in the first place. 
In contrast, in the second critical trial type, using ‘two’, participants typically rejected the 
sentence (89% did this in ‘upward-entailing’ contexts; 60% in ‘downward-entailing’ contexts).  
This suggests that they preferred a bilateral, ‘exactly’, interpretation of the number expression, 
rather than maintaining or adopting a lower-bounded, ‘at least’, interpretation.  
These results relate to the discussion of risky-choice framing in a couple of different ways. The 
point I wish to emphasise is that they are, at least prima facie, at odds with FTT. Presumably, 
FTT predicts that the responses in the ‘two’ trial should pattern similarly to those in the ‘some’ 
trial. This is because, when faced with a number expression as in the ‘two’ trial, FTT claims that 
people will reason with the ‘gist-like’ representation, ‘some’ (understood as ‘some and possibly 
all), as long as that suffices for completing the task at hand. And in this case it does suffice: it is 
possible to complete the matching task by deploying ‘some and possibly all’, namely by 
matching the description to the child who has all three items. Importantly, even though 
participants could have reasoned with the ‘gist-like’ representation, clearly they did not. Instead, 
while participants typically made the match in the ‘some’ condition, they tended to reject the 
target sentence in the ‘two’ condition. This indicates that they were deploying a more precise 
interpretation of ‘two’. 
A natural response for fuzzy trace theorists here would be to argue that some element of 
Panizza et al.’s experimental set-up prompted subjects to work with an unusually precise 
interpretation of ‘two’ rather than representing it as denoting some. This might be due, for 
example, to the experimenters having used small numbers. In a different study, Degen and 
Tanenhaus (2015) find that ‘some’ is considered unnatural when describing sets containing one 
to three items. Perhaps, then, ‘two’ is more likely to be represented verbatim than the larger 
numbers typically used in framing studies (like ‘200’ and ‘400’).106 While this hypothesis has 
some prima facie plausibility, it would at least require a refinement of FTT, to restrict its claims 
to sufficiently large numbers. Pending further empirical investigation, however, there is little 
reason to suppose that even large numbers are preferentially represented as ‘some’. 
Before moving on, I note that Panizza et al.’s experiment threatens to undermine the lower-
bounding hypothesis: after all, if cardinal expressions in that study are typically given bilateral, 
‘exactly’ interpretations, it might seem unwarranted to suppose that the number expressions 
 
106 Compounding this worry, the within-subjects design could perhaps have encouraged participants to 






used in framing studies generate lower-bounded readings. As a first point in response, even if 
only a minority of participants are reasoning with lower-bounded interpretations, this may be 
sufficient to contribute towards a framing effect, in line with the modest version of the lower-
bounding hypothesis I endorse. Second, it is possible that scenarios like the ADP encourage 
lower-bounded readings to a greater extent than does Panizza et al.’s scenario (although this is 
clearly a claim that would require further empirical testing).  
7. Semantics, Pragmatics, and Lower-Bounding 
In the preceding discussion, I argued that framing effects probably depend in part on some 
participants interpreting number expressions lower-boundedly. However, this does not yet 
address the question of why they do so. In this final section I briefly survey various possible 
answers to that question, which trace lower-boundedness to the meaning (broadly construed) 
of an uttered number expression. On some views, lower-boundedness is seen as part of the 
conventional meaning of a number expression; on others it is held to be the result of a pragmatic 
effect, which enriches or modulates the conventional meaning.  
According to the traditional neo-Gricean approach, developed in different ways by Horn (1989) 
and Levinson (2000), number expressions (and other scalars) conventionally have lower-
bounded denotations. On this view, ‘200’ in sentence (1) conventionally denotes at least 200, as 
in (1a), while ‘400’ in sentence (2) conventionally denotes at least 400, as in (2a). 
(1) If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
(1a) If Program A is adopted, at least 200 people will be saved. 
(2) If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. 
(2a) If Program C is adopted, at least 400 people will die. 
On this view, then, (1) and (2) are inequivalent with respect to their basic semantics, which 
could explain why they are represented differently.107  
 
107 Of course, they need not be represented differently, since some participants might pragmatically 
enrich the conventional meaning, arriving at bilateral interpretations. A neo-Gricean explanation for such 
enrichment might go roughly as follows: if more than 200 people would be saved, the speaker would have 
said so explicitly (assuming the speaker to be cooperative and knowledgeable about the number of 
people who will be saved). However, since the speaker did not do that, it must be the case that no more 
than 200 people will be saved. Note that, since this conclusion relies on assumptions of cooperativity and 
knowledgeability, participants are not necessarily required to draw it: instead, they might prefer to leave 
open the possibility that the speaker does not know (or want to say) exactly how many people will be 
saved. This could potentially explain why some individuals adopt bilateral interpretations while others 





A distinct semantic explanation of lower-bounded interpretations of number expressions takes 
number expressions to be ambiguous or polysemous. According to this kind of approach, 
number expressions have two lexical entries, or senses, as a matter of linguistic convention, one 
of which has a lower-bounded denotation, while the other has a bilateral denotation. To give an 
idea of how this works, I will briefly outline the polysemy-based analysis put forward by Geurts 
(2006).108  
Geurts argues that the basic conventional meanings of number expressions are bilateral senses. 
According to his semantic analysis, this means ‘200 people will be saved’ can be paraphrased 
roughly as follows: 
(1d) There uniquely exists a set of exactly 200 people who will be saved.109 
According to (1d), the expression ‘200’ maps a predicate to TRUE just if that predicate holds of 
one and only one group of 200 people.110 In other words, the semantics of ‘200’ is bilateral and 
precise.  
Geurts proceeds to show that when number expressions are used predicatively they require a 
different analysis. This is formally derived by applying to the basic meaning a standard type-
shifting operation known as ‘Quantifier Lowering’ (Partee, 1987). Consider, for example, 
sentence (6) in which the number expression is used predicatively: 
(6) These are 200 people. 
By applying Quantifier Lowering to the basic sense of the number expression, it is possible to 
arrive at a semantic analysis of (6) that can be paraphrased as follows: 
(6a) The number of these is exactly 200 and these are people.111 
In (6a) the expression ‘200’ is analysed as denoting a property – namely, a property of 
whichever sum of entities is denoted by ‘these’.112 
Once this predicative sense of number expressions is added to our semantics, it becomes 
susceptible to a further standard type-shifting operation known as ‘Existential Closure’. 
Crucially, this operation maps number expressions to lower-bounded meanings, which can 
 
108 According to a related proposal, put forward by Chierchia, Fox, and Spector (2012), the different 
readings of number expressions arise from the interaction between grammatical context and a covert 
syntactic operator known as the ‘exhaustivity operator’. However, for reasons of space, I will not discuss 
this account. 
109 Formally: ∃!x[#x = 200 ∧ People(x) ∧ Saved(x)], where ‘∃!x’ means that there uniquely exists an x, and 
‘#x’ means the number of entities in x.  
110 Formally: λP∃!x[#x = 200 ∧ P(x)] 
111 Formally: #these = 200 ∧ People(these). 





therefore be posited as additional conventional senses. For example, applying Existential 
Closure to the predicative analysis of ‘200’ produces a semantic analysis of (1) that can be 
paraphrased as follows:  
(1e) There exists a set of exactly 200 people who will be saved.113 
Although the inclusion of ‘exactly’ in (1e) might appear to invoke a bilateral reading of the 
number expression, in fact it produces lower-bounded reading here. This is because the group 
of exactly 200 people is no longer required to be unique: ‘200’ in (1e) maps a predicate to TRUE 
just if the predicate holds of at least one group of exactly 200 people.114 Equivalently, it maps a 
predicate to TRUE just if it holds of at least 200 people.  
Geurts claims that the bilateral sense of a number expression is the more usual, dominant, and 
preferred reading, at least when the number expression is used as a quantifier. Nevertheless, his 
account seems to allow that some hearers of frames could select the lower-bounded sense. 
Whether or not the selection of one sense is more justified than the other remains a further 
question; however, the onus falls on those who claim that framing effects are irrational to show 
that the lower-bounded sense should not be deployed in framing scenarios.  
A third approach to the semantics of number expressions similarly denies that number 
expressions are straightforwardly and univocally bilateral. However, it is argued that their 
conventional meanings are altogether underspecified, neither having bilateral nor lower-
bounded denotations. This view, which is naturally allied with the Contextualist approaches to 
meaning variation discussed in chapter 2, has been advocated by Kempson and Cormack (1981) 
and Carston (1988, 1998). It claims that, on each occasion on which a number expression is 
used, its underspecified conventional meaning must be pragmatically enriched in one way or 
another. Hearers will thus arrive at lower-bounded, bilateral, or upper-bounded interpretations. 
If the view is correct, it might predict that some participants in framing studies interpret the 
number expressions in frames bilaterally, while others interpret them lower-boundedly.115 As 
before, it would require much further justification to show that participants rationally ought to 
derive only bilateral interpretations.  
A final approach, taken by Breheny (2008), considers number expressions to have bilateral 
conventional meanings. This account, which is diametrically opposed to the standard neo-
 
113 Formally: ∃x[#x = 200 ∧ People(x) ∧ Saved(x)]. 
114 Formally: λP∃x[#x = 200 ∧ P(x)] 
115 Recall that, on the Relevance Theoretic approach Carston endorses, this will depend on which 
interpretation happens to be the most relevant, i.e. which is the most readily accessible interpretation 
that is informative enough to justify the cognitive effort required to derive it. Since relevance will depend 
in part on each individual’s extant set of beliefs, it is consistent with this account that different 





Gricean approach, fits naturally with the assumption that framing researchers have standardly 
made about the meanings of the number expressions in frames. Even so, Breheny is fully 
cognisant of the fact that number expressions can obtain lower-bounded interpretations in 
certain contexts. Specifically, he appeals to the role of hearers’ background knowledge in their 
derivation of lower- or upper-bounded readings. On a Breheny-style account, then, it might be 
hypothesised that differences in participants’ background knowledge could affect their 
tendency to derive lower-bounded or bilateral readings of the number expressions in the 
frames they receive. Therefore, even this bilateral approach is, in principle, consistent with the 
ability of the lower-bounding hypothesis to provide a rationalising explanation of framing 
effects.  
I will not arbitrate between the various positions on the meanings of number expressions, 
which have been briefly surveyed here. I do not believe the framing data bears directly on this 
large and complex debate.116 However, whether lower-bounded interpretations end up being 
traced back to conventional meaning or pragmatic enrichment, what I hope to have shown is 
that far more work would be required to show that hearers behave irrationally in deriving such 
interpretations. As things currently stand, then, the lower-bounding hypothesis stands to 
provide a partial explanation of framing effects, and one that may be compatible with hearers’ 
responses being rational.117 
8. Conclusion 
I have argued that the lower-bounding hypothesis is likely to explain framing effects in part, 
though not in full. The data from Chick et al. (2016) show that, even when hearers represent 
number expressions bilaterally, a framing effect can still arise. In order to investigate the 
unexplained portion of the effect, I will now proceed as if the number expressions in alternative 
frames did have bilateral meanings, and were represented by participants as such. This will 
allow me to isolate the other factors contributing to the framing effect. With the assumption of 
bilaterality in place, then, I am now in a position to accept that many pairs of alternative frames 
are logically equivalent, at least at the level of their minimal semantic meanings. In other words, 
if we compose the conventional meanings of their constituent expressions, we arrive at 
meanings that share a single set of truth-conditions.  
It is necessary to pause at this point because the assumption that frames, qua sentences, can 
even possess truth-conditions (let alone share them) immediately begs the question against 
Radical Contextualists, who prominently deny this. In the next chapter I address their objection.   
 
116 For further discussion, see (Spector, 2013). 








The debate between Semantic Minimalism and Radical Contextualism is standardly 
characterised as concerning truth-evaluability – specifically, whether or not sentences require 
rich contextualization in order to express complete, truth-evaluable contents. In this chapter, I 
examine the notion of truth-evaluability, considering which kinds of mappings it might require 
from worldly states of affairs to truth-values. At one end of the spectrum, an exhaustive notion 
would require truth-evaluable contents to map all possible states of affairs to truth-values. At 
the other end, a liberal notion would require only that truth-evaluable contents map at least one 
possible state of affairs to at least one truth-value. I show that both Minimalists and Radical 
Contextualists rely on some intermediate, moderately strict notion of truth-evaluability, falling 
between these two poles. I consider four ways in which such a notion could be defined. 
However, I argue that each of these is ultimately implausible, giving us no reason to favour a 
moderately strict notion of truth-evaluability over the liberal alternative. This suggests that 
Minimalists and Radical Contextualists alike should accept that sentences can express truth-
evaluable contents. I conclude that, in principle, the meanings of alternative frames can be 
understood as being truth-evaluable and capable of logical equivalence.  
1. Introduction 
The notion of truth-evaluability features centrally in the debate between Semantic Minimalism 
and Radical Contextualism. Recall from chapter 2 that Minimalists argue that well-formed 
sentences in language express complete, truth-evaluable contents, with only a very limited role 
for the contexts in which those sentences are uttered.119 Thus, Borg (2012, p. 3) writes: 
According to minimal semantics, natural language sentences mean things, the things 
they mean are in some sense complete (that is to say, they are propositional, truth-
evaluable contents), and these literal meanings are determined entirely as a function of 
the lexical elements a sentence contains together with its syntactic form. 
 
118 This chapter draws heavily on my published paper, ‘Reassessing truth-evaluability in the Minimalism-
Contextualism debate’ (Fisher, 2019). 
119 Specifically, that role is exhausted by providing values for a limited set of genuinely context-sensitive 





Cappelen and Lepore (2005) defend a similar view, arguing that sentences can express 
complete, truth-evaluable propositions, without pervasive contextual influences.120 
Radical Contextualists, on the other hand, deny that we can sensibly talk about sentences 
expressing complete, truth-evaluable contents. They argue instead that contexts must always 
play a substantial role, such that only richly contextualized utterances of sentences can express 
complete, truth-evaluable contents. Again, according to Travis (2008, p. 70): 
The new view might be called the speaking-sensitive view of words, or language… 
[Words’] fixed, language-contributed semantics must, in general, be supplemented if 
they are to be properly assessable as to truth; that is, if they are to count either as true 
or as false. Nor is such supplementation provided automatically by some fixed stock of 
‘indexical features’.121 
This in-principle claim, that minimal contents are necessarily incomplete, distinguishes Radical 
Contextualism from its more moderate neighbour. Moderate Contextualists accept that there 
can be minimal truth-evaluable contents but claim that these have no theoretical or practical 
importance in their own right. Instead, the contents of primary importance are held to be those 
which the speaker intuitively communicates; and these will often be highly context-dependent. 
As we saw in chapter 2, Recanati (2010) advocates such a view, under the label of ‘Truth-
Conditional Pragmatics’. He writes: 
There is no doubt that one can define ‘what is said’ in such a way that only weak 
pragmatic effects can affect what is said. If we do so, Minimalism comes out true by 
definition…What the truth-conditional pragmatist means by ‘what is said’ corresponds 
to the intuitive truth-conditional content of the utterance. According to [Truth-
Conditional Pragmatics], the intuitive truth-conditions of an utterance are affected by 
free pragmatic processes. (Recanati, 2010, p. 12, emphasis in original)122 
I will argue in §6 that a closer analysis of the notion of truth-evaluability makes it difficult to 
maintain the distinction between Radical Contextualism’s in-principle claim and Moderate 
Contextualism’s practical relevance claim. For now, though, let us return to the dispute between 
 
120 I will focus mainly on Borg’s version of Minimalism here. However, in §3, I will recap some ways in 
which it differs from that of Cappelen and Lepore. 
121 I will focus on the version of Radical Contextualism put forward by Travis (2006, 2008) although I 
note that Carston (2002) makes a similar claim. 
122 More will be said in later sections to distinguish ‘free’ pragmatic processes from the ‘weak’ processes 





Minimalism and Radical Contextualism. Both sides have explicitly positioned truth-evaluability 
at the heart of their disagreement. As Borg (2012, p. 46) puts it:123 
Where minimalism differs from occasionalism then is over the question of whether 
[content recoverable without rich appeal to the context of utterance] can itself be 
thought of as genuine, truth-evaluable content. Travis…is adamant that it can’t… It is this 
commitment to the idea that any content recovered simply on the basis of lexico-
syntactic features alone (without any rich appeal to the context of utterance) is destined 
to fall short of propositional, truth-evaluable content that makes the occasionalist a true 
opponent of the minimalist. 
Responding to Cappelen and Lepore, Travis conceptualises the debate similarly: 
[Cappelen and Lepore] assign truth precisely that role in semantics which [Radical 
Contextualism] denies it. They insist that (unproblematic) declarative sentences—‘Pigs 
grunt’, ‘There are French women in Chicago’, ‘The oboe is double-reeded’—and even 
more problematic ones—‘Giraffes are tall’, ‘Sid has had enough’—express, as such, 
‘minimal propositions’. Whatever else a minimal proposition is, it is (for them) 
something truth-evaluable, and, as a rule, truth-valued. That, then, is the main issue 
between [Semantic Minimalism] and [Radical Contextualism]. (Travis, 2008, pp. 151-
152, emphasis in original) 
In this chapter, I do not seek to defend either a Minimalist or Contextualist stance. Instead, I will 
argue that it is a mistake to characterise the debate between Minimalism and Radical 
Contextualism in terms of truth-evaluability. I will show that, once this is acknowledged, the 
disagreement turns out to concern the usefulness of minimal truth-evaluable contents, rather 
than their existence per se. Accordingly, the meanings of frames qua sentences can be 
considered truth-evaluable and capable, in principle, of logical equivalence. In later chapters I 
will go on to argue that these minimal semantic meanings also have explanatory value. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows: in the next section, I introduce a spectrum of possible 
notions of truth-evaluability. In §3 and §4, I show that both Minimalists and Radical 
Contextualists rely on moderately strict notions of truth-evaluability, falling somewhere 
between the liberal and exhaustive extremes. In §5, I consider—and reject—four possible 
candidates for a moderately strict notion of truth-evaluability. I conclude, in §6, by arguing that 
 






the debate should not be framed in terms of the truth-evaluability of contents but what various 
truth-evaluable contents do for us. This dispels the Radical Contextualist’s in principle objection 
to the idea that sentences can have truth-evaluable meanings. 
2. What Truth‑evaluability Requires 
I start from the assumption that what makes a content truth-evaluable is, in some sense, its 
ability to map worldly states of affairs to truth-values.124, 125 A naïve view would require truth-
evaluable contents to map all possible states of affairs to truth-values. Take, for example, the 
following sentence: 
(1) Serena Williams is American 
According to the naïve view’s exhaustive criterion, for sentence (1) to express a truth-evaluable 
content, states of affairs must either be ones in which Serena is American (and which are 
therefore mappable to TRUE) or ones in which that is not the case (mappable to FALSE). 
Crucially, no states of affairs may remain unmapped.  
The naïve view, however, is typically considered to be implausibly stringent by philosophers on 
both sides of the debate. Borg (2012, p. 108) writes: 
On this approach then a proposition p must suffice to determine, for every possible 
world, whether p is true or not in that world. As it stands, this condition is too strong 
(for instance, there are issues with worlds where objects fail to exist, worlds where 
fundamental laws are very different to those of this world, and perhaps with vagueness). 
Travis (2008, p. 134) similarly points out: “Our language is not rigid. It does not foresee its own 
application in, or to, every circumstance in, or to, which it may prove to need to be applied”. 
Building on this, he writes: 
 
124 Therefore, should truth-evaluability be defined in an entirely different way, the arguments developed 
here might not apply. 
125 Putting things in terms of mappings effected by contents themselves allows us to target a metaphysical 
question, distinct from epistemic questions concerning language-users’ knowledge or beliefs about those 
mappings. This strategy avoids begging the question against those who consider such epistemic questions 
to be independent of the truth-evaluability of contents themselves. Borg, for example, aims to keep 
semantic theory free of substantive epistemological concerns (Borg 2004, pp. 1–2). Such a strategy does 
not presume that contents can map states of affairs to truth-values wholly independently of a community 
of language-users; it rests only on the weaker point that such mappings may be independent of what any 





Take an arbitrary collection of statements, for each of which there is a way which is the 
way it said things to be. Is it guaranteed that every member of the collection is either 
true or false? Does that follow merely from those statements being the ones they are? Or 
from each having the feature that there is such a thing as how it said things to be? My 
answer is no. (Travis, 2008, pp. 142-143) 
It seems clear, then, that neither Minimalists nor Radical Contextualists wish to deploy an 
exhaustive notion of truth-evaluability. Instead, they are thinking of truth-evaluable contents as 
achieving only some partial mapping of possible states of affairs to truth-values. The task is to 
say what this partial mapping should be. 
One possibility lies at the opposite end of the spectrum. A liberal notion of truth-evaluability 
would count any content as truth-evaluable so long as it mapped at least one possible state of 
affairs to at least one truth-value. Returning to (1), there need only be some possible state of 
affairs in which Serena is American, or one in which that is not the case.126 
In §3 and §4, I will show that neither Minimalists nor Radical Contextualists can be thinking of 
truth-evaluability in this liberal way. Instead, both of their accounts depend on some stricter 
notion. Although there is relatively little discussion in the literature of how to define such a 
notion, in §5 I will consider four alternatives. These require truth-evaluable contents to map, 
respectively: 
(i) at least one possible state of affairs to TRUE; 
(ii) many, or most, possible states of affairs to truth-values; 
(iii) possible states of affairs to truth-values in an intuitively correct way; 
(iv) actual states of affairs to truth-values. 
 
126 I am grateful to Nat Hansen for pointing out that this liberal notion seems technically consistent with 
Bach’s claim that a “complete and determinate proposition” must be “something capable of being true or 
false” (Bach 1994, p. 127). In practice, though, Bach seems to rely on a stricter notion. He deems many 
sentences to fall short of expressing complete, truth-evaluable propositions (thus expressing only 
‘propositional radicals’). These nevertheless seem capable of expressing something false (applying the 
strategy to be fleshed out in §§3 and 4 below). Although such sentences would satisfy the second disjunct 





Jumping ahead for a moment, I will argue that none of these options is plausible. I will propose 
instead that we revert to the most liberal way of defining a mapping from states of affairs to 
truth-values. 
3. Truth‑evaluability in Minimalism 
Minimalists appeal to truth-evaluability at two junctures in their account: first, to demonstrate 
that some sentences require (very limited) relativization to contexts, in order to express truth-
evaluable minimal contents; and, second, to defend against any further contextual influences on 
such contents. 
According to Minimalists, the truth-evaluable, minimal contents expressed by sentences are 
determined compositionally; roughly-speaking, by the meanings of words (as given by their 
entries in the lexicon) and the way they are combined (according to grammatical rules). 
In typical cases, the contributions that sentence components make to minimal contents are held 
to be independent of the particular context in which they are uttered. Nonetheless, as discussed 
in chapter 2, Minimalists standardly recognize a set of exceptional elements in language that are 
genuinely context-sensitive. These include, at least, indexicals (like ‘I’ and ‘you’), demonstratives 
(like ‘this’ and ‘that’), a small set of other, open-class expressions (like ‘here’, ‘yesterday’, and 
‘actual’) and tense-markers. Such context-sensitive elements can have different extensions in 
different contexts; for example, the expression ‘she’ can refer to different (female) individuals, 
when uttered by different speakers on different occasions. 
Minimalists deny that sentences containing these kinds of context-sensitive elements can 
express truth-evaluable contents independently of context. Thus Borg writes: 
To claim that pragmatics has no role to play at all within the semantic realm is very 
likely to lead to the claim that the subject matter of semantics is sub-propositional or 
non-truth evaluable content. The reason for this is pretty easy to see: consider the 
sentence ‘I’m here now’. Unless one is able to look to a specific context in which this 
sentence is uttered it will be impossible to deliver values for the context-sensitive terms 
‘I’, ‘here’ and ‘now’. Yet without such values any content we can recover for the sentence 
(perhaps in terms of a Kaplanian character) is bound to fall short of propositional, truth-





Take the following sentence:127 
(2) She is American 
The context-independent, linguistic meaning of sentence (2) places some conditions on its truth. 
Specifically, it requires that there is at least one female individual who is American; we can 
express this as follows:128 
Context-Independent Content (CIC): ‘She is American’ is true only if ∃ x (x is female ∧ 
x is American). 
Minimalists consider CIC to fall short of being a truth-evaluable content because it does not 
specify which individual—the actual referent of ‘she’ in the context of utterance of (2)—must 
have the properties of being female and American. 
Relatedly, CIC is not a traditional truth-condition: it captures only necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for the truth of sentence (2) (the direction of the conditional travels only from left to 
right). This means that CIC is incapable of mapping any states of affairs to TRUE. Instead, for any 
state of affairs that includes at least one female American (thus satisfying the necessary 
condition expressed by CIC), the truth-value of the content remains indeterminate (neither 
definitely true nor definitely false). These considerations are taken as evidence against contents 
like CIC being truth-evaluable.129 
Note, though, that CIC is capable of mapping some states of affairs to FALSE – specifically, those 
in which there are no female Americans. The context-independent, linguistic constraints 
provided by sentence (2) are sufficient on their own to rule out such states of affairs. Recall too 
that the liberal notion of truth-evaluability described in §2 above requires only that at least one 
possible state of affairs be mappable to at least one truth-value. If we were to adopt this notion, 
 
127 In this sentence, ‘she’ is to be understood deictically rather than anaphorically. This ensures that its 
referent cannot be determined purely linguistically, within the discourse context, but only by appeal to 
features of the extra-linguistic context. 
128 According to some accounts (2) may express a truth as long as the speaker’s intended referent is 
American, even if that individual turns out not, in fact, to be female. Thus, the necessary condition in the 
consequent of CIC reduces to: Ǝx(x is American). If preferred, readers can simply plug in this alternative 
condition, and substitute ‘American’ for ‘female American’ throughout the ensuing discussion. 
129 Note that CIC differs from two other kinds of contents in the neighbourhood. First, it differs from a 
content expressible by the sentence, “There are some female Americans”, for which the condition ‘∃x(x is 
female ∧ x is American)’ would be not only necessary but also sufficient. That content would map any 
state of affairs containing at least one female American to TRUE. CIC also differs from Perry’s ‘reflexive 
content’ (Perry, 2012). The reflexive content of (2) would typically determine a value for x; the important 
point is that it would do so via a relation between x and the utterance of (2), not via the direct reference of 





then, CIC would count as a truth-evaluable content (just in virtue of its being ‘falsity-evaluable’, 
as it were). Since Minimalists deny that CIC is truth-evaluable, it is clear that they cannot be 
operating with the liberal notion of truth-evaluability. Instead, they are assuming something 
stricter. In §5, I will consider some potential candidates. For now, I continue setting out the 
positive Minimalist view, leading to its second appeal to truth-evaluability. 
Minimalists argue that a sentence like (2) can only express a truth-evaluable content once 
relativized to a context of utterance. Specifically, that context must determine the referents of 
context-sensitive elements like ‘she’. To characterise the truth-conditions of minimal contents, 
Borg (2004, pp. 165-166; 2012, pp. 135-136) adopts Higginbotham’s conditionalized t-
sentences (Higginbotham & Segal, 1994, pp. 92-93). For sentence (2), this gives us something 
like the following: 
Minimal Content (MC): If the speaker of ‘She is American’ refers with the utterance of 
‘she’ therein to x and to nothing else, then this sentence, as uttered in this context, is true 
if and only if x is American. 
MC depends on a specific, contextualized utterance of (2), in order to incorporate x as the actual 
referent of ‘she’.130 This is what supposedly allows MC to provide sufficient as well as necessary 
conditions on truth. Since MC is a standard biconditional truth-condition, it maps states of 
affairs to TRUE if x is American; and to FALSE if x is not American. In this way, Minimalists 
standardly acknowledge some role for context in determining minimal contents. 
A crucial qualification is that the role for context is restricted to providing values only for 
genuinely context-sensitive elements of the sentence. As discussed in chapter 2, there is some 
disagreement between Minimalists as to how these genuinely context-sensitive elements should 
be defined. Cappelen and Lepore (2005) primarily seek to limit the quantity of context-sensitive 
elements in language (more or less to those enumerated by Kaplan (1989)). Borg (2004, 2012) 
instead prioritises a qualitative constraint, requiring context-sensitivity to be traceable back to 
lexico-syntactic features of the sentence. The key idea here is that any context-sensitivity must 
already be built into the lexical entry or grammatical rule.131 
 
130 Specifically, ‘she’ is supposed to acquire the value, x, via direct reference. This means that MC2 is not a 
reflexive content in Perry’s sense (Borg, 2012, p. 136, footnote 27). 
131 In this way, it is maintained that minimal contents flow directly from a sentence’s formal, 
compositional, semantic meaning. As we will see in §5, though, they need not correspond to 
communicated contents, which may also depend on pragmatic factors. As Kratzer (2012, p. 4) puts it: 
Words, phrases, and sentences acquire content when we utter them on particular occasions. 





Setting this wrinkle aside, Minimalists typically agree that a minimal content like MC is truth-
evaluable as it stands, without further contextual enrichment. The claim that there are 
complete, truth-evaluable, minimal contents of this kind constitutes Minimalism’s second 
appeal to truth-evaluability. As will be discussed in the next section, it is also the focus of the 
Radical Contextualist critique. 
Before moving on, though, it should be noted that Minimalists may well have other reasons for 
accommodating limited contextual influences on minimal content, aside from considerations of 
truth-evaluability. In particular, they point out that certain context-sensitive elements of 
language are referring expressions, and rigidly designate their referents (see, for example (Borg, 
2012, pp. 134-142)). Whereas a content like MC captures this feature of the expression ‘she’, CIC 
does not; in that sense, CIC might be deemed ‘incomplete’. 
It would take us too far afield to evaluate the substance of claims about which expressions are 
rigid designators. Instead, I want only to show that such claims are orthogonal to the current 
discussion. The question we are concerned with here is whether or not a content like CIC is 
truth-evaluable, not whether it fails to capture certain facts about the meaning of the expression 
‘she’. Minimalists have claimed that one problem with a content like CIC is that it falls short of 
truth-evaluability; it is this claim I wish to interrogate. I allow that a different incompleteness 
challenge may be mounted against CIC, on the basis that it fails to respect certain meaning facts. 
Indeed, this is an approach I discuss further in §§5 and 6. However, once the Minimalist takes 
this path, any appeal to truth-evaluability, as such, simply falls away.132 
4. Truth‑evaluability in Radical Contextualism 
Radical Contextualists claim that minimal contents, and not just the likes of CIC, inevitably fall 
short of truth-evaluability. Extending the Minimalist’s argument against CIC, it is argued that the 
context-independent, linguistic meanings of sentences always underspecify truth-evaluable 
contents.133 Travis writes: 
 
describe all those features of the meaning of a linguistic expression that stay invariable in 
whatever context the expression may be used. This invariable element is the meaning proper of 
an expression. 
132 In §5 I will also reject attempts to incorporate such meaning facts within the very definition of truth-
evaluability itself. 
133 This is not a straightforward generalization of the Minimalist’s argument, since Radical Contextualists 
think the incompleteness arises in a different way: whereas, for Minimalists, context-sensitivity can only 
emerge from lexical or syntactic features, Contextualists argue for free contextual enrichment, unbidden 





The driving force of [Radical Contextualism] is this idea: the open sentences of language 
speak of ways for things to be which admit of understandings… This blocks truth-
conditional semantics. For suppose I say, ‘The sentence “Sid grunts” is true iff Sid 
grunts’. Either I use that last ‘grunts’ on some particular understanding of being a 
grunter—one understanding among many—or I do not. If I do, then I assign the 
sentence a property it does not have. For it does not speak of being a grunter on any 
special understanding of this. But if I do not, then I fail to state any condition under 
which anything might be true. Being a grunter on no particular understanding of being 
one is just not a way for Sid to be. In brief, the choices here are falsehood or failure to 
say anything. What would be needed to block this result are ways for things to be, which 
one might speak of, and which do not admit of understandings. (Travis, 2008, p. 159, 
emphasis in original) 
Similar reasoning can be applied to the expression ‘American’ in our sentence (2). Imagine, for 
example, a tennis player who is an American citizen but has nonetheless entered a tournament 
as part of a team that is unaffiliated to America. In a context in which the player’s citizenship is 
at stake, an utterance of (2) might be considered true. However, in a context in which her team 
affiliation is at stake, an utterance of the same sentence might be considered false. According to 
the Radical Contextualist, there are no available understandings of expressions like ‘grunt’ and 
‘American’, in the absence of specific contexts of utterance.134,135 
From the Radical Contextualist’s perspective, then, the minimal contents posited by Minimalists 
fall short of truth-evaluability, since they fail to recognise the full extent of contextual effects. 
With respect to sentence (2), the minimal content can be thought of as placing only a necessary 
condition on the truth of an utterance of (2). Specifically, it requires that the referent of ‘she’ is 
American on some understanding of ‘American’—an understanding which could potentially be 
 
134 In response, Minimalists typically reject this claim outright. They argue, for example, that such 
expressions pick out properties common to all individuals of whom they may be literally and truthfully 
predicated. See, for example, (Cappelen & Lepore, 2005, chapter 11) and (Borg, 2012). For opposing 
views, see (Chomsky, 2000; MacFarlane, 2007; Pietroski, 2005, 2018). 
135 Since the issue here concerns the satisfaction of predicates like ‘grunts’ and ‘is American’, it would be 
possible to reframe the discussion in terms of the satisfaction-conditions of such predicates, rather than 
the truth-conditions of sentences that contain them (an anonymous reviewer of (Fisher, 2019) raises this 
point). In order to address the Minimalist and Contextualist arguments head-on, I have opted to retain the 
standard framing in terms of truth-evaluability. However, I do not believe anything of substance hangs on 
this decision; the same considerations that favour a liberal notion of truth-evaluability (enumerated in §5) 
would also favour a liberal notion of satisfiability, such that a predicate would count as satisfiable so long 





made available in some context or other. The truth-condition must therefore be pared back to 
the following conditional: 
Minimal Content 2 (MC2): If the speaker of ‘She is American’ refers with the utterance 
of ‘she’ therein to x and to nothing else, then this sentence, as uttered in this context, is 
true only if there is some understanding of ‘American’ on which x is American. 
Whereas the Minimalist’s MC assumes that there is some context-independent understanding of 
‘American’, the Radical Contextualist denies that any such understanding is available. In the 
absence of an appropriate, contextually-determined understanding of ‘American’, MC2 fails to 
provide a value for that expression. As before, this leaves us with a content that lacks a 
sufficiency condition for its truth. It is incapable of determining whether x is American, and 
therefore cannot map any states of affairs to TRUE. Instead, states of affairs in which x is 
American on some possible understanding remain unmapped to either truth-value. This is taken 
to show that MC2 falls short of truth-evaluability. 
Nevertheless, again, MC2 is capable of mapping some states of affairs to FALSE – specifically, 
those in which x is not American, on any possible understanding. This seems compatible with 
Travis’s account; in the long passage quoted below, he argues that linguistic meaning places 
important constraints on expressible content: 
I think that the English ‘is round’ speaks, as such, of being round. So I think it speaks of 
that on every use of it which is (a case of) speaking proper English. I am not dissuaded 
from this view by the fact that, on different such speakings of it, it will make different 
contributions to the truth-conditions of wholes of which it may, then, be part. There is a 
fact about that bit of English which I hope I can capture in that way. It is that the 
meanings of those words constrain, in a particular way, what you can say on an occasion 
in using them—even if they do not narrow things down to just one thing. I can, occasion 
permitting, call the squash ball round and speak truth of it even as it begins its rebound 
off the wall. But I cannot so easily call it round and speak truth of it just in case it barks, 
or is made of lead, or is on fire. My idea is: I can use ‘is round’, on an occasion, of a ball, to 
say what I would say on that occasion in calling it round; and (ceteris paribus, perhaps) 
that is all I can use those words to say of it. Further, to say what I just did is to say how 
the meanings of those words constrain their use. I cannot use those words of the ball 
(speaking English, so that they mean what they do) and thereby say the ball to be on fire, 
unless there is an understanding of being round on which to be round is to be on fire. 





what you can use ‘is round’ to say in speaking English. (Travis, 2008, pp. 175-176, 
emphasis in original) 
I interpret the linguistic constraints described by Travis as ruling out some possible states of 
affairs.136 As we have seen, this is all that is needed for contents to count as truth-evaluable on a 
liberal notion of truth-evaluability. Radical Contextualists, then (like Minimalists) must be 
operating with some suitably stricter notion of truth-evaluability, given their denial that 
contents like MC2 are truth-evaluable. 
5. Stricter Notions of Truth‑evaluability 
In the previous two sections, I demonstrated that neither Minimalists nor Radical Contextualists 
can be working with a liberal notion of truth-evaluability. Instead, both camps are relying on 
something stricter. There has been little explicit discussion of what that stricter notion is. In this 
section I will consider four possibilities that require truth-evaluable contents to map, 
respectively: 
(i) at least one possible state of affairs to TRUE; 
(ii) many, or most, possible states of affairs to truth-values; 
(iii) possible states of affairs to truth-values in an intuitively correct way; 
(iv) actual states of affairs to truth-values. 
I will argue that none of these works. Of course, given the form of the argument, this does not 
prove that no moderately strict notion of truth-evaluability is available, since more promising 
candidates might yet be identified. However, by eliminating some initially plausible possibilities, 
I aim to shift the burden of proof to those who rely on such a notion, to provide a workable 
definition. 
Starting with (i), we saw that contents like CIC and MC2 were incapable of mapping any possible 
states of affairs to TRUE (even though they map some to FALSE). The first suggestion, then, 
would require truth-evaluable contents to map at least one possible state of affairs to TRUE, not 
 
136 Likewise, if we chose to think about things in terms of predicate satisfaction, a predicate’s invariant 
satisfaction-condition would act as a constraint, or filter, preventing at least some things from being 
included within its extension on any occasion of use (and therefore ensuring that at least some possible 
applications of the predicate would express falsehoods). This is despite the fact that the satisfaction 
condition might not define any very specific extension that the predicate may be used to pick out on a 





just to FALSE. In other words, this proposal stipulates that the truth-condition must be a 
standard biconditional, preventing mere ‘falsity-evaluability’ from entailing truth-evaluability. 
The problem with this proposal is that it would automatically deny truth-evaluability to 
necessary falsehoods. By definition, these cannot map any states of affairs to TRUE (no state of 
affairs could correspond to the right-hand side of a biconditional truth-condition). Take, for 
example, a sentence of the following form: 
(3) x is F and not-F. 
Let’s assume that the lexical entry for ‘F’ has no context-sensitivity built into it; and that both 
occurrences of ‘F’ in (3) obtain identical understandings in the context of utterance. In such a 
scenario (3) will express a contradiction, mapping no states of affairs to TRUE. Nevertheless, I 
take it that both Minimalists and Radical Contextualists would consider it to express something 
truth-evaluable (just false).137 
It might be objected, however, that necessary falsehoods are relevantly different from the 
contents expressed by sentences like (1) and (2). An obvious difference is that necessary 
falsehoods map all possible states of affairs to FALSE, leaving no possible worlds unmapped. It 
might be suspected, then, that the problem with the liberal notion of truth-evaluability is that it 
leaves some possible worlds unmapped to either truth-value. 
As discussed in §2, neither Minimalists nor Radical Contextualists endorse an exhaustive notion 
of truth-evaluability, so the problem can’t be a simple failure to map all possible states of affairs 
to truth-values. Perhaps, though, contents like CIC and MC2 map too few states of affairs to 
truth-values. This brings us to proposal (ii), which would require truth-evaluable contents to 
map many, or most, possible states of affairs to truth-values. However, any such criterion is at 
best vague and at worst unworkable. It is vague as long as the requirement to map ‘many’ states 
of affairs to truth-values fails to specify how many. Any attempt to impose such a threshold 
would seem straightforwardly arbitrary. A deeper problem is that, assuming there are infinitely 
 
137 Note that I am not requiring Radical Contextualists to sign up to the idea that sentence (3) expresses 
something necessarily false independently of context. I have explicitly allowed for the possibility that it 
does so only following rich contextualization, as long as both occurrences of ‘F’ obtain identical 
understandings in the context. It is important here to distinguish between the context of utterance, which 
determines the content of (3), and the context of evaluation, which determines whether or not (3) is 
satisfied. (3) may express a necessary falsehood only in some contexts of utterance, but wherever it does 





many possible states of affairs, it may not even make sense to talk about some proportion of 
them being mappable to truth-values. 
Another way of interpreting the worry is that the contents expressible with sentences like (1) 
and (2) (unlike necessary falsehoods) should, intuitively, map certain kinds of states of affairs to 
TRUE – specifically, those in which the individual being referred to is, in fact, American 
(whether ‘American’ is thought of as expressing a property context-independently, or only on a 
context-specific understanding). This brings us to suggestion (iii). The idea is that truth-
evaluable contents must map states of affairs to truth-values in an intuitively correct way, i.e. in 
a way that reflects what a speaker could reasonably mean by using those words. 
I take it that CIC and MC2 would not count as truth-evaluable on this basis. A speaker uttering 
(2) is reasonably taken to refer to some particular (female) individual by using ‘she’; and to 
predicate some property of that individual by saying that she is ‘American’. Thus, intuitively, the 
content of (2) should map to TRUE those states of affairs in which the individual in question has 
the relevant property; and it should map to FALSE those in which she doesn’t.138,139 
Nevertheless, intuitions about appropriate mappings to truth-values would need to be of the 
right kind for this proposal to get going. For the Minimalist, that would mean showing that the 
intuitions concern the minimal content of the sentence, rather than some contextually richer 
speech act content that gets communicated by the sentence in use. In general, Minimalists are 
careful to point out that minimal contents need not (and typically won’t) answer to all of our 
intuitions about what is communicated by an utterance. As Borg (2012, p. 48) puts it: 
These minimal contents provide the literal meaning of sentences relativized to contexts 
of utterance, though, the minimalist acknowledges, they do not usually provide the 
intuitive contents of speech acts involving those sentences.140 
To see the point, take the following sentence, as uttered by a tennis spectator to her companion: 
 
138 I note that the question of how widely these intuitions are shared is ultimately an empirical matter. 
139 This may be one way of cashing out a suggestion we find in Borg, that one might consider a content 
truth-evaluable “just in case it makes a ruling in a range of clear-cut possible scenarios” (Borg, 2004, p. 
238). Note that Borg does not endorse this suggestion; she argues only that if it were adopted, minimal 
contents would count as truth-evaluable. 
140 Similar points are made by Cappelen and Lepore (2005) and García-Carpintero (2013). It is worth 
noting that each of these philosophers is careful to emphasize the very important role played by speech 
act contents in a theory of linguistic communication. Their claim is therefore not that we can, or should, 
disregard such contents. Rather, it is that they should be held apart from minimal contents, which play a 





(4) Williams bounced the ball three times and served an ace. 
What the spectator intuitively communicates is that Williams bounced the ball three times and 
then served an ace. However, the minimal content of the sentence is consistent with Williams 
having performed those actions in the reverse order, i.e. serving an ace and then bouncing the 
ball three times. Minimalists thus place a wedge between a sentence’s minimal content (based 
on compositional semantics) and the wider (pragmatic) speech act contents of utterances. 
At most, then, minimal contents aim to capture only some subset of intuitions about what 
speakers could reasonably mean; namely, those which reflect the constraints imposed by 
context-independent, linguistic meanings. These would need to be carefully delineated before 
the Minimalist could appeal to what speakers of (2) intuitively use ‘she’ to mean. Specifically, it 
would need to be shown that the use of ‘she’ to refer to a particular female individual relates to 
the expression’s lexical entry rather than to use-specific facts.141 
Assuming that the relevant intuitions can be pinned to a sufficiently restricted content, still they 
seem to arise from meaning facts that are quite distinct from the requirements of truth-
evaluability. For example, it is because ‘she’ is taken to be a certain kind of referring expression 
that the content of (2) is expected to concern the referent of ‘she’ (and to be true if and only if 
that particular individual is American). Rather than stipulating that truth-evaluable contents 
must respect such facts, it seems more parsimonious to appeal to the facts directly when 
arguing for contextual relativization. As discussed in §3, then, the Minimalist might argue that 
contents like CIC are incomplete, on the basis that the lexical entries for expressions like ‘she’ 
demand contextually-determined referents. Yet this is entirely consistent with CIC being truth-
evaluable. The argument that CIC fails to capture our intuitions about the invariant meaning of 
the expression ‘she’ is independent of that content’s status as truth-evaluable or not. In sum, 
nothing is gained by building independently motivated intuitions into the notion of truth-
evaluability.142 
 
141 Radical Contextualists may face a similar problem if they wish to distinguish the content directly 
expressed by the utterance from other contents that are merely indirectly expressed, or implicated. 
Specifically, it would need to be shown that the use of ‘American’ to pick out a context-specific property 
relates to what the speaker of (2) directly expresses, rather than indirectly implicates. There is some 
evidence that Travis sees value in maintaining such a distinction; see, for example, his discussion in ‘On 
What is Strictly Speaking True’ (Travis, 2008, chapter 1). 
142 Analogously, from the Contextualist perspective, nothing is gained by conflating a content’s truth-
evaluability with whether a speaker intuitively communicated it. Thus, even if there is a sense in which 
speakers are reasonably taken to mean something fairly specific by using the word ‘American’, we can 
appeal to that fact without saying that considerations of truth-evaluability require ‘American’ to have such 





Finally, option (iv) would require any truth-evaluable content to map actual states of affairs to 
truth-values. Again, this would preclude contents like CIC and MC2 from being truth-evaluable. 
For example, given that the actual world does contain female Americans, CIC fails to map any 
actual states of affairs to truth-values (not even to FALSE). 
This condition is also implausible, however. At the same time as denying the truth-evaluability 
of the sentence ‘She is American’, it would deem the structurally similar sentence ‘She is 
demoniac’ to be perfectly truth-evaluable, in virtue of its being mappable to FALSE in the actual 
world (assuming there are in fact no demons). This seems to carve up the territory in the wrong 
way, for both the Minimalist and the Radical Contextualist.143,144 
To sum up, I currently see no reason to favour a moderately strict notion of truth-evaluability 
over the liberal alternative. The liberal notion has the advantage of being modest without being 
vacuous: it successfully captures the idea that truth-evaluability concerns mappings of states of 
affairs to truth-values, without imposing additional, unjustified, constraints on the nature of 
those mappings. Pending the identification of more promising candidates for a moderately strict 
notion, I conclude that we should take contents like CIC and MC2 to be truth-evaluable, in line 
with the liberal notion. 
6. Implications 
Where does this leave us? First, acknowledging that contents like CIC are truth-evaluable 
undermines the Minimalist’s claim that sentences like (2) require relativization to contexts, in 
order to be truth-evaluable. (As we will see below, however, those sentences may still be argued 
to require contextual relativization on separate grounds.) 
Likewise, acknowledging that contents like CIC and MC2 are truth-evaluable neutralizes the 
Radical Contextualist’s claim that sentences can only ever express truth-evaluable contents once 
richly contextualized. (Again, though, as will be discussed below, it may still be denied that such 
contents have any explanatory value.) 
 
143 The underlying problem seems to be that option (iv) makes a content’s truth-evaluability—not just its 
truth-value—depend on how the actual world happens to be. Instead, truth-evaluability is better thought 
of as a function of content, which (whether richly dependent on the context of utterance or not) must be 
fixed independently of its satisfaction in actual or possible worlds. Thus, only the truth-value of the 
content may change across different contexts of evaluation, not its truth-evaluability in general. 
144 Perhaps a fifth option could require truth-evaluable contents to map, not actual states of affairs, but 
some contextually-relevant set of possible states of affairs, to truth-values. Indeed, something along these 
lines is suggested by Rayo (2013). However, getting the proposal off the ground would require, at least, 





A third point, which falls out from the first two, is that the debate between Minimalism and 
Radical Contextualism cannot fundamentally concern truth-evaluability. I have suggested that 
both camps should agree that minimal contents are truth-evaluable. As I will argue below, I 
think the debate between them ultimately concerns the practical significance of minimal 
contents. 
In fact, Minimalists and Radical Contextualists shouldn’t only agree that minimal contents are 
truth-evaluable but also that contents like CIC are truth-evaluable. In other words, there is a 
level of truth-evaluable content that is even more minimal than Minimalism’s minimal content. I 
will call this ‘marginal content’.145 
Although I think Minimalists should recognize that marginal contents like CIC are truth-
evaluable, I note that this is consistent with their maintaining that minimal contents like MC 
retain an important role in semantic theorising. Such contents, recall, capture just those 
contextual effects which are anticipated by an expression’s lexical entry, or a sentence’s 
combinatory syntax. Thus, I believe the key task facing the proponents of standard versions of 
Minimalism, is to demonstrate the explanatory value of the minimal contents they posit, which 
hold apart ‘weak’ or ‘mandatory’ contextual effects from the ‘free’ contextual effects that 
influence wider speech act contents. Minimalists have indeed sought to meet this challenge; see, 
for example, (Borg, 2004, 2012, 2017) and (Cappelen & Lepore, 2005). Although I do not 
attempt to assess their arguments here, they seem to me to be the cornerstone of any defence of 
the view. 
On the other side, I have argued that Radical Contextualists should also recognize both minimal 
and marginal contents as truth-evaluable. In other words, they should drop the in-principle 
claim that sentences cannot express truth-evaluable contents independently of context. That 
means Radical Contextualism must take up a more moderate position, objecting to minimal 
contents purely on the basis that that they lack practical relevance, since they generally fail to 
capture what speakers communicate. 
 
145 The proposal here is in some ways similar to that of García-Carpintero (1998), which identifies 
minimal semantic content with context-independent, linguistic meaning. However, García-Carpintero 
assumes that this content is not truth-evaluable. Others who restrict ‘semantics’ to an entirely context-
independent level of meaning similarly take it to fall short of truth-evaluability (in some or all cases) – 
see, for example (Carston, 2002) and (Harris, forthcoming). My purpose here has been to show that 
semantic constraints of the kind envisaged are, in fact, sufficient for truth-evaluability. Of course, though, 
we can (and should) posit additional levels of meaning in order to capture other aspects of what is 





Indeed, this line of argument is commonly pursued by Contextualists of all stripes. As we saw in 
§1, Moderate Contextualists acknowledge that sentences express truth-evaluable, minimal 
contents, while arguing that these contents have no significance, in their own right. Thus, 
whereas appeals to truth-evaluability have standardly purported to distinguish Radical 
Contextualism from Moderate Contextualism, they in fact end up obscuring a key point of 
agreement between the two views. 
A key task facing both Moderate and Radical Contextualists, then, is to argue (against the 
Minimalist) that mandatory contextual effects have no privileged status in a theory of meaning 
but, instead, the contents of theoretical interest are those which can be freely influenced by the 
context. For some arguments to this effect, see (Carston, 2002) and (Recanati, 2004, 2010). 
Again, I cannot assess these here but I suggest that they are central to the dispute between 
Minimalists and Contextualists. It is only possible to recognize this point once we dispel the 
spectre of truth-evaluability. The upshot is that we should focus on what the contents posited by 
competing theories do for us, not whether they are truth-evaluable. 
As an aside, my claim that Radical Contextualism collapses into a more moderate position may 
seem to contradict arguments put forward by Cappelen and Lepore (2005) and Borg (2012) to 
the effect that it is Moderate Contextualism that is doomed to collapse into Radical 
Contextualism.146 I believe that the disagreement here is, in large part, only apparent. In this 
chapter, I have focused narrowly on the different parties’ claims about truth-evaluability; it is 
with respect to these claims that I have argued Radical Contextualism must move towards a 
more moderate stance. In contrast, Cappelen and Lepore (2005, chapters 3-5) focus on 
Contextualists’ claims about the number of context-sensitive expressions in language. They 
argue that, once the Moderate Contextualist begins to expand the set of context-sensitive 
expressions, there is no stable place to stop, until all linguistic expressions are included. Thus, 
taking the first step on a Contextualist path inevitably sends one down the slippery slope to a far 
more radical position. Whether or not they are right about this, it remains entirely consistent 
with what I have said; sliding towards the more extreme position on their scale, concerning the 
pervasiveness of context-sensitivity, does not imply taking a radical stance on the question of 
whether minimal contents can, in principle, be truth-evaluable. As I have attempted to show, a 
sentence can still express something truth-evaluable, despite its containing context-sensitive 
elements, just so long as its invariant meaning filters out some possible states of affairs. 
 





Meanwhile, Borg (2012, pp. 35-38) addresses Contextualists’ claims about ‘sharpening’ or 
‘precisifying’ contents, in order to capture what a speaker communicated in context. Whereas 
Moderate Contextualists standardly take such sharpenings to be possible, some Radical 
Contextualists have argued (and Borg agrees) that the process is, in principle, never-ending: the 
only way to stop making increasingly fine-grained distinctions is by acknowledging that context 
plays an ineliminable role in content-determination. She thus identifies a different way in which 
Moderate Contextualism seems inexorably to slide toward a more radical position. Again, 
though, this would be consistent with my argument since, even if one is forced to accept that 
only richly contextually-embedded contents capture what a speaker communicated, this would 
not imply that such contextualization is required for truth-evaluability. Thus, for example, 
according to Travis’s Occasion-sensitive account, it is impossible to sharpen communicated 
contents in a way that would allow them to be represented, either in language or in thought 
(this distinguishes his approach from many other forms of Contextualism). However, this 
dimension of his view is quite independent of the claim that only contextually-embedded 
communicated contents can be truth-evaluable. Again, it is the latter claim that has been my 
target here.  
As mentioned in chapter 2, the question of whether it is possible to represent communicated 
contents accurately in language, abstracting from context, is one which falls beyond the scope of 
the thesis. Throughout my discussion of framing effects, I provide linguistic formulations that 
are intended to capture roughly how uttered frames might be interpreted. If Travis is right, 
these formulations will never fully capture what is actually communicated. Be that as it may, 
they are sufficient for my purpose, which is to investigate why alternative frames are 
interpreted differently from one another. Therefore, I will not address the radical 
representational claim that is distinctive of Travis’s Occasion-sensitivity. I will only address (in 
chapter 8) a claim it shares with other, more moderate, forms of Contextualism – namely, that 






At the end of the previous chapter, I raised a possible objection to my claim that some pairs of 
alternative frames are logically equivalent, at least at the level of their minimal semantic 
meanings. The Radical Contextualist would deny that frames, qua sentences, can have meanings 
that are even truth-evaluable, let alone logically equivalent to one another. In this chapter, I 
have argued that this is mistaken, based on a closer examination of the notion of truth-
evaluability. I have argued for a liberal notion of truth-evaluability, which would block the 
Radical Contextualist’s in-principle objection to minimal contents. In conclusion, then, I 
maintain that alternative frames can have logically equivalent semantics. In the next two 










In this chapter, I endorse the ‘information leakage’ account of attribute framing effects, 
according to which alternative frames carry distinct information about the utterance context. I 
consider whether that information might concern reference points, implicit recommendations, 
psychological salience, or argumentative orientation. I also explore a related account, which 
focuses on the information conveyed by hearers’ judgements, rather than by speakers’ frames. I 
provide empirical and theoretical considerations in favour of the reference point hypothesis, 
which is developed and refined for deployment in the next steps of my argument. 
1. Introduction 
From this point on, I shift my focus from risky-choice framing to attribute framing. As discussed 
in chapter 1, attribute framing is a simpler paradigm, in which different wording is used to 
attribute the same property to an entity. Take for example, the following pair of sentences, used 
to describe a basketball player: 
(1) This player made 40% of his shots last season. 
(2) This player missed 60% of his shots last season. 
As argued in chapter 3, ‘made’ and ‘missed’ have contradictory meanings here: since no shot can 
be both missed and made, the expressions denote mutually exclusive sets; and, since any shot is 
either missed or made (with no third possibility) the sets they denote are also jointly 
exhaustive. In line with the discussion in chapter 4, the proportions, 40% and 60%, will be 
assumed to have bilateral, complementary meanings. Taken together, these properties of 
frames (1) and (2) ensure that they have logically equivalent meanings: if one composes the 
conventional meanings of their constituents, the resulting meanings will be true (or false, or 
indeterminate) in the same possible worlds. The conclusion of chapter 5 was that we need not 
deny that frames qua sentences have such meanings, so long as truth-evaluability is understood 
sufficiently liberally. Therefore, attribute frames like (1) and (2) can indeed be understood as 
having logically equivalent minimal semantic meanings.147 I therefore define attribute frames as 
follows: 
 
147 And, indeed, logically equivalent ‘marginal’ meanings, in the terminology of the previous chapter. For 
simplicity, I will stick to discussing their ‘minimal’ meanings, in which context-sensitive elements are 





Attribute frames: pairs of sentences that predicate the same property of an individual or 
object by using contradictory predicate expressions together with complementary 
quantificational expressions. 
According to their minimal semantics, then, both (1) and (2) locate the basketball player’s 




Intuitively, though, the player sounds better when described using (1) rather than (2). As 
mentioned in previous chapters, experimental results confirm this intuition: a player is deemed 
more valuable to a team when described using (1) rather than (2) (Leong et al., 2017). In this 
chapter, I adopt the following definition of the attribute framing effect:  
Attribute framing effect: a systematic shift in audience judgements, brought about by the 
speaker’s choice of attribute frame (while all aspects of the wider context are held 
constant). 
The structure of the chapter is as follows: in §2, I outline the dominant ‘associationist’ account 
of attribute framing effects. In §3 I argue that this account cannot explain framing effects which 
do not depend on the evaluative polarity of alternative frames. In §4 I describe a competing 
approach, known as the ‘information leakage’ account, which can capture evaluatively-neutral 
framing paradigms. In §5 I explore a specific version of the information leakage account, known 
as the ‘reference point hypothesis’. In §§6-8 I assess this hypothesis against alternatives based 
on ‘implicit recommendations’, ‘psychological salience’, and ‘argumentative orientation’. In §9 I 
consider a related account developed by Geurts (2013), which focuses on the information 
conveyed by hearers’ judgements rather than by speakers’ frames. I conclude by endorsing a 
refined version of the reference point hypothesis, which I take to be currently the most 
theoretically and empirically well-supported version of the information leakage account.  
2. The Associationist Account 
Recall from chapter 1 that an expression will be considered to have positive or negative 
evaluative valence insofar as it denotes something that is typically thought of as good or bad, 
respectively. Assuming that it is good for a basketball player to make shots (given that this is the 
aim of the game), frame (1) can be thought of as positively worded, in virtue of its inclusion of 











basketball player to miss shots. As noted in chapter 1, I will restrict my focus to affirmative uses 
of valenced expressions like ‘make’ and ‘miss’. I thus leave aside for now the question of 
whether negating these verbs would produce a frame that is positive, negative, or neutral 
overall. 
Data from attribute framing research confirms that positively-worded attribute frames lead to 
relatively favourable evaluations of the entity being described, whereas their negatively-worded 
counterparts lead to relatively unfavourable evaluations (for a survey of the experimental 
literature, see (Levin et al., 1998)). Noting this ‘valence-consistent shift’, Levin and others have 
proposed that a speaker’s wording being positive or negative directly affects how hearers 
encode the information conveyed (Levin, 1987; Levin & Gaeth, 1988; Levin et al., 1986; Levin, 
Johnson, Russo, & Deldin, 1985; Levin et al., 1998). They write: 
Attribute framing is likely to influence the encoding and representation of information 
in associative memory, and this representational difference is viewed as the cause of 
valence-consistent shifts in responses. (Levin et al., 1998, p. 164, emphasis in original) 
To see roughly how this is supposed to work, when a hearer of (1) encodes the semantically-
determined information that the basketball player made 40% and missed 60% of his shots, this 
is encoded with some kind of positive association(s). Levin et al. do not say much about the 
mechanics of the encoding process; perhaps we could think of the information as receiving a 
positive ‘tag’, or as being stored in memory within a network of positively-evaluated 
information.  
Either way, when the information about the player’s performance is subsequently retrieved 
from memory, it comes with the relevant positive association(s). This is held to colour the 
hearer’s judgement in the evaluative task, explaining why the player is judged more valuable to 
a team in the positively worded framing condition than in the negatively worded condition.  
Again, it remains rather unclear exactly how the positive association(s) are supposed to affect 
the judgement. In places, the authors seem to suggest that attention plays a mediating role, such 
that the positive association(s) would cause hearers of (1) to attend mainly to the positive 
attributes of the player, rather than the negative ones (Levin et al., 1998, p. 167). I find this 
proposal rather puzzling, though: since alternative frames predicate the same attribute of an 
entity, there are no distinct (positive vs. negative) attributes to attend to under each frame.  
For now, I will simply grant that there could be some mechanism through which positive 
associations attaching to information retrieved from memory lead to relatively favourable 





encoded under negatively-worded frames can lead to relatively unfavourable judgements of the 
entity).  
Since the positive or negative associations evoked by attribute frames are supposed to bias 
hearers’ subsequent judgements, the associationist account conceives of attribute framing 
effects as a species of priming effect. What makes attribute framing effects particularly 
distinctive – and particularly robust – is how explicit the priming is. As Levin et al. put it: 
In attribute framing, the framed stimulus label is like a prime, but it is part of, rather 
than peripheral to, the description of the target stimulus. It is no wonder that the effect 
is so reliable. (Levin et al., 1998, p. 166)  
I will not attempt a detailed assessment of the associationist account here; evidently, several 
important aspects remain in need of further elaboration. Instead, I will argue that it fails to 
explain a subset of framing effects (whereas these can be captured by the competing 
‘information leakage’ account, to be introduced in §4). In particular, as I show in the next 
section, framing effects can arise independently of frames being positively- or negatively- 
valenced.  
3. Evaluative Neutrality 
I will focus on an experiment reported by McKenzie and Nelson (2003). In this experiment 
participants were found to make systematically different judgements about the prior contents 
of a glass, based on how its current contents were described. Below is an example vignette, 
which was presented to participants in one of six experimental conditions: 
Imagine that Mary was sitting at her kitchen table with a glass in front of her. She left the 
room briefly and came back to find that the contents of the glass had changed. When 
asked to describe the glass now, Mary said, “The glass is half full.” Given how Mary chose 
to describe the glass after its contents had changed, please choose the statement below 
in terms of what you think was most likely true about the glass before its contents 
changed. 
Participants were then given the following options: 
The glass was full before its contents changed. 
The glass was empty before its contents changed. 
In two of the other conditions, Mary used the degree modifiers ‘a quarter’ or ‘three quarters’ 





Mary used the contrary adjective, ‘empty’, with the complementary degree modifier. All six 
frames are listed below: 
(a) The glass is a quarter full. 
(b) The glass is three quarters empty. 
(c) The glass is half full. 
(d) The glass is half empty. 
(e) The glass is three quarters full. 
(f) The glass is a quarter empty. 





There are three pairs of frames: (a) and (b); (c) and (d); (e) and (f). Within each pair, both 
frames describe the same current contents of the glass. Nevertheless, participants were found to 
make systematically different judgements about the prior contents of the glass, depending on 
whether Mary used a ‘full’ or ‘empty’ frame. Participants in conditions (a) and (c) (where Mary 
used ‘full’ frames) were more likely to say that the glass was previously empty than participants 
in conditions (b) and (d) (where Mary used ‘empty’ frames). And, of course, it follows that the 
reverse is true: participants in conditions (b) and (d) were more likely to say the glass was 
previously full than participants in conditions (a) and (c). The difference between conditions (e) 
and (f) fell just short of statistical significance, although the trend was in the same direction. The 
full results are presented in the table below: 
 
148 According to a prominent theory of gradable adjectives, ‘full’ and ‘empty’ are absolute gradable 
adjectives with ‘closed’ scales, i.e. scales with fixed endpoints (Kennedy & McNally, 2005). Therefore, a 
glass’s being ‘full’ simpliciter means that it contains water to a maximal degree, while its being ‘empty’ 
simpliciter means that water is absent from the glass to a maximal degree. Once ‘full’ and ‘empty’ are 
combined with degree modifiers, however, they enable mappings to points along a scale, similarly to 
‘made’ and ‘missed’ in the earlier example. 
(a) ¼ full 
(b) ¾ empty 
(c) ½ full (e) ¾ full 






Frame % participants saying the glass 
was full before 
% participants saying the glass 
was empty before 
(a) ¼ full 35% 65% 
(b) ¾ empty 94% 6% 
(c) ½ full 50% 50% 
(d) ½ empty 80% 20% 
(e) ¾ full 56% 44% 
(f) ¼ empty 79% 21% 
 
Notably, this framing study does not depend on the evaluative polarity of the frames. On the one 
hand, it must be acknowledged that describing a glass as ‘half full’ has acquired idiomatic status 
in English, connoting a positive outlook on a state of affairs (whereas describing a glass as ‘half 
empty’ connotes a negative outlook). On the other hand, the experimental task is independent of 
these evaluative connotations: participants are not asked to provide an evaluative judgement 
but rather to assess the probable prior contents of the glass. Thus, even if information about a 
glass described as part ‘full’ were encoded with some positive association(s), as per the 
associationist account this would not imply that the glass was more likely to have started out 
empty rather than full. Nor would information about a glass described as part ‘empty’ being 
encoded with some negative association(s) imply that it was more likely to have started out 
full.149 Nevertheless, the experimenters observed a systematic shift in audience judgements, 
brought about by the speaker’s choice of ‘full’ or ‘empty’ frames. In other words, they found an 
attribute framing effect, without this being a ‘valence-consistent shift’.  
McKenzie and Nelson’s findings concerning ‘full’ and ‘empty’ frames have been corroborated by 
subsequent experiments conducted by Sher and McKenzie (2006) and Ingram, Hand, and Moxey 
 
149 Other experiments use pairs of frames that are more straightforwardly evaluatively-neutral. For 
example, Honda and Yamagishi (2017) ask participants to judge a protagonist’s initial beliefs about the 
number of red balls in a box of coloured balls, based on his/ her later description of the probability of 
drawing a red ball. Below is an example vignette:  
In the box, there are 100 red and white balls that have been thoroughly mixed. You are going to 
draw a ball from this box. You cannot check the contents of the box. One of your friends has 
checked the contents of the box, and found that there were 50 red balls. Then, the friend said, 
“Because there are 50 red balls in this box, it is likely that you will draw a red ball”. 
The participants were then asked:  
Which do you think the friend thought – that the number of red balls was more than 50 or fewer 
than 50? 
In this case, drawing a red ball does not denote a positive event; nor does describing the outcome as 
‘likely’ connote something good. Nevertheless, framing effects were observed for alternative descriptions 
of the probability of drawing a red ball (such as ‘likely’ vs. ‘quite doubtful’), despite these descriptions 
being mapped to similar numerical probabilities (for example, ‘likely’ and ‘quite doubtful’ were assigned 





(2014) (both of which will be discussed in more detail in chapter 7). These framing effects 
cannot be captured by the associationist account, since they do not plausibly depend on hearers 
having encoded the semantic information expressed by frames with positive or negative 
associations. In the next section, then, I turn to a competing account which can provide a 
unifying explanation of both valenced and evaluatively neutral framing effects.  
4. Information Leakage 
Over the last 20 years, McKenzie, Sher, and others have developed an explanation of attribute 
framing effects which they dub the ‘information leakage’ account (Leong et al., 2017; McKenzie 
& Sher, 2008; Sher & McKenzie, 2006, 2011). While they acknowledge that alternative frames 
have logically equivalent explicit meanings, it is argued that each frame implicitly conveys 
divergent information. As McKenzie puts it: 
[R]ecent evidence has shown that a speaker’s choice among logically equivalent 
attribute frames can implicitly convey (or “leak”) normatively relevant information 
about the speaker’s reference point, among other things. (McKenzie, 2004, p. 874)150   
In the next two chapters I will argue that the distinction between explicitly-conveyed, logically 
equivalent information, on the one hand, and implicitly-conveyed, inequivalent information, on 
the other, is naturally and fruitfully cast in terms of the distinction between semantics and 
pragmatics. In chapter 9, I will return to the idea that the information frames ‘leak’ is 
normatively relevant. For now, though, I want to explore the basic proposal that alternative 
frames convey distinct information. This is importantly different from the associationist 
hypothesis that the frames convey the same information, which merely gets encoded with 
positive or negative associations. In the remainder of the chapter, I consider what additional 
information a frame might convey, beginning with the hypothesis that it concerns a ‘reference 
point’. 
5. The Reference Point Hypothesis 
According to the reference point hypothesis, by including one of two contradictory predicate 
expressions, an attribute frame tends to convey that the subject of predication possesses the 
corresponding property to a relatively high degree. In the proponents’ own words: 
McKenzie and Nelson (2003) hypothesized the following regularity in linguistic 
behavior: (1) In describing a fixed state of proportionate affairs, speakers are more 
likely to describe the proportion in terms of ‘‘X1’’ when X1 has increased relative to the 
 
150 I interpret the central ‘leakage’ metaphor as an unofficial disclosure of information (whether 





reference point proportion (the norm, or what one would have expected) than when X1 
has decreased relative to the reference point. (2) Listeners are sensitive to this 
regularity—that is, listeners are capable of correctly inferring the reference point 
proportion from the speaker’s choice of proportion-frame. (Sher & McKenzie, 2006, p. 
471, emphasis in original)151 
To see how this is supposed to work, consider again the following pair of frames from McKenzie 
and Nelson’s experiment: 
(a) The glass is a quarter full. 
(b) The glass is three quarters empty. 
The reference point hypothesis predicts that (a) will tend to convey the ‘reference point 
information’ in (ai): 
(ai) The glass is relatively full. 
Conversely, (b) will tend to convey the reference point information (bi): 
(bi) The glass is relatively empty.152 
Since the experimental vignette and task instructions make the prior state of the glass salient, 
that can be taken as the reference point on this occasion, relative to which the glass is now 
relatively full or relatively empty.  As we will see, in other cases different kinds of reference 
points may be salient – for example, the reference point might correspond to an average, norm, 
or expectation. I will not seek to explain the determinants of salience here.153 However, in the 
relatively simple experimental scenarios I discuss, the reference point is usually fairly 
obvious.154 
 
151 Their formulation of the hypothesis here implies a temporal component, since the proportion is 
described as having increased relative to a reference point. However, in other studies where they appeal 
to the reference point hypothesis, there is no temporal relation between the reference point and the 
subject of predication. For example, in the study by Leong et al. (2017) the reference point is assumed to 
be an average, or typical, individual. Therefore, I will understand the hypothesis in more temporally 
neutral terms. 
152 Strictly speaking, the reference point information here should be the contents of beliefs attributed to 
the speaker, as in: The speaker believes that the glass is relatively full; and The speaker believes that the 
glass is relatively empty. For current purposes, I will assume that the hearer makes a justified inference 
from these more complex metarepresentational forms to the simpler ones provided in (ai) and (bi) in the 
main text. However, I will return to interrogate this assumption in chapter 9. 
153 Plausibly, salience could depend on a plethora of factors, including the wider discourse context, the 
nature of the subject of predication, and also subjective factors of the kind discussed by Verheyen, Dewil, 
and Égré (2018). 





Given the salience of the prior state of the glass in McKenzie and Nelson’s scenario, we can 
predict the following, more specific, reference point information to be conveyed by (a) and (b):  
(aii) The glass is fuller than before. 
(bii) The glass is emptier than before. 
If (a) and (b) conveyed the information in (aii) and (bii), that could explain why, when Mary 
utters (a), participants are more likely to think the glass started out empty than when she utters 
(b) (and vice-versa). The idea is that alternative frames tend to establish diametrically opposed 
relations between the subject of predication and the reference point: in this example, frame (a) 
conveys that the prior state of the glass lies in region R1 on the scale below, while frame (b) 







Depending on exactly what counts as instantiating a property to a ‘relatively high’ degree – i.e. 
how much more of the property an entity must instantiate, relative to the reference point – the 
regions R1 and R2 could turn out to be smaller than those depicted here. However, I will make 
the simplifying assumption that, so long as the entity being described possesses the relevant 
property to some higher degree than the reference point, then it counts as possessing it to a 
‘relatively high’ degree.156 
Unlike the associationist account considered earlier, the reference point hypothesis can explain 
evaluatively neutral framing effects like the one observed by McKenzie and Nelson. As Sher and 
McKenzie write:  
 
155 It is not entirely clear why the experimenters used maximal rather than relative states in the options 
presented to participants, with the glass initially being completely full or completely empty, rather than 
simply fuller or emptier. Nevertheless, their results are still consistent with the reference point 
hypothesis. 
156 We might ultimately need to appeal to something like the notion of ‘standing out’, discussed by 
Kennedy (2007), such that the distinction is based on a noticeable difference in degree. For the sake of 








[A]n associative account makes no predictions about the reference point phenomena…, 
which deal with valence-neutral descriptions and non-evaluative behaviors. (Sher & 
McKenzie, 2006, p. 482) 
Additionally, the reference point hypothesis is easily extended to the valenced cases that 
dominate the framing literature. Returning to consider the example of the basketball player, I 
will now describe in more detail the first experiment by Leong et al. (2017). Below is an 
example vignette presented to participants in one of the ‘frame’ conditions:157 
Imagine that you are a recruiter for a college basketball team. Your job is to search for 
promising high school basketball players and try to recruit them to your college. You are 
looking through files for players from local high schools, and you are especially 
interested in players who can score many points. 
The file you are currently looking at shows a player whose performance is quite 
unusual. This player made 40% of his shots last season. 
Participants in the other ‘frame’ condition were told that the player ‘missed 60%’ of his shots. 
All participants were then asked: 
How valuable do you think this player would be to your basketball team? 
In line with previous framing research, the experimenters found a statistically significant 
valence-consistent shift, such that the player was judged to be more valuable under the positive 
‘made’ frame than under the negative ‘missed’ frame. To see how this is explained by the 
reference point hypothesis, note that this account predicts (1) to convey (1a): 
(1) This player made 40% of his shots last season. 
(1a) This player made a relatively large proportion of his shots last season. 
Conversely, (2) is predicted to convey (2a): 
(2) This player missed 60% of his shots last season. 
(2a) This player missed a relatively large proportion of his shots last season. 
Under frame (1), then, the player is understood to have performed relatively well (assuming, of 
course, that making more shots is better). In contrast, under frame (2) he is understood to have 
performed relatively badly. Therefore, he is evaluated more favourably under (1) than under 
(2). Note that while both frames are taken to convey the same information about the player 
 





himself, they shift our assumptions about the reference point’s location on the scale, so that the 
player’s performance ends up seeming better or worse by comparison. Stated generally, the 
same subject can seem better under one frame than another just in virtue of being evaluated 
relative to different alternatives. 
Leong et al. (2017) provide further support for the claim that it is reference point information 
which drives the attribute framing effect here. They investigate the extent to which the adoption 
of reference point information is necessary and sufficient for the effect to occur. Their first 
experiment addresses the sufficiency claim. In addition to the ‘frame’ conditions discussed 
above, this experiment included ‘recipient’ conditions, in which participants were told that a 
particular basketball player made 40% of his shots and missed 60% last season. In other words, 
they received the performance information in both frames. They were also given information 
about the performance of a ‘typical’ high school basketball player (again, this was presented in 
both ‘made’ and ‘missed’ frames). For some participants, the typical player’s performance was 
better than that of the target player; for others the typical player’s performance was worse.158 
The results from the recipient conditions showed that the better the typical player’s 
performance, the less valuable the target player was judged to be. In other words, providing 
reference point information explicitly was sufficient to shift evaluative judgements.  
Perhaps more surprisingly, the results of the second experiment suggest that framing effects are 
weakened where reference point information conflicts with a hearer’s extant knowledge. 
Participants with varying amounts of prior basketball knowledge were asked to assess the value 
of a high school basketball player to a National Basketball Association (NBA) team. The player 
was either described as having ‘made 60%’ or ‘missed 40%’ of his free-throws; this represents 
fairly poor performance in an NBA context. It was found that participants who knew more about 
basketball were less susceptible to framing effects. In other words, the strength of the framing 
effect varied inversely with participants’ basketball knowledge. The same participants were 
nevertheless equally susceptible to framing effects under a different, medical scenario. The 
experimenters take this as evidence that framing effects causally depend, at least partly, on the 
uptake of reference point information.159  
 
158 The specific performance statistics for the ‘typical’ players were taken from estimates made by a 
different group of ‘modeler’ participants, who had judged average performance based on receiving 
information about the target player in one or other frame. However, for current purposes what is most 
important is that a range of higher and lower averages were provided. 
159 Since the effects were not eliminated entirely among knowledgeable participants, uptake of reference 
point information may not be necessary for framing effects to arise. Leong et al. appeal also to the ‘implicit 
recommendations’ that the frames convey (to be discussed in §6 below). In subsequent chapters, I will 





A series of other experimental studies, deploying various different pairs of frames, provide 
further support for the reference point hypothesis (Honda & Yamagishi, 2017; McKenzie & 
Nelson, 2003; Sher & McKenzie, 2006; Teigen & Karevold, 2005). Each of these studies also 
demonstrates that speakers choose their frames on the basis of what they believe about 
contextual reference points. In other words, it is not just that hearers infer reference point 
information but that, in doing so, they are tracking speakers’ beliefs. I will discuss some of the 
data concerning speaker behaviour in the next chapter. In the remaining sections of this 
chapter, I want to consider some competing hypotheses within the broad ‘information leakage’ 
camp.  
Before moving on, though, I end this section by providing the following refined characterisation 
of the reference point hypothesis:  
Reference Point Hypothesis: In virtue of their including one of two contradictory 
predicate expressions, attribute frames tend to convey that the subject of predication 
instantiates the property corresponding to that expression to a high degree, relative to 
the most salient reference point. 
6. Implicit Recommendations 
Alongside the reference point hypothesis, Sher and McKenzie (2006) put forward an ‘implicit 
recommendation hypothesis’, according to which attribute frames carry information about the 
speaker’s attitude towards the subject of predication. They write: 
The fact that a speaker has described an object in terms of a positively valenced 
property makes it more likely that the speaker has a favorable attitude towards the 
object on the dimension under discussion. (Sher & McKenzie, 2006, p. 482) 
The idea is that the positive or negative wording tends to reflect the speaker’s overall, positive 
or negative, attitude towards a target state of affairs. So, for example, the choice to use (1) 
would indicate that the speaker has a favourable attitude towards the player, conveying to the 
hearer something like the information in (1b).160 
(1) The player made 60% of his shots. 
(1b) The player is good. 
 
160 Again, strictly speaking, (1b) should be ‘The speaker believes that the player is good’. Again, I will 
assume for now that the hearer makes a justified inference from this metarepresentational form to the 





Conversely, a use of (2) would indicate that the speaker has an unfavourable attitude towards 
the player, conveying the information in (2b). 
(2) The player missed 40% of his shots. 
(2b) The player is bad. 
On this picture, hearers can infer evaluative information about the player’s performance 
directly from the valence of the wording. 
6.1. Empirical Evidence 
Sher and McKenzie (2006) attempt to investigate empirically whether speakers choose frames 
in line with the implicit recommendation hypothesis. They present experimental participants 
with information about one of two project teams, differing in their overall quality (as measured, 
for example, by the qualifications of team members). However, both teams have identical rates 
of nominal ‘successes’ and ‘failures’. Participants are then asked to describe the team’s track 
record by completing the following sentence: 
            successes 
Of the last 50 projects undertaken by the team, ________________    were 
                        (write #)     failures 
          (circle one) 
 
It was found that participants who read about the poor quality team were more likely to 
describe its performance in terms of the proportion of past projects that were ‘failures’. 
Conversely, those who read about the good team were more likely to describe its performance 
in terms of the proportion of ‘successes’.161 The experimenters take this to show that speakers’ 
framing choices are affected by their overall attitudes towards states of affairs. Specifically, 
framing in terms of ‘failures’ in this case is taken to indicate a generally negative attitude 
towards the team, whereas framing in terms of ‘successes’ indicates a positive attitude. 
The interpretation of the results is somewhat problematic. First, the authors explicitly note that 
‘successes’ and ‘failures’ do not jointly exhaust the logical possibilities, since it is generally 
possible not to ‘succeed’ without necessarily ‘failing’. However, they argue that this does not 
affect the findings. I disagree; indeed, the issue comes to the fore in the way each team’s 
successes and failures are described. The good team’s failures are described as mostly “valiant 
 
161 There was also evidence of a general preference for the ‘success’ frame. This may be because ‘failure’ is 
a ‘marked’ expression, whereas ‘success’ is unmarked. I will return to discuss the issue of markedness in 





and groundbreaking attempts at seemingly unsolvable problems” (Sher & McKenzie, 2006, p. 
484) as compared with the “incoherent attempts at simple problems” that constitute most of the 
poor team’s failures (Sher & McKenzie, 2006, p. 485). Conversely, the poor team’s successes are 
described as “slightly confused but nonetheless adequate” (Sher & McKenzie, 2006, p. 485), in 
contrast with the good team’s “truly extraordinary, sometimes revolutionary” ones (Sher & 
McKenzie, 2006, p. 484). Thus, the successes of the good team count more clearly as genuine 
successes, rather than mere avoidances of failure (which the poor team’s nominal ‘successes’ 
appear to be). Conversely, the failures of the poor team are more clearly failures (and don’t just 
fall somewhat short of being successes, as do the ‘failures’ of the good team). It is perhaps 
unsurprising, then, that these are the frames typically chosen by participants: the nature of the 
‘successes’ and ‘failures’ themselves makes one frame clearly more fitting than the other. The 
experimental design does not allow us to exclude the possibility that this is what drives 
participants’ different responses.  
Arguably, stronger support for the implicit recommendation hypothesis can be found in the 
wider literature. For example, several studies find that participants’ judgements about speakers’ 
attitudes systematically track the speakers’ uses of positively- or negatively-valanced frames 
(Karevold & Teigen, 2010; Teigen & Brun, 1999; Teigen & Nikolaisen, 2009). However, again, 
competing interpretations of the data are available. For example, participants could be 
projecting their own attitudes onto the speaker, rather than inferring the speaker’s attitude 
directly from the frame used. A similar point is made by Karevold and Teigen (2010, p. 725): 
finding a correlation between participants’ own attitudes and those they attribute to speakers, 
the researchers note the standard difficulties in inferring causation in one or other direction.  
Importantly, the data also remain consistent with the reference point hypothesis: it is possible 
that hearers are first picking up on reference point information and then using that to infer the 
speaker’s attitude, as was suggested in the case of the basketball player. This possibility points 
to a conceptual problem facing the implicit recommendation hypothesis, which is explored next. 
6.2. Evaluative Neutrality Revisited 
Recall that a key motivation for the information leakage account, over the associationist 
alternative, was its ability to explain framing effects in evaluatively neutral cases (like the 
experiments involving the glass) as well as valenced cases. As discussed in §5, the reference 
point hypothesis meets this desideratum. In contrast, the implicit recommendation hypothesis 
only applies to framing effects that depend on the frames’ evaluative polarity. To that extent, it 
is unclear why the implicit recommendation hypothesis should be preferred to the 





The information leakage theorists may be thinking of the reference point hypothesis and the 
implicit recommendation hypothesis as forming a ‘package deal’; taken together, they are 
supposed to provide a better account than the associationist alternative. I want to suggest, 
though, that the implicit recommendation hypothesis may be superfluous. To reach that 
conclusion, it is helpful to unpick exactly how the information leakage theorists conceptualise 
their two hypotheses. 
First, it is worth noting that there is some confusion about how the hypotheses are supposed to 
relate to one another. In places, the proponents suggest that the implicit recommendation 
hypothesis is more general than the reference point hypothesis. For example, Leong et al. write: 
Related work has generalized the information leakage framework from signaling a 
speaker’s reference point…to signaling a speaker’s attitude toward the object—a type of 
implicit recommendation (Leong et al., 2017, p. 1155). 
Perhaps, then, the idea behind the implicit recommendation hypothesis is that positive frames 
convey that target entities are generally better than the most salient comparator, whereas 
negative frames tend to convey that they are generally worse. The target entity would now be 
considered relatively good in potentially any respect, not just in virtue of having more of the 
good property corresponding to the predicate expression used. For example, rather than (1) 
tending to convey that the player made more shots than average, it would be taken to convey 
that the player is generally better than average. 
Again, though, this generalising approach would restrict the scope of the information leakage 
account to cases where alternative frames are positively or negatively valenced, failing to 
capture evaluatively neutral framing effects. A more charitable view, then, would be that the 
two hypotheses are relatively independent, each capturing some portion of the framing data. 
Accordingly, Sher and McKenzie sometimes talk about frames being able to convey two distinct 
kinds of contextual information, as in the following quote:  
[E]xperimental work has identified two…background conditions – reference points and 
implicit recommendations – that have broad relevance in attribute framing tasks. (Sher 
& McKenzie, 2011, p. 44) 
In other words, framing effects may depend on reference point information or evaluative 
attitude information (or perhaps a combination of both).162 This would seem to be the best 
 
162 Note that, on this understanding, only the reference point hypothesis need involve a comparative 
element. Under that hypothesis, frames convey information about the relative quantities of certain 
properties instantiated by target and reference point entities. The implicit recommendation hypothesis 





interpretation of the theorists’ considered view. Additionally, though, they argue that both 
hypotheses can be subsumed under another, more general, one. I turn to that proposal in the 
next section. 
7. Psychological Salience 
Sher and McKenzie (2006) propose that, in general, frames convey information about whatever 
is ‘psychologically salient’ to the speaker. In cases where it is salient to the speaker that an 
entity instantiates a particular property to a relatively high degree, the frame will convey 
reference point information (as per the reference point hypothesis).163 In other cases, the frame 
could be conveying various other sorts of information. In general terms: 
(1) A speaker is more likely to describe D in terms of ‘X1’ when X1 is salient in the 
speaker's psycholinguistic representation of D. 
(2) Listeners are sensitive to this regularity—they are more likely to (implicitly or 
explicitly) infer that X1 is salient in the speaker's representation of D when the speaker 
describes D in terms of ‘X1’.  
(McKenzie & Sher, 2008, p. 87) 
Although this proposal has intuitive appeal, it is rather difficult to operationalise. After all, there 
are indefinitely many possible reasons why a given predicate expression could become salient 
to a speaker. Precisely which information a frame conveys on any given occasion, then, would 
be extremely unconstrained. Therefore, in the absence of a fuller account of psychological 
salience, the hypothesis has limited power to predict or explain framing effects. The theorists 
themselves recognise this, with Sher and McKenzie (2006, p. 486) noting that “the notion of 
psychological salience is a rough one, requiring further specification”.  
For the time being, I believe the reference point hypothesis remains the more theoretically well-
developed and empirically well-supported version of the information leakage account. 
Moreover, since it could explain framing effects in both valenced and neutral cases, it renders 
the implicit recommendation hypothesis potentially redundant.164 That said, if the psychological 
salience approach could be worked out, I believe the arguments presented in the next three 
 
badness simpliciter. In other words, the implicit recommendation hypothesis need not predict that an 
entity described using a positive frame is better than some comparator but merely that it is good. 
163 Sher and McKenzie (2006, p. 483) claim that “unusually abundant properties and events are more 
salient than unusually absent ones”, although they do not offer independent empirical support for this. 
164 How, then, should we explain the residual framing effect found by Leong et al. (2017), even among 
hearers who were familiar with the typical performance of NBA basketball players? I believe various 
possible explanations are available here, aside from appealing to implicit recommendations. For example, 
hearers might assume that the speaker has some other reference point in mind. I return to this idea in 





chapters of the thesis could be adapted accordingly, and would still stand. Before concluding the 
current discussion, I will consider two further proposals put forward by theorists working 
outside the core information leakage camp. The first of these concerns the ‘argumentative 
orientations’ of frames. 
8. Argumentative Orientation 
Holleman and Pander Maat (2009) propose that framing invokes a conversational principle of 
‘argumentative orientation’ (a concept they inherit from Ducrot). The idea is that a frame, by 
including (or, in their terminology, ‘profiling’) one of two contradictory predicates, licenses a 
hearer to draw certain conclusions, based on the mere presence of the corresponding property 
(not its relative abundance, as under the reference point hypothesis). This is summarised in 
following pair of maxims:  
Speaker’s maxim: when a situation lends itself to description in terms of a two-valued 
variable, profile the component carrying the value that best fits the direction of the 
conclusions one would prefer to be drawn from the utterance. 
Recipient’s corollary: when a situation lends itself to description in terms of a two-valued 
variable, the component that is profiled indicates the direction of the conclusions the 
speaker would prefer to be drawn from the utterance.  
(Holleman & Pander Maat, 2009, p. 2209)165 
In the formulation of these maxims, it is rather unclear what is meant by the ‘direction’ of 
conclusions one would prefer to be drawn. Indeed, the relationship between alternative frames 
and the distinct inferences they license is precisely what stands in need of explanation. One way 
of fleshing out the account would be to appeal to something like representativeness, whereby 
frames tend to convey that the subject of predication is representative of subjects that 
instantiate the relevant property. For example, describing a basketball player in terms of the 
number of shots he made might convey that he is generally representative of players who make 
their shots (being talented, tall, hard-working, or whatever). Conversely, describing him in 
terms of the number of shots missed might convey that he is generally representative of players 
who miss their shots. I believe this would be an interesting possibility to investigate further but, 
for reasons of space, it is not something I can pursue here. As things stand, though, the 
argumentative orientation account remains underspecified.  
 
165 Holleman and Pander Maat also posit a moderating effect of markedness. I leave this issue aside for 





Setting aside this conceptual point for a moment, I will briefly run through Holleman and 
Pander Maat’s empirical investigation of frames’ argumentative orientations. Across six 
experiments, participants were presented with a series of sentence continuation tasks, most of 
which were language production tasks, as in the example below:166 
 Choose the sentence that best fits next. 
Next week I’ll have much (little) time to come over and help you with odd jobs about the 
house. 
 (A) My diary is half full 
(B) My diary is half empty   
The experimenters predicted that having ‘much’ (or ‘a lot of’) time would be more likely than 
having ‘little’ time to prompt response B (and that having ‘little’ time would be more likely to 
prompt response A).167 This prediction was borne out by the results. Indeed, responses 
patterned in the expected way for 30 out of a total of 34 production tasks.168 
Some participants also received interpretation tasks, in which they were asked to choose 
continuations on the basis of a speaker’s choice of frame. An example is provided below:  
 Choose the sentence that best fits next. 
 My diary is half full (half empty). 
 (A) So I will have quite a lot of time to come do odd jobs about your house. 
 (B) So I will have little time to come do odd jobs about your house. 
The experimenters predicted that, when the diary is described as ‘half full’, hearers would be 
more likely to infer that they have ‘little’ time than if it is described as ‘half empty’ (and vice-
versa). The expected pattern was observed in all four interpretation tasks. 
Although the results of the study are presented in support of the argumentative orientation 
hypothesis, I believe they remain consistent with the reference point hypothesis. For example, 
 
166 In the English translation the phrasing sounds slightly awkward. The stimuli were originally presented 
to participants in Dutch. 
167 If we were thinking about things in terms of representativeness, the idea here might be that describing 
the diary as ‘half full’ conveys that it is generally representative of a full diary, whereas describing it as 
‘half empty’ conveys that it is generally representative of an empty diary. 
168 The expected pattern subsequently emerged for one of the remaining four tasks, when it was 
presented to a larger number of participants. Regarding the other three tasks, the authors speculate that 
choices may have been driven by other aspects of the particular scenarios used, concerning the expected 





inferring that one’s diary is relatively full (under the ‘half full’ frame) could justify the conclusion 
that one will have relatively little time. And, conversely, inferring that it is relatively empty 
(under the ‘half empty’ frame) could justify the conclusion that one will have a relatively large 
amount of time. Therefore, I do not believe there are currently good empirical reasons to prefer 
the argumentative orientation hypothesis over the conceptually clearer reference point 
hypothesis.  
9. Hearers’ Responses 
In this section, I consider one further account, which focuses on what hearers convey when they 
respond to speakers’ uttered frames. Geurts (2013) begins by observing that alternative frames 
reverse the order in which related possibilities are located along a scale. For example, 
describing a basketball player in terms of the proportion of shots he made orders the following 
scale from left to right, with 0% of shots being made at the leftmost extreme, and 100% being 





Conversely, describing the player in terms of the proportion of shots he missed reverses the 
scale: at the rightmost extreme, 0% of shots are missed; at the leftmost extreme, 100% are 
missed. 
Geurts proposes that frames evoke alternative formulations, corresponding to different points 
along the scale, i.e. ‘scalar alternatives’. Such alternatives are standardly appealed to by linguists 
in explaining various communicative effects. As Geurts notes:  
The interpretation of an utterance is determined not only by what the speaker says, but 
also…what he could have said (Geurts, 2013, p. 5)169  
The set of scalar alternatives to (1), for example, would include (3) and (4): 
(1) This player made 40% of his shots last season. 
(3) This player made 90% of his shots last season. 
 
169 In the next chapter, I will appeal to the same idea in discussing how an attribute frame might evoke its 









(4) This player made 15% of his shots last season. 
Meanwhile, the set of alternatives to (2) would include (5) and (6). 
(2) This player missed 60% of his shots last season. 
(5) This player missed 75% of his shots last season. 
(6) This player missed 20% of his shots last season. 
Thus far, Geurts’s analysis says nothing about the significance of the scale reversal in accounting 
for framing effects; it simply identifies sets of alternatives that arise in virtue of a frame’s 
linguistic structure. However, Geurts goes on to argue that when recipients of frames provide 
evaluative responses, their utterances convey frame-dependent information about items in the 
set of alternatives. Specifically, he suggests that when hearers evaluate a target entity 
favourably, they convey that alternatives higher up the scale would have been even better, while 
alternatives lower down would have been worse. To illustrate how this works, the central 
scenario Geurts considers concerns the following two ways of describing a plane crash, affecting 
600 passengers: 
(7) 200 people survived. 
(8) 400 people died. 
He observes that, whereas it would be felicitous to say (9) it would be infelicitous to say (10): 
(9) It’s good that 200 people survived. 
(10) It’s good that 400 people died. 
His explanation is that (9) conveys that it would have been better if more than 200 people 
survived. This makes (9) felicitous, since that would have been better. In contrast, (10) 
infelicitously conveys that it would have been better had more than 400 people died. Geurts 
writes: 
[E]ven if [a speaker’s] descriptions of the actual facts are equivalent (‘200 people 
survived/ 400 people died, and that’s good’), [9] and [10] also license inferences about 
counterfactual states of affairs, i.e. about what might have been the case, and these turn 
out to be inconsistent (Geurts, 2013, p. 12, emphasis in original). 
Geurts’ reasoning reads across nicely to the example of the basketball player: giving a 
favourable evaluation of the player in response to (1) could be understood as conveying that the 
player would have been better had he made more shots (as per alternative (3) above, for 





contrast, giving an unfavourable evaluation in response to (1) could be understood as conveying 
that the player would have been worse had he made more shots, and better had he made fewer. 
Since that would clearly be odd, it would be an infelicitous response.  
On the flipside, giving a favourable evaluation of the player in response to (2) could be 
understood as conveying that the player would have been better had he missed more shots (as 
per alternative (5), for example), and worse had he missed fewer (as per alternative (6)). Again, 
this would be odd. Evaluating the player unfavourably, on the other hand, would be perfectly 
felicitous, since it conveys that the player would have been worse had he missed more shots, 
and better had he missed fewer. In general, then, a favourable evaluation will be felicitous when 
the scale is ordered by a positively-valenced expression but not when it is ordered by a 
negatively-valenced one (which instead calls for an unfavourable evaluation).  
In this way, Geurts’ hearer-focused proposal could explain the framing effect in a case like that 
of the basketball player: recipients of the positively-worded ‘made’ frame will tend to evaluate 
the player relatively favourably, while recipients of the negatively-worded ‘missed’ frame will 
tend to evaluate him relatively unfavourably.  
Note that Geurts takes an importantly different line from the information leakage theorists 
here: rather than appealing to the information typically conveyed by a speaker’s frame, he 
focuses instead on the constraints which that frame imposes on hearers; specifically, on what 
they can convey with their evaluative judgements. This is an extremely interesting proposal. 
Taken on its own, though, I do not believe it can explain why speakers’ framing choices are 
sensitive to contextual information concerning reference points, as well as hearers’ elicited 
judgements. Moreover, it seems not to extend to evaluatively neutral cases of framing effects, 
since it depends on a contrast between positively- and negatively-valenced wording. In that 
respect, it is in the same boat as the associationist and implicit recommendation hypotheses.  
At best, then, Geurts’ proposal gives us a partial explanation of the framing data. To provide a 
full explanation, the proposal would need to be supplemented by something like the reference 
point hypothesis. On the one hand, that seems unproblematic, since the two accounts are 
compatible: it could be that both speakers’ frames and hearers’ responses convey information 
beyond the explicit semantic meanings of their words. Indeed, Geurts himself may be envisaging 
such a combined approach: he concludes his 2013 article by briefly discussing some of the other 
framing researchers who acknowledge that “the information conveyed by a sentence goes 
beyond its descriptive content” (Geurts, 2013, p. 16). Having explicitly cited the research by 





All these scholars agree that the information carried by a sentence is not exhausted by 
its descriptive content. Hence, there seems to be a consensus that we need a notion of 
information that is essentially richer than the classical one. Indeed, I believe that the 
consensus runs deeper, that despite obvious differences in terminology and emphasis, 
the ideas underlying these various approaches are closely related, and that the 
connections can be brought out within the general framework outlined in the foregoing. 
(Geurts, 2013, pp. 16-17) 
On the other hand, though, the reference point hypothesis already holds out the promise of 
explaining the data (pertaining to both speakers’ and hearers’ behaviour, and both valenced and 
neutral frames). For this reason, in the remaining chapters of the thesis I choose to focus solely 
on that hypothesis.  
10. Conclusion  
I have argued that alternative frames plausibly convey distinct information beyond their 
(logically equivalent) minimal semantic meanings. According to the most theoretically powerful 
and empirically well-supported hypothesis on the market, alternative frames convey distinct 
contextual information about reference points. In the next chapter, I will proceed to argue that 







Implicating Reference Point Information 
Abstract 
In this chapter, I explore the ‘pragmatic’ credentials of the information leakage account. I argue 
that frames conversationally implicate reference point information, showing that this 
information is not only cancellable but also calculable. I dust off an additional maxim of Manner, 
proposed by Grice in his ‘Presupposition and Conversational Implicature’, and explain how this 
licences hearers to infer reference point information from a speaker’s use of frame. I end by 
considering the status of reference point information as part of what speakers intend to 
communicate: although I acknowledge that, intuitively, this information is not always 
uppermost in a speaker’s mind, I argue that it still counts as something s/he implicates.  
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I endorsed a version of the ‘information leakage’ account according to 
which a pair of alternative frames may be (‘explicitly’) logically equivalent to one another while 
‘implicitly’ conveying distinct information – specifically, information about contextual reference 
points. As noted there, I believe the distinction between ‘explicit’, or ‘logical’, meaning and 
‘implicit’, or ‘informational’, meaning may be helpfully cast in terms of the semantics-pragmatics 
divide.170 First, it is somewhat misleading to contrast ‘logical’ and ‘informational’ meaning since, 
in whichever respect alternative frames are supposed to be logically equivalent, they will also 
be carrying the same information. For example, (1) and (2) carry the same information about a 
player, locating his performance at exactly the same point marked on the scale below: 
(1) This player made 40% of his shots last season. 






170 Corner and Hahn (2010) similarly interpret the information leakage account as tracking that 
distinction; however, they do not engage in any detailed discussion of how the notions of semantics and 











Indeed, Sher and McKenzie (2011) seem to recognise this point, distinguishing there between 
different ‘levels’ of information.  
By the same token, the distinct pieces of reference point information conveyed by alternative 
frames are logically inequivalent to one another. For example, (3) and (4) clearly have different 
truth-conditions: 
(3) This player made a relatively large proportion of his shots last season. 
(4) This player missed a relatively large proportion of his shots last season. 
The descriptors ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ are perhaps somewhat better, although these get used in 
different ways by different theorists.171 I propose, instead, to map the distinction to that of 
‘semantics’ vs. ‘pragmatics’. Of course, it should be acknowledged straight off the bat that these 
terms also have an extremely vexed history in philosophy and linguistics. Over the course of the 
next two chapters, though, I will use the reference point hypothesis to argue for, and clarify, a 
broadly Minimalist conception of the semantics-pragmatics divide. In the current chapter I will 
show how the pragmatics of frames can be thought of in broadly Gricean terms. In the 
subsequent chapter, I will go on to argue that their semantics should be conceived of minimally.  
Note that Sher and McKenzie explicitly take themselves to be putting forward a ‘pragmatic’ 
explanation of framing effects, understood as one which concerns “the ways in which speakers 
typically select utterances and convey meaning in human conversational environments” 
(McKenzie & Sher, 2008, p. 83). Describing their project, they write: 
This chapter demonstrates how the pragmatics of natural language can explain many 
apparent biases of ‘framing’ in reasoning. It explains that the way in which a problem is 
expressed carries a great deal of information, e.g. about underlying beliefs and values – 
and that these influence reasoners in systematic ways, although the formulation of a 
problem has typically been viewed as irrelevant to its solution (McKenzie & Sher, 2008, 
p. 79). 
Nevertheless, the authors remain deliberately neutral with respect to the particular pragmatic 
mechanism at work: 
Note that the present analysis makes no assumptions about the existence of Gricean 
norms, or, more generally, about the communication of informative intent…The analysis 
simply points out that, when a certain kind of regularity in speaking behavior exists, a 
 
171 For example, as discussed in chapter 2, Relevance Theorists associate ‘explicit’ meaning with 
‘explicatures’, which include pragmatic modulation and enrichment of the conventional meanings of the 





particular kind of inference will typically be warranted, norms and intentions aside. 
Whether and how listeners, in drawing such inferences, consider informative intentions 
or conversational norms is a question for further research to address. (Sher & McKenzie, 
2006, p. 470, footnote 3) 
Here I will develop their analysis by showing that the reference point information conveyed by 
a frame can be understood as a conversational implicature in Grice’s sense. The structure of the 
chapter is as follows: in §2, I introduce the Gricean concept of conversational implicature. In 
§§3-5 I work through three case studies, to assess whether the reference point information 
inferred from frames could plausibly be a (relevance- or quantity-based) implicature. I identify 
three potential obstacles to such an analysis, based on reference point information being 
detachable, unintended, and non-calculable. In §6 I argue that these obstacles cannot be 
overcome by appeal to Grice’s original set of Manner maxims, or to the related notion of 
‘markedness’. In §7, however, I show how an additional maxim of Manner, as proposed by Grice 
in ‘Presupposition and Conversational Implicature’, would render reference point information 
calculable (as well as explaining its detachability). In §8 I turn to the issue of speakers’ 
intentions, arguing that, even if implicatures must be part of the speaker’s intended meaning 
(which is not obvious), that would not automatically disqualify reference point information 
from counting as implicated.  
2. Conversational Implicature 
Grice famously distinguished between what is ‘said’ by a sentence and what it may be used to 
‘implicate’ on a particular occasion of utterance (Grice, 1989, chapter 2).172 According to Grice, 
when a speaker utters a complex expression, what is ‘said' will be more or less the result of 
composing the conventional meanings of the constituent words (‘more or less’ because it will 
also depend on the resolution of any ambiguities, and on the assignment of denotations to any 
context-sensitive expressions (Grice, 1989, p. 25)). Grice further required that what speakers 
‘say’ be part of what they mean. His definition of speaker meaning is provided below – note that 
the subscript ‘NN’ refers to ‘non-natural’ meaning, as distinct from meaning that merely 
correlates naturally occurring events (as in smoke ‘meaning’ fire). 
“A meantNN something by x” is roughly equivalent to “A uttered x with the intention of 
inducing a belief by means of the recognition of this intention.” (Grice, 1989, p. 219)  
 
172 I will largely ignore conventional implicatures, which Grice took to depend on expressions’ 
conventional meanings without affecting what is ‘said’. Due to the cancellability of reference point 
information (which I will demonstrate in §3), I do not believe that information could be conventionally 






Thus, information which is speaker meant (or ‘m-intended’) can be thought of as that which the 
speaker intends the hearers to recover, by means of their recognising that the speaker had that 
very intention.173 
In contrast with what is ‘said’, implicatures can depart quite radically from conventional 
meaning. This is because they depend in a substantive way on general rational principles of 
communication, summarised by the Cooperative Principle: 
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are 
engaged. (Grice, 1989, p. 26) 
Beneath this overarching principle, Grice (1989, pp. 26-27) proposed a series of conversational 
maxims, falling within the categories of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner: 
Quantity 
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the 
exchange). 
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.   
Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true. 
 1. Do not say what you believe to be false. 
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
Relation: Be relevant. 
Manner: Be perspicuous. 
 1. Avoid obscurity of expression. 
2. Avoid ambiguity. 
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). 
4. Be orderly. 
These are intended to be highly intuitive principles, which are characteristic of rational 
behaviour in general. As Grice writes: 
 
173 The requirement for what is ‘said’ to answer to both conventional and communicational criteria 
generates a tension in Grice’s account. For further discussion, see (Borg & Fisher, forthcoming). For the 





As one of my avowed aims is to see talking as a special case or variety of purposive, 
indeed rational, behavior, it may be worth noting that the specific expectations or 
presumptions connected with at least some of the foregoing maxims have their 
analogues in the sphere of transactions that are not talk exchanges. (Grice, 1989, p. 28) 
He observes that similar principles apply to non-linguistic activities like mending a car or 
baking a cake. The common sense nature of the conversational maxims forms part of their 
intuitive appeal: as Geurts (2010, p. 11) puts it, “the banality of the maxims strongly speaks in 
their favour”.  
2.1. Calculability 
Grice argued that, on the assumption that speakers are complying with the maxims (or, at least, 
the Cooperative Principle), it is possible to ‘calculate’ that a speaker is implicating something 
beyond what they merely ‘say’. To illustrate the calculability of implicatures, Grice invites us to 
consider the following exchange:  
Suppose that A and B are talking about a mutual friend, C, who is now working in a bank. 
A asks B how C is getting on in his job, and B replies, Oh quite well, I think; he likes his 
colleagues, and he hasn’t been to prison yet. (Grice, 1989, p. 24) 
He provides the following gloss to show how B implicates that C is potentially dishonest: 
In a suitable setting A might reason as follows: “(1) B has apparently violated the maxim 
‘Be relevant’ and so may be regarded as having flouted one of the maxims conjoining 
perspicuity, yet I have no reason to suppose that he is opting out from the operation of 
the Cooperative Principle; (2) given the circumstances, I can regard his irrelevance as 
only apparent if, and only if, I suppose him to think that C is potentially dishonest; (3) B 
knows that I am capable of working out step (2). So B implicates that C is potentially 
dishonest.” (Grice, 1989, p. 31) 
In this example, the maxim of Relation can be used to work out that A believes C to be 
potentially dishonest. That information clearly goes beyond what A ‘says’, which is merely that C 
hasn’t been to prison yet.  
Grice takes it to be a necessary condition of some content’s being implicated that it be calculable 
from the conversational principles. He writes:  
A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that p has implicated that q, 
may be said to have conversationally implicated that q, provided that (1) he is to be 





Principle; (2) the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is required in order 
to make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in those terms) consistent with 
this presumption; and (3) the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that 
the speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp 
intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2) is required. (Grice, 1989, pp. 30-31, 
emphasis in original) 
Unpacking this rather complex passage, the first clause specifies a condition known as the 
‘cooperative presumption’: it must be assumed that the speaker is adhering to the 
conversational maxims (or, at least, to the Cooperative Principle) in order to work out the 
implicature. The second clause specifies a condition I will call the ‘calculability criterion’. This 
states that the cooperative presumption must require a belief to be attributed to the speaker, 
the content of which goes beyond what was ‘said’. In this sense, the implicature is needed to 
bridge the gap between what a speaker ‘said’ and the assumption of the speaker’s cooperativity. 
Finally, the third clause requires that the speaker believes that hearers can, in fact, infer that the 
implicature is required.  
I want to highlight four aspects of calculability that will be important in the subsequent 
discussion. Two can be dealt with fairly quickly here; the other two will be addressed in §§2.2-
2.3. The first point to note is that Grice required implicatures to be calculable whether they are 
‘particularised’ (only being conveyed in virtue of special features of the context) or ‘generalised’ 
(normally being conveyed, in the absence of special contextual features) (Grice, 1989, pp. 37-
38). He writes:  
The presence of a conversational implicature must be capable of being worked out; for 
even if it can in fact be intuitively grasped, unless the intuition is replaceable by an 
argument, the implicature (if present at all) will not count as a conversational 
implicature; it will be a conventional implicature. (Grice, 1989, p. 31) 
This point will be relevant in §7, where I discuss the relatively generalised way in which frames 
convey reference point information. 
Second, it is worth emphasising that the calculability criterion makes no claims about how 
implicatures are actually processed in the minds of interlocutors (this point is emphasised, for 
example, by Bach (2006b)). There is ongoing debate in the philosophical literature about 
whether a Gricean calculation process is psychologically realistic – see, for example (Geurts & 
Rubio-Fernández, 2015; Saul, 2002b). However, this is a point on which I intend to remain 






One point concerns the notion of requirement in the above-quoted passage from Grice. The 
claim that it should be possible to calculate some particular content (‘q’) seems too strong, even 
by Grice’s own lights. A few pages later, he notes that the contents of implicatures are often 
indeterminate: 
Since, to calculate a conversational implicature is to calculate what has to be supposed 
in order to preserve the supposition that the Cooperative Principle is being observed, 
and since there may be various possible specific explanations, a list of which may be 
open, the conversational implicatum in such cases will be [a] disjunction of such specific 
explanations; and if the list of these is open, the implicatum will have just the kind of 
indeterminacy that many actual implicata do in fact seem to possess. (Grice, 1989, pp. 
39-40) 
I suggest, then, that we should not think of hearers as being forced to attribute a specific belief 
to the speaker. However, hearers are still required to suppose that the speaker has some extra 
belief. In other words, the cooperative presumption determines that an implicature is present, 
even if does not determine what it is.  
The same point emerges from a dispute between Davis (1998) and Saul (2001). Davis argues 
that many apparent implicatures are not calculable, but depend instead on linguistic 
conventions.174 He re-examines standard Gricean analyses of tautologies like ‘war is war’ (Davis, 
1998, p. 41). A speaker of this sentence would appear to violate the first maxim of Quantity, 
since what is ‘said’ is totally uninformative. Therefore, if the speaker is to be understood as 
cooperative, s/he must be presumed to have something else in mind. However, Davis points out 
that the conversational principles give us no way to arrive at what that something else might be. 
Instead, it is only due to particular linguistic conventions of English that speakers may use the 
expression ‘war is war’ to communicate something like ‘It is the nature of war that terrible 
things happen’ (Davis, 1998, pp. 43-46/ 87-89).175  
According to Davis, tautology implicatures fail to meet Grice’s calculability criterion. Against 
this, Saul (2001) argues that Grice’s framework can accommodate such implicatures. After all, 
Grice himself was clear that the cooperative presumption is only one of the factors on which 
implicatures depend: 
 
174 As discussed in chapter 2, a similar idea has been defended more recently by Lepore and Stone (2015). 
175 Davis draws on the cross-linguistic analysis of Wierzbicka (1985), which shows that the contents of 





To work out that a particular conversational implicature is present, the hearer will rely 
on the following data: (1) the conventional meaning of the words used, together with 
the identity of any references that may be involved; (2) the Cooperative Principle and its 
maxims; (3) the context, linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance; (4) other items of 
background knowledge; and (5) the fact (or supposed fact) that all relevant items falling 
under the previous headings are available to both participants and both participants 
know or assume this to be the case. (Grice, 1989, p. 31) 
Building on this, Saul sees no reason why the ‘background information’ Grice refers to shouldn’t 
include knowledge of community-wide conventions. She writes: 
Once this information is allowed to enter into the audience’s calculations, tautology 
implicatures become perfectly calculable. With this information a part of the calculation, 
audiences also become much more restricted as to what hypotheses are reasonable to 
consider in trying to make sense of the speaker as cooperative. Given the background 
information about historical conventions, it seems far more plausible to suppose that 
the audience might be required to assume the conventional tautology implicatures. 
(Saul, 2001, p. 638) 
Saul’s interpretation of Grice here supports my claim that the conversational principles might 
determine an implicature’s presence without necessarily determining its content. This point will 
come up again in §4.  
2.3. Speaker Meaning 
It is generally assumed that implicatures must be part of speaker meaning, in Grice’s technical 
sense of m-intending. However, this is not inevitable. Certainly, no requirement for implicatures 
to be speaker-meant falls out straightforwardly from Grice’s three necessary conditions, quoted 
earlier. In particular, just because the speaker believes that the hearer can infer the presence of 
an implicature does not guarantee that the speaker intends the hearer to do so. Demonstrating 
this, Saul (2002a, pp. 237-238) considers a case in which a professor is providing a reference for 
a candidate whom she believes to be a terrible philosopher but likes on a personal level. The 
professor writes a long and irrelevant (yet factually accurate) reference in the hope that the 
search committee, despite being capable of working out that the candidate is a terrible 
philosopher, will in fact fail to do so.  
Of course, though, Grice only provides us with necessary conditions for implicating. These need 
not be jointly sufficient. Grice could therefore be assuming that there is a further requirement 





(1998) and Neale (1992). Again, though, Saul (2001, 2002a) provides a more nuanced 
interpretation, observing: 
[I]t is genuinely unclear whether Grice took being meant by the speaker to be a 
necessary condition for being a conversational implicature. He may well have done so, 
but the only place in which he states this explicitly is a passage in “The Causal Theory of 
Perception” which he chose to omit when he collected his papers for Studies in the Way 
of Words. (Saul, 2001, p. 635) 
Although I cannot settle the exegetical debate here, I return to this point in §8, in discussing the 
worry that reference point information is not speaker-meant. 
2.4. Cancellability and Nondetachability 
I conclude the section on Gricean implicature by describing two other features of implicatures, 
in addition to their calculability. First, conversational implicatures are characteristically 
cancellable, whereas what is ‘said’ is not (Grice, 1989, p. 39). For example, imagine a 
modification of the earlier exchange, in which B responds as follows to A’s question about how C 
is getting on in his job:  
(5) Oh quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues, and he hasn’t been to prison yet. I was quite 
worried about that since the last three jobholders were framed for fraud. 
B’s continuation here explicitly pre-empts the implicature that C is dishonest. Implicatures can 
also be defeated implicitly, by wider contextual factors. For example, if both A and B knew (and 
knew that the other knew) that the last three jobholders were framed for fraud, then the 
implicature that C is dishonest is unlikely to arise. 
Related to their cancellability, Sadock (1978) observes that conversational implicatures can be 
reinforced without redundancy. Thus, for example, B might have felicitously uttered (6): 
(6) Oh quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues, and he hasn’t been to prison yet, despite his 
being dishonest. 
Here, explicitly appending the information that C is dishonest to the original utterance seems 
perfectly acceptable.  
Grice also observed that implicatures are typically ‘nondetachable’, meaning that they survive 
logically equivalent reformulations of what is ‘said’ (Grice, 1989, p. 39). Thus, for example, had B 
said something like the following, he would still have implicated that C is potentially dishonest.  





An important qualification here is that Manner-based implicatures will be ‘detachable’, since 
they are linked to the way in which something is said, not just what is said. This will be 
important in §7, where I propose that reference point information is a Manner implicature. 
3. Reference Point Information and Relevance 
I turn now to consider whether the reference point information conveyed by a frame is 
analysable as a conversational implicature. In a relatively straightforward type of case, the 
information may be thought to arise from considerations of relevance. Consider, for example, 
the following hypothetical exchange concerning a basketball player: 
A: Why wasn’t Federico recruited to the team? 
B: He missed 60% of his shots last season. 
Assuming that B is cooperative, Federico must have missed a relatively large proportion of 
shots, otherwise B’s utterance would fail to provide a relevant answer to A’s question.  
In addition to its being calculable in this way, the reference point information conveyed by B’s 
utterance is also cancellable. For example, B might have continued as follows: 
(8) He missed 60% of his shots last season. That’s a relatively small proportion of misses but, 
unfortunately, the coach witnessed every single one.  
In (8) B explicitly blocks the reference point information, defeating the implicature that might 
otherwise be present.  
Relatedly, no redundancy would result from making the reference point information explicit, as 
in (9): 
(9) He missed 60% of his shots last season. That’s a lot! 
Note that the fact that reference point information is readily defeated or reinforced indicates 
that it does not arise purely as a result of composing the conventional meanings of the words 
used. Instead, it require modulation or enrichment of some sort.176 
Even in this relatively straightforward case, however, we encounter some problems with the 
nondetachability criterion. On one hand, the reference point information survives certain 
reformulations. For example, had B uttered (10) she would still have implicated that Federico 
missed a relatively large proportion of his shots: 
 






(10) 60% of his shots failed to go in last season. 
On the other hand, as predicted by the reference point hypothesis, it may not be possible to 
convey the reference point information when the alternative frame is used. Consider the 
following version of the exchange: 
A: Why wasn’t Federico recruited to the team? 
B: He made 40% of his shots last season. 
B’s utterance sounds odd here and is difficult to square with the assumption that she is 
providing a relevant answer to A’s question.177 I will end up diagnosing this as a conflict 
between the maxims of Relation and Manner (see §7). For now, I want to introduce a trickier 
case. 
4. A Calculability Gap? 
Recall that, in the experimental scenario used by McKenzie and Nelson (2003), which was 
discussed in the previous chapter, the protagonist, Mary, describes a glass by using a ‘full’ or 
‘empty’ frame. The example vignette is reproduced below: 
Imagine that Mary was sitting at her kitchen table with a glass in front of her. She left the 
room briefly and came back to find that the contents of the glass had changed. When 
asked to describe the glass now, Mary said, “The glass is half full.” Given how Mary chose 
to describe the glass after its contents had changed, please choose the statement below 
in terms of what you think was most likely true about the glass before its contents 
changed.  
The glass was full before its contents changed. 
The glass was empty before its contents changed. 
As discussed, McKenzie and Nelson find that when Mary uses ‘full’ frames, participants are more 
likely to judge that the glass was previously empty than when she uses ‘empty’ frames (and, of 
course, vice-versa).  
I want to allow that this result could potentially be given a relevance-based analysis. Note first 
that the experimenters ask participants to judge the prior state of the glass without giving them 
 
177 Notice that the inclusion of ‘only’ – i.e. ‘He only made 40% of his shots last season’ – would restore the 
original implicature. Thus, ‘only’ switches the reference point from making fewer shots to making more. It 
may be possible to achieve a similar effect with certain patterns of intonation. I take this as further 
evidence that frame-dependent reference point information is usually present in the absence of such 





the requisite information to deduce an answer. Merely composing the conventional meanings of 
Mary’s words will not suffice, since the result is strictly compatible with the glass having been 
full or empty. Nevertheless, participants are instructed to consider how Mary chose to describe 
the glass. Perhaps, then, the utterance the experimenters put in Mary’s mouth should be thought 
of as implicating something about the prior state of the glass (even if it is unclear what). After all, 
the experimental stimuli would otherwise be irrelevant to the task, violating the maxim of 
Relation (or, alternatively, the stimuli might be thought of as insufficiently informative, violating 
the first Quantity maxim).178 
Note that, unlike in the exchange about Federico, appealing to Relation (or Quantity) could at 
most explain the presence of an implicature. The content of the reference point information 
cannot be derived because those maxims tell us nothing about why hearers tend to associate 
Mary’s ‘empty’ frames with the glass being previously full and her ‘full’ frames with its being 
previously empty. In principle, the opposite associations would be equally relevant and 
informative. As discussed in §2,2, though, this may not be a problem so long as the 
conversational principles need only require something to be implicated, without their 
necessarily determining what.  
A separate worry that emerges with this scenario is that it seems less obvious that Mary intends 
to communicate the reference point information (or, perhaps better, that the experimenters 
intend her to have such an intention). I will return to this issue in §8. For now, I want to present 
a final case, in which reference point information might be thought to be entirely non-calculable. 
5. A Calculability Failure? 
I will focus on the series of ‘action-oriented’ experiments run by Sher and McKenzie (2006), to 
corroborate and extend the findings of McKenzie and Nelson (2003). Below is a description of 
their first experiment: 
Subjects, tested individually, were seated at a desk in one of two small rooms. At the left 
edge of the desk, two apparently identical transparent plastic cups stood side-by-side. 
One was full of water, the other empty. (Order of the cups—whether the full or empty 
cup was closest to the subject—was varied between the rooms.) Indicating the right 
edge of the desk, the experimenter said to about half of the subjects in each room: 
 
178 This case is complicated by the fact that the experimenters deliver information to participants via a 
fictional protagonist. Ultimately, a Relation-based analysis may not be workable here but that would 





‘‘Just to get things started, could you pour water from one cup to the other and 
set a half-full cup at the edge of the desk’’.  
The remaining subjects were asked for ‘‘a half-empty cup”.  
(Sher & McKenzie, 2006, p. 473) 
Two further experiments used the following fractions in the instruction: ‘one-quarter full’ or 
‘three-quarters empty’ (in the second experiment); and ‘three-quarters full’ or ‘one quarter 
empty’ (in the third experiment).179 
The experimenters found that participants’ choice of which cup to set at the edge of the desk 
varied systematically across conditions, depending on whether the instructor used a ‘full’ or 
‘empty’ frame. Specifically, participants who received ‘full’ frames were more likely to choose 
the initially empty cup than those who received ‘empty’ frames (and vice-versa). The full results 
are shown in the table below. As in McKenzie and Nelson’s study, there was no significant 
difference between the ‘one-quarter empty’ and ‘three-quarters full’ conditions, although the 
trend was in the same direction.  
Frame % participants choosing the glass 
that was full before 
% participants choosing the glass 
that was empty before 
¼ full 7% 93% 
¾ empty 29% 71% 
½ full 46% 54% 
½ empty 69% 31% 
¾ full 60% 40% 
¼ empty 70% 30% 
 
179 In these experiments, the set up was slightly different: 
As in Experiment 1, subjects were seated at a desk in one of two small rooms. Transparent cups, 
one full and one empty, stood side-by-side at the left edge of the desk. (Again, order of the cups 
was varied between rooms.) 
A square, slightly larger than the base of a single cup, was marked on the desk. Subjects were 
given a one-page instruction sheet, which, for half of the Experiment 2 subjects, read: 
In front of you on the table you’re sitting at, there should be two cups and a square. To 
get things started, please pour water from one cup to the other and set a 3/4-empty cup 
in the square. Please go tell the experimenter when you’ve finished, and he will tell you 
what to do next. 
The remaining subjects in Experiment 2 were asked for ‘‘a 1/4-full cup’’ instead of ‘‘a 3/4-empty 
cup’’. 
In Experiment 3, the instruction sheet, otherwise identical to that used in Experiment 2, 
requested either ‘‘a 1/4-empty cup’’ or ‘‘a 3/4-full cup’’.  
(Sher & McKenzie, 2006, p. 475) 
The experimenters note that the use of written rather than spoken instructions eliminates certain 
possible confounds, such as prosodic effects. It seems unlikely that the other differences (such as asking 






The results of these experiments indicate that participants remained sensitive to reference 
point information concerning the prior contents of the cup. Crucially, though, in this experiment, 
the prior state of the cup is strictly irrelevant to the completion of the task. What the 
experimenters ‘say’ is already entirely consistent with their being cooperative speakers. They 
are not obliged to care which of the two cups is placed at the edge of the desk, just that one of 
them is. Thus, participants are given the freedom to choose how they pour the water between 
the cups.180 After all, the experimenters might have been interested, say, in which hand the 
participant would use, or how close to the edge of the desk the cup would be placed. Indeed, in 
the second and third experiments, participants were asked to judge the probable purpose of this 
part of the experiment and it appeared to have remained opaque to them. Here, then, it is 
implausible that there could be any relevance- or quantity-based implicature.  
Sher and McKenzie’s results suggest that reference point information can be inferred without its 
being implicated via the maxims of Relation or Quantity. Perhaps, at this point, we might try 
appealing to Manner – after all, what is important is how the speakers framed their utterances. I 
think it would be difficult to directly apply Grice’s original set of Manner maxims; these are 
designed to deal with linguistic formulations that are especially obscure, ambiguous, prolix, or 
disordered – or, as Lepore and Stone (2015, p. 104) put it, “so cumbersome or awkward that no 
speaker could sensibly use it without some ulterior motive”. In contrast, the attribute frames 
considered here, using ‘full’ or ‘empty’, ‘made’ or missed’, seem clear and straightforward. That 
said, there might be scope to argue that one member of the pair is more ‘marked’ than its 
counterpart. In the next section I explore how this proposal could work. 
6. Markedness 
The notion of ‘markedness’ concerns the morphological complexity or unusualness of an 
expression. As Levinson writes:  
On the formal side, marked forms, in comparison to corresponding unmarked forms, are 
more morphologically complex and less lexicalized, more prolix or periphrasitic, less 
frequent or usual, and less neutral in register. On the meaning side, such forms suggest 
some additional meaning or connotation absent from the corresponding unmarked 
forms. (Levinson, 2000, p. 137) 
 
180 Note too the use of indefinite descriptions, as in ‘a half-full cup’, which avoids any supposition that the 





It should be noted that the phenomenon of markedness has been developed in various different 
ways. Lehrer (1985) surveys a number of tests that have been proposed for assessing which 
member of a pair of antonyms is ‘marked’ and which is ‘unmarked’. For example, unmarked 
expressions typically sound more natural and neutral than their marked counterparts in certain 
question forms. Thus, the relative naturalness of ‘How tall is Federico?’, as opposed to ‘How 
short is Federico?’ (which carries the additional suggestion that Federico is relatively short), 
demonstrates that ‘short’ is marked relative to ‘tall’.  
I will not argue here for any particular set of criteria for identifying (un)marked expressions. 
Instead, I want to consider whether an asymmetry in the markedness of alternative frames 
could, in principle, explain how reference point information is being implicated. Focusing on the 
‘full’ and ‘empty’ frames used in the experiments discussed above, I will simply follow others in 
the literature in assuming that ‘full’ is unmarked, whereas ‘empty’ is relatively marked 
(Holleman & Pander Maat, 2009; Ingram et al., 2014; Moxey, 2011).181 Justifying their 
classification, Holleman and Pander Maat (2009, p. 2210) note that “[t]his seems to be 
supported by the fact that full tends to precede empty when the two terms are listed, and by the 
use of full in neutralized contexts such as how X is it?”. 
Assuming that ‘empty’ frames are marked, then, we might hypothesise that only these frames 
carry reference point information, while ‘full’ frames carry no reference point information at all 
beyond their conventional meanings. On this hypothesis, the framing effect is driven by the fact 
that ‘empty’ licenses the inference to relative emptiness, just as ‘How short is Federico?’ licenses 
the inference to his relative shortness. Although this is an interesting proposal, there is some 
empirical evidence to suggest it is unlikely to be correct. Below, I briefly summarise a study by 
Ingram et al. (2014).  
Ingram et al. used an eye-tracking paradigm to measure the ease with which reference point 
information was processed under alternative frames.182 Using a within-subjects design, Ingram 
et al. presented participants with 36 scenarios (interspersed with 36 filler items), an example of 
which is provided below: 
 
181 If, instead, ‘full’ and ‘empty’ are considered to be equally unmarked, then it is already clear that the 
proposal discussed in this section cannot explain how reference point information is implicated. I will 
take a few more steps to reach that same conclusion below. 
182 Roughly, it was assumed that participants had more difficulty processing a region of text if they spent 
longer fixating on that region (allowing for differences in word length between different conditions), or if 





Summer was here, and Henry was eagerly preparing to get into his paddling pool. He 
ran inside to ask his Mum to apply sunscreen then hurried back to the garden. The pool 
was now half full but when he had left it was full and the sun beat down.183 
The text shown in italics was varied to generate the four conditions in the table below. 
Frame Prior state 
‘Half full’ Full 
‘Half full’ Empty 
‘Half empty’ Full 
‘Half empty’ Empty 
 
In two further control conditions, the critical expressions in the frames were replaced by 
expressions of similar length that were unrelated to volume, such as ‘quite cold’. The prior state 
was still described as ‘full’ or ‘empty’ in these conditions. The purpose of the controls was to see 
how easily the prior state would be processed when no reference point information could have 
been conveyed. 
The experimenters found framing effects on processing: when a container’s current state was 
described using a ‘full’ frame, participants were quicker to process information about its prior 
state if it had previously been empty rather than full; and, conversely, when the container’s 
current state was described using an ‘empty’ frame, participants were quicker to process 
information about its prior state if it was previously full rather than empty. In other words, 
readers seemed to be expecting a prior state of ‘full’ after the use of an ‘empty’ frame and – 
crucially – a prior state of ‘empty’ after the use of a full frame. The results suggest that the 
framing effect is not being driven solely by inferences drawn from ‘empty’ frames but also by 
those drawn from ‘full’ frames. Ingram et al. conclude: 
In this experiment, participants’ patterns of reading strongly reflected the predictions of 
the information leakage framework. A consistent interaction within the critical region 
showed that where a vessel was initially described as being half full…there was a clear 
processing advantage for a previous volume of empty (Ingram et al., 2014, p. 814).184 
 
183 The purpose of the final clause is to allow gaze to be tracked after the critical region. 
184 One might worry that the corresponding processing delay for a previous volume of full in this 
condition was simply due to the oddness of repeating the expression ‘full’. This is not addressed by 






While it would certainly be valuable to confirm this result using other pairs of frames and 
different experimental paradigms, I will assume for now that framing effects are not driven 
purely by marked forms.185  
Before moving on, I will briefly address – and reject – another possibility. One thought at this 
point might be that both frames convey reference point information but that the unmarked ‘full’ 
frame conveys how glasses typically relate to reference points, whereas the marked ‘empty’ 
frame conveys some unusual relation between the glass and a reference point. However, 
reflection quickly shows that this proposal is untenable. It would require that glasses are 
typically relatively full (that being the reference point information associated with the 
unmarked ‘full’ frame). Even if that supposition were credible, the logic certainly couldn’t carry 
across to other cases. For example, returning to the study by Leong et al. (2017), it would be 
incoherent to suppose that basketball players typically make (or miss) a relatively large 
proportion shots – by definition, they typically make (and miss) the typical proportion!  
In sum, it is doubtful that reference point information is calculable purely on the basis of 
markedness.186 That said, I do think marked forms could convey reference point information 
with greater strength than unmarked forms. I return to this idea in §7.2 after first setting out the 
core of my positive proposal.   
7. A New Manner Maxim 
I will argue that reference point information can be analysed as an implicature once we put in 
place an additional submaxim of Manner. Initially that might seem like an ad hoc move. First, 
though, it should be noted that directly after introducing the four submaxims of Manner, Grice 
explicitly states that “one might need others” (Grice, 1989, p. 27). Second, in later work, Grice 
proposed an additional manner maxim himself, the wording of which is highly suggestive for 
current purposes:  
I would be inclined to suggest that we add to the maxims of Manner which I originally 
propounded some maxim which would be, as it should be, vague: “Frame whatever you 
say in the form most suitable for any reply that would be regarded as appropriate”; or, 
“Facilitate in your form of expression the appropriate reply.” (Grice, 1989, p. 273) 
 
185 I note also that such a hypothesis would be unable to explain framing effects that arise where neither 
form is marked. For example, a series of experiments reported by Teigen and Karevold (2005) contrast 
time ‘spent’ or ‘left’, or work ‘done’ or ‘left’. There does not seem to be any obvious difference in the 
markedness of these (at least not in the English translation of the original Norwegian) yet framing effects 
are still observed (with hearers making systematically different inferences about progress relative to the 
original schedule).  
186 Although it would also be worth making sure that framing effects are not exhausted by the combined 





Of course, it must be acknowledged that Grice introduces this ‘framing maxim’ for the entirely 
different purpose of defending a Russellian semantic analysis of statements like (11): 
(11) The king of France is bald.  
Grice takes (11) to entail (not presuppose) that there is a king of France. However, he argues 
that it carries an implicature, which is calculable on the basis of the framing maxim. Specifically, 
Grice suggests that it is only felicitous to assert (11) if an appropriate response would be to 
challenge the king’s baldness but not his mere existence. Grice’s rationale here is that a 
cooperative speaker will only convey one challengeable claim at a time and, since the king’s 
baldness depends on his existence whereas his existence does not depend on his baldness, it 
must be the baldness claim which is challengeable. If, instead, the king’s existence should also be 
open to challenge, then the speaker of (11) would have violated the framing maxim. S/he should 
instead have used a formulation like ‘There is a king of France and he is bald’.  
Although I make no comment on Grice’s analysis of sentences like (11), I want to suggest that 
his framing maxim can account for the presence of reference point information. I propose 
reformulating it slightly as follows: 
Framing Maxim: Facilitate in your form of expression the appropriate response. 
The idea is this: if a speaker is complying with the framing maxim, s/he will choose the frame 
that facilitates the response of inferring accurate reference point information. In the next 
subsection, I will say something about what makes the inference of reference point information 
an ‘appropriate’ response to an attribute frame. In particular, I will argue that interlocutors 
have tacit knowledge of an association between frames in use and contextual reference points. 
7.1. Tacitly Known Use Properties 
The psychological data clearly demonstrate that attribute frames do facilitate hearers’ 
inferences of reference point information. Thus, when a glass is described using a ‘full’ frame, 
hearers have a tendency to infer that the glass is relatively full; and when it is described using 
an ‘empty’ frame, they have a tendency to infer that it is relatively empty. As the information 
leakage theorists propose, this seems to be due to hearers (tacitly) knowing that the use of a 
frame is sensitive to facts about reference points: when an entity instantiates some property 
(like fullness or emptiness) to a relatively high degree compared to the contextually salient 
reference point, speakers tend to use the corresponding (‘full’ or ‘empty’) frame.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the claim that speakers’ framing choices are sensitive to 
contextual reference points is empirically well-supported. To give a flavour of the findings, I will 





is an example vignette, which was presented to participants in one of six experimental 
conditions: 
Imagine a 4-ounce measuring cup in front of you that is completely filled with water up 
to the 4-ounce line. You then leave the room briefly and come back to find that the water 
is now at the 2-ounce line. What is the most natural way to describe the cup now? 
Participants were then then given the following options:  
The cup is ½ full. 
The cup is ½ empty. 
In two other conditions, the water now in the cup was described as being at the 1-ounce line, or 
at the 3-ounce line. These three conditions, in which the measuring cup started out completely 
full, were mirrored by three conditions in which it started out completely empty.  
The experimenters found that, where the measuring cup had started out empty, participants 
were more likely to choose ‘full’ frames to describe the cup than where it had started out full 
(and, of course, vice-versa). The difference was not significant where the water was now at the 




Prior state % participants choosing 
‘full’ frame 
% participants choosing 
‘empty’ frame 
1-oz line Full 56% 44% 
1-oz line Empty 97% 3% 
2-oz line Full 31% 69% 
2-oz line Empty 88% 12% 
3-oz line Full 75% 25% 
3-oz line Empty 88% 12% 
 
The data suggest a tendency for participants to choose frames according to their beliefs about 
the contextually salient reference point. As mentioned previously, this finding has been 
confirmed in several other speaker-focused experiments, using various pairs of frames (Honda 
 
187 It is possible that, as the glass approaches fullness, the unmarked ‘full’ frame becomes the obvious 
choice for speakers, regardless of prior state; in the next subsection, I discuss the interaction between 





& Yamagishi, 2017; McKenzie & Nelson, 2003; Sher & McKenzie, 2006; Teigen & Karevold, 
2005). 
In summary, then, when hearers infer reference point information, they are plausibly deploying 
knowledge of how speakers use frames in different contexts. In other words, frames convey 
reference point information in virtue of facts about how speakers tend to use frames. I want to 
remain neutral about the status of the association between frames and contextual reference 
points: perhaps it depends on an arbitrary linguistic convention (of English and, presumably, 
several other languages, given that studies have been conducted in Dutch, Norwegian, and 
Japanese, at least). Alternatively, perhaps it could be a universal fact about human cognition that 
we tend to highlight what is relatively abundant.188 While this would be an interesting issue for 
future (cross-linguistic and psychological) research, I will not attempt to pursue it here. Instead, 
I will simply assume the existence of some kind of regularity in use, which connects alternative 
frames with distinct reference point information. 
Given such a regularity, the appropriate response to a speaker’s frame will typically be to infer 
the associated reference point information. And cooperative speakers can be expected to use 
frames accordingly. Therefore, if a cooperative speaker describes a glass using a ‘full’ frame, 
hearers may infer, on the basis of the framing maxim, that it is relatively full; and, if the glass is 
described with an ‘empty’ frame, hearers may infer that it is relatively empty. If it subsequently 
turned out that the reference point information was false, that would constitute a violation of 
the framing maxim, other things being equal: the frame would have facilitated an inappropriate 
response. According to the proposed analysis, then, the cooperative presumption makes 
reference point information calculable as a Manner-based implicature. In particular, the 
implicature depends on the framing maxim, taken together with a tacitly known association 
between frames and reference points. 
I want to make a series of observations about the proposed account. First, since reference point 
information is taken to be a Manner-based implicature, this immediately explains why it is 
detachable (as discussed in §3). Second, because the implicature is driven by the association 
between frames and contextual reference points, it is likely to be fairly generalised. This would 
explain why framing effects can be felt, intuitively, even when sentences are presented out of 
context. Nevertheless, since the framing maxim will need to be weighed up with all kinds of 
other contextual factors, reference point information remains defeasible. For example, as 
 
188 This possibility might be a better fit with the view of implicatures Geurts puts forward when he writes: 
“Conversational implicatures are, first and foremost, non-conventional; they are not due to linguistic 
conventions of any kind” (Geurts, 2010, p. 9, emphasis in original)  It is worth noting, though, that any 
convention associating frames with reference point information would have to be a convention of use, not 





discussed in the previous chapter, where a hearer possesses conflicting knowledge, reference 
point information may not be taken up, thus mitigating any framing effect. Likewise, Levin et al. 
(1998, p. 164) discuss ceiling and floor effects, whereby attribute framing effects tend to be 
overridden by other considerations at proportions close to 0% or 100%. For example, where a 
basketball player has made only a negligible proportion of his shots, he might still be evaluated 
unfavourably, regardless of whether his performance is described in terms of the proportion 
‘made’ or the proportion ‘missed’.  
Third, it is interesting to observe that the association between frames and reference points does 
not only explain the presence of an implicature but also constrains its content (making framing 
cases unlike the ‘war is war’ tautology implicature considered earlier). For example, the 
association between the use of ‘full’ frames and relative fullness means that cooperative 
speakers using ‘full’ frames will not just be implicating something but, specifically, the 
information that the container is relatively full. In general, where the presence of an implicature 
depends on a regularity of use, we might expect its content to be similarly constrained. Indeed, 
the foregoing analysis suggests that Gricean pragmatics may be able to capture effects that some 
have sought to analyse in different ways. For example, Lepore and Stone argue for a non-
Gricean conception of pragmatics, which they describe as follows: 
It doesn’t appeal to anything like Grice’s Cooperative Principle, and typically exploits 
shallow cues rather than deep inferences about the speaker’s mental state. (Lepore & 
Stone, 2015, p. 265) 
It seems possible that at least some of the ‘shallow cues’ they have in mind could be captured 
within a broadly Gricean framework, in a similar way as suggested here for framing cues.   
Fourth, the proposed account is metalinguistic in the sense that the hearer must register 
(presumably sub-consciously) the speaker’s choice of linguistic form; this falls out directly from 
the framing maxim.189  
Finally, if, as suggested, competent interlocutors tacitly know the association between frames 
and reference points, then it seems reasonable to suppose that speakers (tacitly) believe that 
hearers can infer the reference point information. The proposal would thereby satisfy the third 
of Grice’s necessary conditions for conversationally implicating (as set out in §2.1). Accordingly, 
we shouldn’t treat reference point information as a mere downstream ‘perlocutionary’ effect of 
 
189 It is worth emphasising that the linguistic alternatives in question here are not scalar alternatives of 
the kind discussed in the previous chapter. While the latter have asymmetrical entailment relations, 
frames are mutually entailing, at least in terms of their minimal semantics. Nevertheless, I think it is 
plausible that alternative frames could interact with features like prosodic focus, in similar ways as scalar 





the utterance but as a genuine part of meaning. By way of contrast, consider a case in which A 
says loudly that B will play basketball tonight. Hearers might infer that B is tall on the basis that 
basketball players usually are. Hearers might also infer that A has a loud speaking voice. 
However, there is no reason to think these inferences are tracking A’s beliefs; they are simply 
knock-on effects of the utterance. In contrast, reference point information does reliably track 
speakers’ beliefs. 
7.2. Interaction with Markedness 
In this section, I explain why a marked form may convey reference point information more 
robustly than an unmarked form, playing a larger role in producing framing effects.190 To 
illustrate the point, I will continue to use the scenario of a glass described as part ‘full’ or part 
‘empty’. 
In contexts where a glass is, in fact, relatively full, it is clear how a cooperative speaker should 
behave: namely, by using a ‘full’ frame to describe the glass. First, this frame would provide 
accurate information about the reference point. Second, it is also the unmarked form. Thus, both 
considerations mutually reinforce the choice of a ‘full’ frame (and make an ‘empty’ frame 
particularly inappropriate). That situation is captured in the first row of the table below.  
Context Reference-Point Sensitive 
Frame 
Unmarked Frame 
Glass is relatively full ‘Full’ ‘Full’ 
Glass is relatively empty ‘Empty’ ‘Full’ 
  
Contexts in which a glass is relatively empty are more complicated, however. A cooperative 
speaker faces the following dilemma: on one hand, the contextual reference point calls for the 
use of an ‘empty’ frame. Nevertheless, the speaker has a conflicting reason to use the unmarked 
‘full’ form, since it is less effortful to produce, easier to understand, and so on. In this situation, 
then, Manner-based considerations may pull in opposite directions, as shown in the bottom row 
of the table below. 
An upshot is that, when a marked frame is used, it can be expected to convey the associated 
reference point information with greater strength than an unmarked frame. After all, the 
marked form is felicitous only in one kind of context. In the table above, the use of the ‘empty’ 
 
190 Holleman and Pander Maat (2009) make a similar proposal in the context of their ‘argumentative 
orientation’ account, which was discussed in the previous chapter. They claim that the effects of 
argumentative orientation are modulated by markedness, with marked forms strengthening the effects 





frame only corresponds to contexts in which the glass is emptier than before. In contrast, the 
unmarked form is less informative, since it can be used relatively felicitously in both kinds of 
context. Thus, in the table above, the ‘full’ frame can be used in contexts in which the glass is 
fuller or emptier than before. Another way of thinking about this is that the use of the ‘empty’ 
frame requires more justification for the extra effort required in its processing, strongly 
implying the conclusion that the glass is relatively empty. In contrast, the unmarked frame 
might have been used either because the glass was previously emptier or simply because that 
linguistic form is generally more readily used.  
The proposal advanced here would help explain the slight skew in the experimental data of 
McKenzie and Nelson (2003) and Sher and McKenzie (2006), which suggest a general tendency 
for speakers to use ‘full’ rather than ‘empty’ frames, and for hearers to derive more information 
from ‘empty’ frames than full frames. Nevertheless, as discussed above, the findings of Ingram et 
al. (2014) suggest that ‘full’ frames can convey reference point information, albeit more weakly, 
and therefore that reference point information can sometimes outweigh considerations of 
markedness.  
8. Speaker Intentions 
Before closing, I will consider an objection to the claim that reference point information is 
conversationally implicated, on the basis that it is not plausibly intended by the speaker. In this 
vein, Holleman and Pander Maat complain: 
[T]he explanation put forward by Sher and McKenzie is not really communicative, as it 
does not include any reference to the communicators’ intentions. The central metaphor 
of leakage suggests an automatic process, beyond the control of the language user. 
(Holleman & Pander Maat, 2009, p. 2206) 
As discussed in §2.2 it is not clear, in fact, whether implicatures must be thought of as part of 
speaker meaning at all. Here I want to suggest that, even if they are, this does not automatically 
disqualify reference point information from counting as implicated.  
First, it is clear from the quote above that Holleman and Pander Maat make certain assumptions 
about the nature of speaker meaning: specifically, that it cannot be ‘automatic’ or ‘beyond the 
control of the language user’. However, I think this is far from obvious. Plausibly, at least some 
of the time, communicative intentions are relatively automatic and sub-conscious, with no need 
for competent speakers to engage in conscious deliberation about how to formulate an 
utterance. Of course, the question of precisely what kinds of psychological processes underpin 





However, it would at least require more work to show that speaker meaning has the properties 
assumed by Holleman and Pander Maat. 
Second, I want to return to Grice’s analysis of ‘The king of France is bald’, which led him to 
introduce the framing maxim. According to Grice, that statement implicates that hearers may 
only challenge the fact of the king’s baldness, not his mere existence. Yet, it seems unclear 
whether this information is speaker-intended. At the very least, this case seems no more clear 
than that of reference point information. Certainly, it is rather implausible that a speaker of ‘The 
king of France is bald’ must have a conscious intention about the challengeability of the 
entailments. If that is correct, it suggests that reference point information could stand or fall 
along with other examples like this, which Grice took to be genuine implicatures. Either all of 
them should be considered to be speaker-meant (and therefore unproblematically implicated) 
or none should. And, in the eventuality that none should, it seems just as reasonable to drop the 
requirement that implicatures must be speaker-meant as it would be to weed out those of 
Grice’s implicatures which are not speaker-meant (especially if we take seriously the exegetical 
observations made by Saul).  
While I do not take these points to provide a knock-down argument, I suggest that they do, at 
least, push the burden back onto my opponent to provide stronger arguments against analysing 
reference point information as conversationally implicated. Given that an implicature-based 
analysis provides a parsimonious framework for capturing that information, I suggest treating it 
as such.  
9. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that the reference point information conveyed by frames fits the 
mould of a Manner-based conversational implicature. In the next chapter I will defend this 
proposal against competing analyses, according to which reference point information intrudes 







Keeping Semantics Minimal 
Abstract 
In the previous chapter, I showed how the reference point information conveyed by a frame 
could be analysed as a Gricean conversational implicature. In recent years, though, many have 
argued that information traditionally treated as implicated may intrude on what is ‘said’. There 
are different versions of this claim, which reanalyse implicatures as affecting truth-conditional 
semantic meaning, or the truth-conditions of what is asserted, or non-truth-conditional 
semantic meaning. I consider in turn how each approach might be extended to the case of 
reference point information. I argue that the resulting analyses lack plausibility or parsimony. I 
conclude that the framing data lend further support to a broadly Minimalist understanding of 
the semantics-pragmatics divide. 
1. Introduction 
Building on the discussion of the last two chapters, I will simply assume here that attribute 
frames convey reference point information, and that this explains framing effects at least in 
part. Thus, for example, frames (1) and (2) tend to convey the reference point information in (3) 
and (4), respectively: 
(1) The glass is a quarter full. 
(2) The glass is three quarters empty. 
(3) The glass is relatively full. 
(4) The glass is relatively empty. 
Likewise, (5) and (6) tend to convey the reference point information in (7) and (8): 
(5) This player made 40% of his shots last season. 
(6) This player missed 60% of his shots last season. 
(7) This player made a relatively large proportion of his shots last season. 
(8) This player missed a relatively large proportion of his shots last season. 
In general, the reference point hypothesis predicts that attribute frames, which include one or 
other of a pair of contradictory expressions, tend to convey that the subject of predication 





this can explain why hearers’ responses shift in response to alternative frames – in other words, 
why framing effects are observed. 
In chapter 7, I showed how the reference point information conveyed by frames might be 
analysed as a Manner-based Gricean implicature. However, I will now consider an important 
challenge to that analysis. While Grice sought to hold implicatures apart from what a speaker 
‘says’, a large post-Gricean literature has problematised his distinction. Many now argue that a 
subset of apparent implicatures actually intrude, in some sense, on what is ‘said’. Mapping the 
arguments back to the spectrum of views surveyed in chapter 2, I will consider how each 
approach might be applied to the reference point information conveyed by frames.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows: in §2 I consider Indexicalism-inspired approaches, 
according to which reference point information affects the truth-conditional semantic meaning 
of an uttered frame. In §§3-4 I turn to the idea that reference point information is a free 
pragmatic effect but one which still affects the truth-conditions of what is ‘said’. I discuss 
Contextualist and Relativist versions of this claim. In §§5-7 I consider whether reference point 
information could be part of a frame’s non-truth-conditional semantic meaning, exploring the 
role of presupposition, ambiguity, and ‘bias’. I argue that the approaches discussed in §§2-7 are 
either implausible or less parsimonious than the implicature-based analysis proposed in the 
previous chapter. In §8 I argue that, insofar as explaining framing effects requires a distinction 
between a frame’s minimal semantic meaning and the reference point information it implicates, 
this provides some further support for a form of Semantic Minimalism.  
2. An Indexicalist Approach 
As argued previously, since the reference point information conveyed by a frame is readily 
defeasible, it cannot arise purely as a result of composing the conventional meanings of the 
constituent words. Otherwise, it should arise in all contexts in which the frame is uttered by a 
competent speaker. Nevertheless, it remains possible that frames include certain context-
sensitive elements, which contribute reference point information to their semantic contents. I 
will consider two versions of this Indexicalism-inspired analysis, the first of which posits overt 
context-sensitivity in the surface forms of frames, while the second appeals to covert variables 
in their underlying logical forms. 
2.1. Overt Context-sensitivity 
As discussed in chapter 2, some elements of language are clearly context-sensitive, including 
expressions like ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘this’, ‘that’, ‘here’, and ‘today’, the denotations of which vary across 





traced back to their conventional meanings, which demand contextual ‘saturation’.191 Recall 
that, standardly, context-sensitive expressions are thought to contribute occasion-specific 
denotations to the truth-conditional semantic meaning of a sentence. For example, ‘this’ will 
contribute the object to which it refers on each occasion of use. Therefore, if a frame were to 
contain a context-sensitive element, that element would contribute an occasion-specific 
denotation to its truth-conditional semantic meaning.192 
In fact, I think it is immediately implausible that reference point information arises from overtly 
context-sensitive elements of frames. The elements of surface structure that differ across 
alternative frames are the contradictory predicate expressions used (like ‘full’ and ‘empty’; 
‘missed’ and ‘made’) and the complementary quantitative elements (like ‘a quarter’ and ‘three 
quarters’; ‘40%’ and ‘60%’). However, none of these plausibly requires saturation by a 
contextual reference point. Take, for example, the expression ‘missed’ in (6). In order to 
contribute reference point information, its denotation would have to be restricted to the set of 
individuals who miss relatively large proportions. In other words, to capture the reference point 
information, the conventional meaning of ‘miss’ would need to be something like ‘miss a 
relatively large proportion’. Importantly, this would apply across all occasions of its use (with 
occasion-specific factors simply determining the relevant reference point). It is clear from 
considering other syntactic contexts for ‘miss’ this cannot be its conventional meaning. For 
example, consider (9) below: 
(9) The player missed his shot because he was distracted by the flashing cameras. 
In (9) ‘miss’ does not plausibly mean ‘miss a relatively large proportion’. Indeed, I take it that 
there is no temptation to suppose that (9) appeals in any way to a reference point player who 
missed relatively few shots. Similar reasoning applies to the other expressions substituted 
across frames, suggesting that reference point information is not the result of straightforward 
overt context-sensitivity.  
2.2. Covert Variables 
Even though expressions like ‘full’, ‘empty’, ‘make’, and ‘miss’ are not plausibly context-
sensitive, it remains possible that attribute frames contain context-sensitive elements in their 
logical form. To flesh out this idea, I will draw on the Indexicalist account proposed by Stanley 
 
191 As before, I will remain neutral as to the degree to which conventional meanings constrain what 
context-sensitive expressions can denote, and also on whether saturation depends on speakers’ 
intentions or objective features of the situation. 
192 Again, one might argue instead that semantics is exhausted by the composition of conventional 
meanings, as does Harris (forthcoming). And, as argued in chapter 5, I believe semantic meanings can be 





and others, which was introduced in chapter 2. Recall that these theorists appeal to covert 
variables, which contribute occasion-specific comparison classes, domains, or locations to truth-
conditional semantic meanings. For example, the logical form of (10) can be represented 
roughly as in (11), where the variable ‘x’ requires saturation by an occasion-specific comparison 
class: 
(10) John was old when he died. 
(11) John was old(x) when he died. 
Similarly, we might analyse the logical form of (6) as containing a placeholder for a contextually 
salient player or class of players, relative to which the target player is to be compared. We could 
represent this roughly as follows: 
(12) The player missed(x) 60% of his shots. 
This would make the semantic meaning of (6) dependent on whichever player (or set of 
players) is salient on the given occasion of use. 
The problem with this analysis is that it does not explain why the player should be thought of as 
having missed a relatively large proportion of shots. It only requires that there must be some 
comparator in play. To capture the reference point information, we would need to place an 
additional restriction on the comparator, requiring it to render 60% a relatively large 
proportion of shots to miss. A Stanley-style account provides no motivation for imposing such a 
restriction. Moreover, once that restriction is imposed, it is unclear that the covert variable, x, is 
playing any substantive role in explaining how reference point information arises.193  
There are various other problems with this kind of approach. First, frames seem far less likely to 
generate intuitions of semantic incompleteness than, for example, sentences containing the 
expression ‘old’. This limits the intuitive argument for positing a covert variable. Also, it may be 
difficult for the Indexicalist to explain why reference point information is defeasible, if it is 
supposed to arise from logical form. In light of these points (taken together with the more 
foundational criticisms of Indexicalism mentioned in chapter 2) I suggest that reference point 
information is unlikely to be traced back to either overt or covert context-sensitivity in the 
frame itself. Therefore, it does not plausibly affect a frame’s truth-conditional semantics. In the 
next three sections, I will consider whether it could nevertheless affect what frames are used to 
‘say’. 
 






As discussed in chapters 2 and 5, Contextualists and Relativists deny that Minimalists and 
Indexicalists carve at a natural joint when they focus on the lexical and syntactic features of 
sentences. Instead, it is argued that capturing truth-conditional contents with genuine 
theoretical value will require appeal to ‘free’ effects. I will begin by considering how a 
Contextualist account might be brought to bear on framing cases, turning to Relativism in §4.194  
As we saw in chapter 2, Contexualists are concerned with the truth-conditional meanings that 
are ‘said’ or ‘explicated’ (I will also talk about these meanings in terms of what speakers ‘assert’ 
or ‘directly communicate’).195 The focus on what speakers assert tracks Grice’s requirement for 
what is ‘said’ to be speaker-meant. Contextualists depart from Grice, however, in weakening the 
link between ‘said’ contents and conventional meaning. In this section, I will consider whether 
reference point information could plausibly intrude on what is asserted. I do so by assessing it 
against the various criteria Contextualists have put forward for individuating explicatures or 
what is ‘said’. I will begin by focusing on Relevance Theory’s category of explicature, although in 
§3.4 I will briefly discuss Recanati’s distinct psychological criterion for what is ‘said’. 
3.1. Formal and Functional Criteria 
As we saw in chapter 2, explicatures are supposed to be ‘developments’ or ‘expansions’ of an 
uttered expression’s logical form. In other words, the information that is derivable via linguistic 
decoding should be contained within the explicature. As I have presented the reference point 
information so far, it would not meet this criterion: for example, (8) does not plausibly contain 
the logical form of (6) (both repeated below) since (8) includes no component corresponding to 
‘60%’.  
(6) This player missed 60% of his shots last season. 
(8) This player missed a relatively large proportion of his shots last season. 
However, we could easily reformulate the reference point information as follows:  
(13) This player missed 60% of his shots last season, and thereby missed a relatively large 
proportion. 
 
194 As discussed in chapters 2 and 5, I will not address Occasion-sensitivity, which claims that 
communicated meanings cannot be adequately represented, either in language or thought, but is instead 
essentially context-involving. Whether or not this is correct, the claim is orthogonal to the question of 
whether reference point information is part of what is ‘said’ or implicated. 
195 As noted previously, Contextualists typically do not classify such meanings as ‘semantic’. Instead, that 





It seems possible that a hearer of (6) might form a representation like (13), which contains and 
expands the logical form of the frame.  
Nevertheless, (13) arguably fails to meet the separate ‘locality constraint’ put forward by 
Carston and Hall (2012). This criterion requires that any modulation and enrichment operates 
on sub-propositional constituents of the logical form, rather than on a complete propositional 
meaning. In (13), the additional clause seems to operate on the proposition that this player 
missed 60% of his shots last season. Perhaps, then, we ought to represent the explicature as 
follows, where the added constituent specifically modifies the proportion: 
(14) This player missed the relatively large proportion of 60% of his shots last season 
If hearers of (6) formed the representation in (14), that could satisfy the first two formal tests 
for explicature. I believe (14) could also pass the ‘scope test’, since this content seems to survive 
the embedding of (6) in relevant syntactic environments. For example, consider the following 
sentence in which (6) is in the antecedent of a conditional: 
(15) If this player missed 60% of his shots last season, then he won’t be selected for the team. 
The antecedent of (15) still plausibly conveys (14). Indeed, the information in (14) provides the 
explanatory connection that links the antecedent with the consequent. As far as the formal 
diagnostics go, then, the reference point information conveyed by a frame like (6) could 
potentially be considered an explicature. 
In addition to these formal tests, recall that Carston also proposes a functional constraint on 
explicatures, whereby they may act as premises for inferring implicatures but cannot 
themselves be entailed by implicatures. Plausibly, (14) could play the requisite role. Imagine, for 
example, that a speaker utters (6) in the context of selecting players for a basketball team. The 
hearer might arrive at something like the following conclusion: 
(16) This player should not be selected for the team. 
We can treat (16) as an implicature. It is inferable from (14), taken together with a further 
background premise that players who miss relatively large proportions of their shots should not 
be selected for the team. Meanwhile, (14) is clearly not entailed by (16): there are potentially 
many other reasons why a player should not be selected for the team, so it may not be inferred 
from the fact that this player should not be selected, that he missed a relatively large proportion 
of his shots. Thus, (14) seems capable of meeting Carston’s functional criterion. 
We might be tempted, then, to conceptualise reference point information as intruding on what 





a frame’s logical form and the implicatures it is used to convey. However, these formal and 
functional tests should not be treated as conclusive. As acknowledged by Carston and Hall 
(2012), it is only to be expected that formal tests will ultimately be insufficient, since they 
operate at the level of sentence types, whereas explicatures are supposed to depend on token 
utterances (see also (Borg, 2016, p. 343)). Contextualists have also acknowledged that 
implicatures can sometimes meet the formal and functional criteria as well: for example, playing 
a similar intermediate role in the inference of further implicatures (Carston, 2002, p. 190).  
It is more controversial whether implicatures can survive embedding under logical operators 
without their needing to be reclassified as explicatures. Borg (2009) is among those who argue 
that generalised conversational implicatures can do so, and that, therefore, the scope test fails to 
isolate explicatures. For example, Borg argues that the semantic truth-conditions of a 
conditional sentence are strictly independent of any information that might be implicated by its 
antecedent. She writes: 
[T]he advocate of minimal semantics will have to bite the bullet with respect to the 
apparent semantic relevance of some implicatures, claiming that in all cases it is an 
appearance of truth-conditional relevance not a genuine case of rich pragmatic input to 
semantic content. Thus, given (3) and (4) (repeated here): 
3) If Jill blew the whistle on poor practices at work and was sacked, then she is 
entitled to compensation. 
4) If Jill was sacked and blew the whistle on poor practices at work, then she is 
entitled to compensation. 
the minimalist must hold that there is no semantic difference between the two.  
(Borg, 2009, p. 79, emphasis in original) 
Borg accepts that the intuitive understanding of the antecedent in her conditional sentence (3) 
is that Jill was sacked after (and presumably because) she blew the whistle. In contrast, in her 
conditional sentence (4) the antecedent is intuitively understood as meaning that Jill was 
sacked first and then blew the whistle (which is why (4) sounds odd). Nevertheless, Borg 
maintains that our intuitions here are tracking implicatures conveyed by (3) and (4). The 
intuitions are particularly strong and compelling, she argues, because we derive generalised 
implicatures relatively mechanically and habitually. This does not show, however, that they are 
not implicatures. 
Applying the idea to our framing case, neither (6) nor the conditional sentence (15) need 





remain implicated. In other words, (15) (repeated below) would be semantically equivalent to 
(17): 
(15) If this player missed 60% of his shots last season, then he won’t be selected for the team. 
(17) If this player made 40% of his shots last season, then he won’t be selected for the team. 
Both would have the same minimal semantic truth-conditions; it is just that their antecedents 
carry different implicatures: whereas the antecedent of (15) implicates that 60% is a relatively 
large proportion for the player to miss, the antecedent of (17) implicates that it is a relatively 
small proportion for the player to miss (or, equivalently, 40% is a relatively large proportion to 
make). Of course, (15) sounds far better than (17) but this can be explained by the fact that they 
carry distinct Manner-based implicatures. As discussed in the previous chapter, since reference 
point information depends on a regularity in use, it can be expected to arise in a fairly 
generalised fashion, coming along ‘for free’ with a frame unless defeated by competing 
considerations.  
In sum, the formal and functional tests discussed above should be thought of as, at best, partial 
filters: while they may succeed in filtering out some implicatures, they will inevitably allow 
some others through. I believe this is what is happening with reference point information – it is 
an implicature that can sometimes meet the formal criteria which have been put forward for 
explicature. In the next subsection, I will argue that it is often blocked by more intuitive criteria. 
3.2. Assertion 
I want to suggest that, in many cases, reference point information will fail to count as something 
the speaker intuitively asserted. As noted in chapter 2, explicatures are supposed to track 
people’s intuitive truth-value judgements, as probed by so-called ‘context shifting arguments’. 
In many cases, I think it is unlikely that reference point information will impinge on these 
judgements. Consider, for example, the exchange below:  
(18) A: What do you know about Federico? 
B: He missed 60% of his shots last season. 
Here B plausibly conveys the reference point information that Federico missed a relatively large 
proportion of his shots. However, had 60% in fact constituted a relatively small proportion of 
shots to have missed, it is rather implausible that B would have asserted something false. This 
suggests that the reference point information fails to affect the intuitive truth-conditions of B’s 
assertion. In other words, it is not plausibly part of the speaker’s explicature. Relatedly, I take it 





information. In other words, this information would fail to affect the speaker’s ‘conversational 
liability’, which Borg (2017) proposes as the hallmark of explicature.196  
That said, we can construct contexts in which reference point information is more plausibly 
asserted. An example is the exchange considered in the previous chapter, and reproduced 
below: 
(19) A: Why wasn’t Federico recruited to the team? 
B: He missed 60% of his shots last season. 
As discussed previously, B’s utterance can only be treated as a relevant reply to A’s question if 
60% is a relatively large proportion of shots to have missed. Perhaps in this case, then, B would 
be judged to have asserted something false, should it turn out that 60% in fact constitutes a 
relatively small proportion of shots to have missed. And, relatedly, we might intuitively hold B 
somewhat liable for communicating false reference point information in this context. 
Although I want to grant this possibility, I believe it makes better sense to treat the reference 
point information as an implicature in both exchanges (18) and (19), with the only difference 
being in how strongly it is implicated. The proposal put forward in the previous chapter can 
capture both cases in a unified way: in the first case, where the reference point information is 
only supported by the framing maxim, the implicature is relatively weak. In the second case, 
where considerations of relevance reinforce the implicature, it is conveyed with greater 
strength. I submit that this univocal account provides a more parsimonious explanation of the 
data. Thus, even if we allow for a distinction to be drawn between cases in which reference 
point information affects intuitions about truth and liability and those in which it does not, we 
should consider that to be a difference in degree, not a difference in kind. As will be reiterated 
below, the key distinction for explaining framing effects remains the one between a frame’s 
minimal semantic meaning (which renders it logically equivalent to its counterpart) and the 
reference point information it typically conveys (which renders alternative frames inequivalent 
to one another).  
3.4. Primary vs. Secondary Processes 
I end the section on Contextualism by turning briefly to the psychological criterion proposed by 
Recanati. As discussed in chapter 2, Recanati’s criteria for individuating what a speaker ‘says’, 
partially overlap with those Relevance Theorists use for individuating explicatures. As we saw, 
 
196 I don’t deny that B’s utterance sounds odd where the reference point information is false, and might be 
considered misleading (as will be discussed in the next chapter). However, this can be adequately 





though, Recanati emphasises a psychological criterion, whereby what is ‘said’ is the product of 
‘primary’ pragmatic processes, operating unconsciously and sub-personally. In contrast, 
implicatures are thought to be the result of ‘secondary’ pragmatic processes that involve 
conscious, personal-level calculation.  
Interestingly, Recanati’s picture would seem to get things exactly the wrong way around for 
framing cases: the contexts in which reference point information is most plausibly asserted (and 
therefore the ones in which it might affect what is ‘said’) are those where it is calculable on the 
basis of general rational considerations, such as relevance and informativity, with little need to 
appeal to a tacitly known regularity in how frames are used. Yet, on Recanati’s framework this 
would point to the reference point information being implicated rather than ‘said’. Conversely, 
the contexts in which there is less temptation to suppose that the reference point information is 
asserted are those in which we need to rely more heavily on tacitly known use properties, 
which presumably operate below the level of consciousness. On Recanati’s framework, 
however, these would seem to be classifiable as part of the primary processing machinery, 
which is supposed to deliver up ‘said’ contents rather than implicatures. Therefore, I do not 
think a Recanati-style Contextualism will help motivate the idea that reference point 
information intrudes on what is ‘said’. 
4. Relativism 
As discussed in chapter 2, Semantic Relativism is the view that sentences obtain different truth 
conditions on different occasions of utterance, not because they obtain different meanings but 
because different contexts require them to be evaluated for truth against parameters with 
different values. Taking inspiration from this approach, we might hypothesise that alternative 
frames have equivalent meanings but that their truth conditions can come apart in certain 
contexts. The idea would be that the reference point is a contextual parameter that affects truth-
conditions without contributing to the meaning of an uttered frame. For example, if a player 
really did miss a relatively large proportion of shots, relative to the contextual reference point, 
then an utterance of (6) would be evaluable as true. If not, it would be evaluable as false.  
I want to dispose of this possibility fairly swiftly. As discussed above, there is often little 
temptation to suppose that reference point information affects the intuitive truth or falsity of an 
uttered frame. To that extent, a Relativist approach seems unmotivated. As before, I am willing 
to grant that reference point information might affect intuitive truth-value judgements in some 
contexts, and the Relativist apparatus is potentially applicable to these cases. However, we 
would still be left with the task of providing a separate explanation for cases in which reference 





implicature-based analysis proposed in the previous chapter brings both kinds of case under a 
single explanatory mechanism. 
Before I move on to another set of approaches, I note that on both Contextualist and Relativist 
approaches, once the truth-conditions of an utterance are taken to depend on reference point 
information, there is supposed to be no theoretical role for a more minimal meaning to play. 
Against this, I think alternative frames continue to express logically equivalent semantic 
meanings at the same time as conveying distinct reference point information. Some 
phenomenological evidence for this is that one can appreciate the equivalence of two attribute 
frames like the ‘60% made’ frame in (5) and the ‘40% missed’ frame in (6) while continuing to 
feel that the first makes the player sound better than the second. Indeed, as discussed in chapter 
1, this is what makes framing effects genuinely puzzling: it is not just that we form equivalent or 
inequivalent representations in response to frames but that we can feel pulled in both 
directions at the same time. I want to suggest that frames can sensibly and legitimately be 
considered equivalent (as experimenters have traditionally supposed), yet, in another sense 
they can be reasonably understood to be inequivalent. Therefore, whereas Tversky and 
Kahneman compare framing effects to visual illusions like the Müller-Lyer, a better analogy 
might be with the Necker cube, or the duck-rabbit: rather than our being misled by surface cues, 
there are two distinct sets of evidence operating simultaneously in different directions (which, 
in the framing case, correspond to semantic and pragmatic evidence). The phenomenology of 
framing effects thus provides some further prima facie evidence that minimal semantic 
meanings have a genuine psychological role to play alongside more enriched interpretations. 
5. Presupposition  
I turn now to consider a different set of theories, which have sought to enlarge semantics, 
accommodating linguistic phenomena that do not necessarily make a truth-conditional 
contribution.197 I begin in this section by assessing whether reference point information could 
be presupposed. My focus here will be on presuppositions that are triggered linguistically.198 For 
illustration, consider the sentence below: 
(20) Federico regrets missing the shot. 
 
197 According to a still more radical view, semantic meaning might be thought of as entirely independent 
of truth-conditions (Chomsky, 2000; Pietroski, 2005, 2018). Thus, Pietroski (2015) seeks to explain 
framing effects by appealing to linguistic properties that are entirely detached from properties of the 
world. I will not pursue his proposal here, although it would be an interesting avenue for future research. 
198 On some theories, presupposition is taken to be a pragmatic phenomenon (Simons, 2006; Stalnaker, 






In (20), the expression ‘regret’ is thought to trigger the following presupposition: 
(21) Federico missed the shot. 
This is not part of what is asserted when (20) is uttered but is rather a precondition for 
felicitously uttering (20). 
Perhaps, similarly, attribute frames might trigger reference point information.199 For example, 
perhaps (6) could presuppose (8) (both reproduced below): 
(6) This player missed 60% of his shots last season. 
(8) This player missed a relatively large proportion of his shots last season. 
There is something initially suggestive about a presuppositional analysis. It seems right that 
reference point information is often ‘backgrounded’ in a similar way to information that is 
presupposed. This point is further supported by the fact that reference point information may 
pass the ‘hey, wait a minute’ test proposed by Von Fintel (2004). For example, one might 
felicitously respond to an utterance of (6) with: ‘Hey, wait a minute, 60% is a relatively small 
proportion to have missed’.200  
Further investigation shows a presuppositional analysis to be implausible, however. Most 
importantly, the reference point information fails to exhibit the projection behaviour 
characteristic of presuppositions. As discussed by Beaver and Geurts (2014), presuppositions 
typically persist when the asserted content is embedded in various syntactic environments, 
especially under negation, and also in questions, possibility modals, and conditionals.201 For 
example, the presupposed content in (21) – that Federico missed the shot – continues to project 
from the following sentences: 
(22) Federico doesn’t regret missing the shot. 
(23) Does Federico regret missing the shot? 
(24) Maybe Federico regrets missing the shot. 
 
199 Note that whereas the presupposition in (20) is triggered by the simple expression ‘regret’, in the 
framing cases the presupposition would probably have to attach to a more complex construction (like 
‘missed [some proportion of] his shots’). I will simply grant for now that such an analysis would be 
possible in principle. However, if it weren’t, then that would merely expedite my conclusion that 
reference point information is not presupposed. 
200 Or, perhaps, the ‘cautious assent’ test described by Predelli (2013, p. 71) might be better in many 
contexts. This uses ‘Yes, but…’ as in: ‘Yes, but 60% is a relatively small proportion to have missed’. 
Predelli treats this as a diagnostic for ‘bias’, which I will consider in §7. 





(25) If Federico regrets missing the shot, he’ll be motivated to keep practicing. 
However, reference point information seems not to project from the same environments (or at 
least not as clearly). It strikes me as less plausible, for example, that (8) survives the 
embeddings of (6) in the following sentences: 
(26) This player didn’t miss 60% of his shots last season.202 
(27) Did this player miss 60% of his shots last season? 
(28) Maybe this player missed 60% of his shots last season. 
(29) If this player missed 60% of his shots last season, he’ll be motivated to keep practicing. 
Note that (29) is similar to the conditional in (15), discussed above. As before, the reference 
point information survives embedding in the antecedent. Crucially, though, it does not project 
from the whole conditional, as (21) does from (25). In other words, (29) taken as a whole does 
not entail that the player actually did miss a relatively large proportion of his shots, whereas 
(23) does entail that Federico actually did miss the shot. This subtle but important difference 
suggests that we are dealing with an implicature rather than a presupposition.203 Given the 
projection data discussed here, I do not think reference point information is plausibly 
presupposed. 
The ease with which reference point information can be defeated provides further support for 
the same conclusion. Strawson (1950) argued that, whenever a presupposition turns out to be 
false, the asserted content will be neither true nor false. For example, if Federico had not missed 
the shot, (20) would simply lack a truth-value; the question of its truth or falsity simply doesn’t 
arise. Others, following Russell (1957), have thought that something false would have been 
asserted in that scenario. On either analysis, though, the speaker has certainly not said 
something true.  
In contrast, as argued above, it seems possible for attribute frames to express truths, even when 
the reference point information turns out to be false. Thus, on either the original Strawsonian 
view, or the Russellian alternative, reference point information is not plausibly presupposed by 
attribute frames. Although Strawson himself later adopted a more moderate view of 
 
202 Negating the alternative, positively-worded, frame encourages an inference to the antonym, as 
discussed by Krifka (2007) and Ruytenbeek, Verheyen, and Spector (2017): in ‘This player did not make 
40% of his shots last season’, the negated verb phrase ‘did not make’ is naturally interpreted as ‘missed’, 
yielding ‘This player missed 40% of his shots last season’. The asymmetry between frames here may be 
linked to the phenomenon of markedness, discussed in the previous chapter. 
203 A similar point is discussed by Davis (2016, §4.6). He gives the example of the sentence ‘If they had a 
child and got married, the Church would disapprove’, in which the antecedent continues to implicate that 





presuppositions, presupposed information is still commonly understood to be difficult to cancel. 
For example, Beaver and Geurts (2014, §3) observe that cancelling a presupposition (unlike 
cancelling an implicature) is usually only possible when the trigger is embedded under an 
operator. Thus, one might sensibly utter (30), in which (20) is embedded under negation: 
(30) Federico doesn’t regret missing the shot because he didn’t miss it. 
In contrast, it is far harder to come up with a context in which it would be coherent to utter 
(31), in which (20) is unembedded:  
(31) Federico regrets missing the shot but he didn’t miss it.  
Reference point information, on the other hand, is defeasible even in unembedded contexts, as 
has been discussed in previous chapters. Again, then, it seems to pattern more like an 
implicature than a presupposition. I believe that is how it should be classified. Before 
proceeding, though, I will briefly consider a ‘presupposition denial’ account of reference point 
information that has been put forward in the psycholinguistic literature. 
5.1. Presupposition Denial 
Moxey, Sanford and others originally developed their ‘presupposition denial’ account to explain 
the effects of certain ‘natural language quantifiers’ (NLQs) like ‘few’ and ‘a few’ (Moxey, 2011; 
Moxey & Sanford, 1987; Sanford, Dawydiak, & Moxey, 2007; Sanford, Fay, Stewart, & Moxey, 
2002). Despite those two expressions being quantitatively equivalent, the ‘positive’ NLQ, ‘a few’, 
has interestingly different effects than the ‘negative’ NLQ, ‘few’.204 Specifically, each brings into 
focus distinct sets of entities. To illustrate, consider the following stimuli, taken from (Sanford et 
al., 2002, p. 130): 
(32) A few of the fans went to the match. They enjoyed it greatly. 
(33) Few of the fans went to the match. They watched it on TV at home instead. 
The use of ‘a few’ in (32) brings into focus the set of fans who did go to the match (which the 
theorists dub the ‘reference set’), and makes these fans available for anaphoric reference: in the 
continuation, ‘they’ is most naturally read as referring to the fans who went to the match. In 
contrast, the use of ‘few’ in (33) brings into focus the set of fans who did not go to the match (the 
‘complement set’), making them available as the referents of ‘they’. As demonstrated by (34) 
and (35) below, it is difficult to get the opposite readings, such that ‘they’ refers to the 
complement set when ‘a few’ is used, or to the reference set when ‘few’ is used: 
 
204 The labels ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ are being used here as linguistic rather than evaluative descriptors. 





(34) A few of the fans went to the match. They watched it on TV at home instead. 
(35) Few of the fans went to the match. They enjoyed it greatly. 
More generally, it is found that the reference set is typically in focus after the use of a positive 
NLQ, whereas the complement set is in focus following a negative NLQ.  
The focus effects of negative NLQs have been explained in terms of ‘presupposition denial’ 
(Ingram & Moxey, 2011; Moxey, 2011; Sanford et al., 2007). The idea is that these expressions 
typically evoke a contrast with some larger quantity. Taking the example above, saying that 
‘few’ of the fans went to the match presupposes an expectation that more fans would have 
attended. By establishing that expectation and simultaneously denying that it actually came to 
pass, the use of ‘few’ induces a focus on the resulting shortfall, making the complement set most 
readily available for anaphoric reference.  
For the purposes of the current discussion, I am interested in the explicit connections the 
proponents of this account have drawn with the reference point hypothesis (Ingram & Moxey, 
2011; Moxey, 2011). They write:  
McKenzie and Nelson (2003) found that if a participant was told a glass was half full, 
s/he was more likely to infer that the glass had previously been empty. If told the glass 
was half empty s/he was more likely to say it had previously been full. These authors 
argue that this is due to a tendency to emphasise the variable that has increased relative 
to an implicit reference point… In our experiments the complement set represents the 
group that has increased relative to the reference point. The manner in which the 
information in our sentences is framed allows readers to draw inferences about the 
situation just as McKenzie and colleagues found with logically equivalent frames. In 
their experiments, the frame itself gives more information than simply the volume in the 
glass. (Ingram & Moxey, 2011, p. 395) 
The authors do not fully develop the application of the presupposition denial account to framing 
cases. However, one way of doing so would be to hypothesise that a frame like (6) presupposes 
the existence of a reference point player who missed less than 60% of their shots. At the same 
time, it explicitly denies that the subject of predication – the target player – missed less than 
60%, by asserting that he made 60%.  
As argued above, I think it is ultimately implausible that frames directly presuppose reference 
point information. However, they may well do so indirectly. This is because, arguably, the 
reference point information itself presupposes the existence of a salient reference point. Take, 





(8) This player missed a relatively large proportion of his shots last season. 
Plausibly, ‘relatively’ in (8) triggers the presupposition that there is some reference point, 
relative to which the player is being compared. Therefore, wherever a frame conveys reference 
point information, it might be understood as indirectly presupposing the existence of a 
contextual reference point. What I am suggesting, then, is that reference point information is an 
implicature, which itself carries a presupposition.205  
Moreover, I suggest that hearers often take the existence of the presupposed reference point for 
granted, ‘accommodating’ it in the sense described by Lewis (1979). This is one way to explain 
how reference point information involves a kind of ‘backgrounding’. As suggested by the 
‘leakage’ metaphor, there may be something indirect, implicit, and even illicit about the way 
frames convey information about contextual reference points. I will return to discuss these 
ideas more fully in the next chapter. For now, I simply want to reiterate that the reference point 
information is not itself a presupposition. I now turn to consider another way in which one 
might attempt to capture it within non-truth-conditional semantics. 
6. Ambiguous Conventions 
As discussed in chapter 2, Lepore and Stone (2015) posit a large class of semantic effects which 
have traditionally been classified as pragmatic but which, they argue, in fact depend on 
interlocutors’ knowledge of linguistic conventions. Let’s suppose (as mooted in the previous 
chapter) that reference point information is associated with frames via some kind of convention 
of language use. Taking inspiration from Lepore and Stone, then, we might hypothesise that 
frames are simply ambiguous between interpretations that do and do not include reference 
point information. The reference point information would thus no longer be thought of as a 
pragmatic enrichment but rather as one of the semantic meanings associated with the frame.  
I think it would be a mistake to treat attribute frames as being straightforwardly ambiguous in 
this way. First, there is an important asymmetry between the two interpretations, which the 
ambiguity view fails to capture. Specifically, the interpretation that includes reference point 
information entails the one that doesn’t. In other words, the minimal semantic meaning of the 
frame persists whether or not reference point information is also conveyed. This makes the 
framing case importantly unlike standard cases of ambiguity, which enable one or other 
interpretation, but not both. The two readings of a frame are mutually consistent rather than 
mutually exclusive. 
 





Second, recall that Lepore and Stone claim that all conventional effects get onto the 
‘conversational scoreboard’, which is supposed to track information that is made publicly 
available to interlocutors during communication. As argued above, though, reference point 
information is typically not part of what speakers intuitively assert. If it gets onto the 
scoreboard at all in such cases, it must have an importantly different status from other 
information speakers communicate.  
Lastly, even where reference point information plausibly is asserted, that should not obscure 
the role played by a more minimal semantic meaning. As discussed in chapter 2, Lepore and 
Stone may themselves retain a distinction between semantic conventions that affect truth-
conditions and those that don’t. It is this distinction that is important for explaining framing 
effects. I believe the distinction separates conventions of meaning from conventions of use: 
meaning conventions guarantee that alternative frames share a set of truth-conditions, while 
the use properties of frames lead to divergent reference point information being conveyed. In 
line with the argument of the previous chapter, then, I suggest we treat the effects of language 
use (whether or not they are conventional) as pragmatic effects on interpretation; specifically, 
we can analyse them as conversational implicatures.  
7. Bias 
As we saw in chapter 2, Predelli (2013) argues that some expressions have conventional 
‘biases’, which constrain the situations in which they may be used. Unlike the ‘characters’ of 
expressions, these biases have no effect on truth-conditions. To recap the earlier example, the 
expression ‘hurray’ can only be used in situations in which (roughly speaking) the agent has a 
favourable attitude towards the state of affairs being described. Conversely, ‘alas’ can only be 
used where the agent has an unfavourable attitude. However, these constraints, it is argued, do 
not affect the truth or falsity of the sentences in which they appear.  
Applying Predelli’s framework to the framing case, let’s grant, again, that it is conventional for 
speakers to select frames in accordance with the existence of contextual reference points. In 
other words, it would be conventional for speakers to use (5) where the player made a 
relatively large proportion of his shots, and (6) where he missed a relatively large proportion. 
Correspondingly, competent language users, who are presumed to be sensitive to this 
convention, may infer reference point information from the speaker’s frame.  
Note that the speaker’s frame could not fully constrain the context to include the associated 
reference point. This points to a disanalogy with uses of ‘hurray’ or ‘alas’. Whereas sincere uses 
of those expressions would seem to impose absolute constraints on the speaker’s attitude, the 





obtain. As we have seen, that information might be defeated altogether by conflicting 
considerations. Even where it is conveyed, I suggest that it may be probabilistic rather than 
deterministic: the speaker’s choice of frame make it more likely that the context contains the 
associated reference point; but this is not guaranteed.  
This is not necessarily an insurmountable problem, though, since something similar could be 
said of several other cases Predelli presents. For example, he discusses the co-extensional 
terms, ‘belly button’, ‘navel’, and ‘umbilicus’. These certainly tend to be used when addressing 
different audiences (roughly, children, adults, and medical professionals, respectively). They 
therefore provide some information about the identity of the addressee. However, the evidence 
is defeasible and probabilistic in a similar way to reference point information. After all, it would 
still make sense (although it would clearly be less felicitous) to use the expression ‘belly button’ 
in addressing medical professionals. Perhaps, then, we should think of expressions’ biases as 
increasing the probability of different contextual facts obtaining, rather than as necessarily 
requiring them to obtain. Once this is clarified, reference point information might be analysed as 
part of a frame’s ‘bias’.  
The problem with weakening the definition of a bias in this way, however, is that it becomes less 
plausible that it counts as a genuinely semantic phenomenon, especially if we are thinking of 
semantic meaning as being constant and fixed rather than defeasible and probabilistic. 
Likewise, it becomes less clear what is gained by analysing reference point information as a 
(semantic) bias rather than as a (pragmatic) implicature. After all, implicatures already seem to 
be perfectly capable of carrying probabilistic, defeasible information about the context of 
utterance. Therefore, there is no obvious need to appeal to bias to capture those features of the 
reference point information conveyed by frames. It seems more parsimonious to bring the 
reference point information under Grice’s general framework than to establish a separate 
category to do similar work.  
8. The Semantics-Pragmatics Divide 
To summarise the preceding discussion, I argued in §2 that the reference point information 
conveyed by attribute frames cannot be part of its truth-conditional semantic meaning. 
However, in §§3-4 I acknowledged that it might sometimes affect what a speaker intuitively 
asserts and, in §§5-7, I further acknowledged that reference point information could potentially 
be analysed as part of non-truth-conditional semantic meaning – specifically, as a ‘bias’. I 
nevertheless suggested that, in both cases, the implicature-based analysis developed in the 
previous chapter would capture the relevant data more parsimoniously. In this section, I argue 





pragmatics divide as Minimalists have proposed, between very minimal truth-conditional 
semantic meanings and broadly Gricean pragmatic meanings.  
The question of where to locate the boundary between semantics and pragmatics might at first 
appear to be a purely terminological one, with different theorists being free to choose how they 
wish to apply those concepts. However, I believe this appearance obscures a substantive debate. 
After all, if our conceptions of semantics and pragmatics are to have genuine explanatory value, 
they must track real-world psychological or sociological phenomena. I suggest that the 
empirical case study of framing effects can be used to inform the conceptual distinction between 
semantics and pragmatics.  
Over the course of the last three chapters, I have argued that the distinction we require to do 
justice to the ‘information leakage’ account of framing effects is one that contrasts the logically 
equivalent minimal semantic meanings of alternative frames with the distinct reference point 
information these frames pragmatically implicate. This fits well with how McKenzie and Nelson 
themselves position their account. As discussed in the previous chapter, they explicitly take the 
communication of reference point information to be pragmatic. The implicature-based analysis 
I have proposed shows how to cash out this claim. In discussing the equivalence of frames, 
meanwhile, the information leakage theorists rarely use the terminology of ‘semantics’.206 
Nevertheless, it is evident from the following quotes that they are relying on something like 
literal sentence meaning:  
[I]f reference points reliably influence speakers’ frame selection, then frames carry 
information beyond their literal content. Frames that are logically equivalent might, 
nonetheless, convey different information. (McKenzie & Nelson, 2003, p. 597, emphasis 
in original) 
[L]ogical equivalence is well-defined (a pair of statements is logically equivalent if each 
member of the pair necessarily entails the other) and, provided some care is taken in 
translating between logical connectives and natural language connectives, 
straightforward to diagnose (Sher & McKenzie, 2006, pp. 468-469). 
Therefore, I think the analysis they present coheres very well with a minimal conception of 
semantics. If we were to focus instead on the (Contextualist) distinction between what is 
asserted and what is implicated, disregarding minimal truth-conditional meanings, the reference 
point information could end up on different sides of the divide on different occasions, 
sometimes being part of what is asserted and sometimes being part of what is implicated. The 
 
206 One exception is their description of the logical equivalence of frames as being determined by 





sense in which frames remain equivalent in all of these contexts would be lost. Alternatively, if 
we were to focus on the (Conventionalist) distinction between conventional and non-
conventional effects on meaning then, assuming that reference point information arises from a 
linguistic convention, the distinction required for the information leakage account would be 
collapsed entirely: both the equivalence and inequivalence of frames would be explained at the 
conventional semantic level, with pragmatics doing no substantive explanatory work. On either 
approach, then, we would end up muddling the distinction between the minimal semantic 
equivalence of frames and the divergent reference point information they convey. This tells 
against an expansive, ‘intrusive’, analysis: the distinction we need for explaining framing effects 
is one that separates semantic meaning from pragmatic use properties. In sum, the information 
leakage account of framing effects rests on a distinction between minimal truth-conditional 
semantic meaning and broadly Gricean pragmatics. By revealing and developing the 
philosophical underpinnings of the account, I hope to have set it on a firmer foundation. 
Equally, given that the explanation of framing effects depends on a broadly Minimalist 
conception of the semantics-pragmatics divide, this case study can be understood as providing 
one more piece of evidence in support of Semantic Minimalism. Since the Minimalist’s way of 
drawing the boundary also tracks key aspects of how ‘semantics’ and ‘pragmatics’ have 
traditionally been understood in the philosophy of language – whereby semantics is 
conventional, constant, and language-driven, while pragmatics operates freely and defeasibly, in 
accordance with general rational principles of communication – that seems like a good result.  
On a concessive note, I recognise, of course, that there are many other applications for the 
concepts of semantics and pragmatics aside from explaining framing effects, and these might 
ultimately point to a different way of drawing the boundary. That said, I hope at least to have 
shown that the case study of framing is one which puts minimal semantic meanings to work in 
an explanatorily valuable way. 
9. Conclusion 
In conclusion, I want to draw together the discussion in chapters 7 and 8 by identifying two 
senses in which framing might be considered a ‘contextual’ phenomenon. First, frames 
constitute part of the context in which minimal semantic meanings are expressed – they are the 
words in which these meanings are ‘clothed’. Therefore, since reference point information 
depends on which particular frame is used, it can be understood as arising from context in an 
analogous way to other pragmatic implicatures.  
A second sense in which framing effects are contextual is due to the relationship between 





accordance with such reference points, hearers may infer information about the wider context 
in which a frame is uttered. Thus, frames are not just part of the context in which a meaning is 
expressed but also tell us something about other features of that context. In the final chapter of 
the thesis, I turn my attention to some of the real-world contexts in which frames are used and, 
drawing on the preceding analysis, I consider how we should assess the behaviour of both 







Framing: The Fault Lines 
Abstract 
In this chapter I assess whether the information leakage account provides a rationalising 
explanation of framing effects. I show how, on the one hand, hearers can no longer be said to 
violate the rational choice principle of description invariance. On the other hand, though, it does 
not automatically follow that hearers are always rational to respond differently to alternative 
frames. I sketch how a rational hearer’s interpretation will depend on a reasonable assessment 
of the speaker’s sincerity, reliability, and relevance. Although ordinary hearers may often fall 
short of the rational ideal, I argue that speakers, too, are often to blame for hearers’ 
misinterpretations. Using real-world case studies, I show how the theoretical framework 
developed in earlier chapters grounds a more nuanced analysis of framing effects than 
standardly emerges from the psychological literature.  
1. Introduction 
As discussed in the introduction to the thesis, psychologists have standardly taken framing 
effects to show that hearers’ behaviour falls substantively and systematically short of the 
rational ideal. As Bermúdez puts it: “The consensus view is that susceptibility to framing effects 
is a paradigm of irrationality” (Bermúdez, 2018, p. 180).207 Against the received view, the 
proponents of the reference point hypothesis purport to provide a rationalising explanation of 
framing effects. They address the following claim made by Kahneman:  
Framing effects are less significant for their contribution to psychology than for their 
importance in the real world…and for the challenge they raise to the foundations of a 
rational model of decision making (Kahneman, 2000, p. xv). 
In response, they write: 
 
207 It is perhaps unfair to attribute this strong view to Tversky and Kahneman, the instigators of framing 
research. Commenting on the results of their early empirical investigations, they write: 
These observations do not imply that preference reversals, or other errors of choice or 
judgment…are necessarily irrational. Like other intellectual limitations discussed by 
Simon…under the heading of “bounded rationality,” the practice of acting on the most readily 
available frame can sometimes be justified by reference to the mental effort required to explore 
alternative frames and avoid potential inconsistencies. (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 458) 
Here they explicitly allow that it might be rational overall for humans to make systematic errors, given 
the cognitive and environmental limitations we face. Nevertheless, susceptibility to framing effects is still 
ultimately seen as a departure from how an unboundedly rational agent would act. As we will see, the 
reference point hypothesis challenges even this weaker claim by proposing that our normative theory of 





Attribute framing, at least, does not raise a “challenge…to the foundations of a rational 
model of decision making”. (Sher & McKenzie, 2006, p. 488) 
The reason they give is that “attribute framing effects are naturally justifiable in terms of sound 
choice-relevant inferences from the speaker’s choice of frame” (ibid). In this chapter, I will 
endorse a qualified version of this claim.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows: in §2 I re-examine why framing effects are standardly 
thought to violate the rational principle of description invariance, and I show how the reference 
point hypothesis undermines the argument. In §3 I observe that it would be irrational for 
hearers to infer reference point information if it has been (explicitly or implicitly) defeated. In 
§4, I argue that the information may only be rationally inferred if the speaker is presumed to be 
adhering to Grice’s maxim of Quality. In §5, I argue that the speaker must also be presumed to 
have reliable beliefs. In §6, I argue that the salient reference point must be presumed relevant. 
Finally, in §7, I show how these arguments extend beyond attribute framing, to risky-choice 
paradigms. Throughout the discussion, I emphasise the responsibilities borne by speakers to 
communicate true, evidenced, reliable, and relevant information. To the extent that speakers 
violate communicative norms in conveying false reference point information, I conclude that 
they must attract some fault as epistemic agents.  
2. Description Invariance 
As discussed in chapter 1, it is standardly deemed irrational for hearers to respond differently 
to alternative frames. Specifically, this is held to violate the principle of description invariance. 
Spelling out this principle precisely is a difficult task.208 Below is a first stab: 
Invariance Principle 1 (IP1): if two linguistic stimuli represent the same situation, they 
should give rise to the same judgements.  
This lines up with what Tversky & Kahneman say in the following passage: 
An essential condition for a theory of choice that claims normative status is the principle 
of invariance: different representations of the same choice problem should yield the 
same preference. That is, the preference between options should be independent of 
their description. (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986, p. 253) 
However, IP1 is clearly implausible for agents with only limited knowledge: we may simply fail 
to realise that the two frames represent the same situation, and this need not be evidence of 
 





irrationality but simply ignorance.209 In fact, Tversky & Kahneman themselves recognise that 
mere sameness of situation does not rationally require sameness of judgement. The quote from 
their 1986 paper continues:   
Two characterizations that the decision maker, on reflection, would view as alternative 
descriptions of the same problem should lead to the same choice – even without the 
benefit of such reflection. (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986, p. 253) 
This points to a different formulation of the principle, as follows: 
IP2: If two linguistic stimuli would, on reflection, be viewed as representing the same 
situation, they should give rise to the same judgements. 
However, IP2 raises other problems. First, it is unclear what would count as a sufficient amount 
of reflection. Second, there is no obvious way to operationalise the criterion: what is the right 
way to reveal someone’s reflective view of what a linguistic stimulus represents?210 In response 
to both questions, Kahneman and Tversky seem to have in mind whatever opinion an 
experimental participant would report, when presented with both frames. Thus, they write: 
Invariance requires that the preference order between prospects should not depend on 
the manner in which they are described. In particular, two versions of a choice problem 
that are recognized to be equivalent when shown together should elicit the same 
preference even when shown separately. (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984, p. 343) 
In a similar vein, Kahneman says: 
It is the decision maker who should determine, after due consideration of both 
problems, whether the differences between them are sufficiently consequential to 
justify different choices. Violations of this lenient form of invariance demonstrate 
incoherence without a need for any judgement from on high about what is truly 
equivalent. (Kahneman, 2000, p. xv) 
Perhaps, then, we might reformulate the invariance principle as follows: 
 
209 Similar points are made by Sher and McKenzie (2006, p. 469, footnote 2) and Bermúdez (2018, p. 183). 
210 Sher and McKenzie also point out that it is rather unclear what we should conclude from explicit 
judgements about equivalence anyway:  
[T]wo descriptions of a decision problem are said to be “equivalent” if, on reflection, people 
would endorse their equivalence. However, no normative theory of decision making has anything 
to say about the correctness of people’s beliefs about equivalence – which, as we argue here with 
reference to most framing researchers’ beliefs, may after all be wrong. (Sher & McKenzie, 2006, p. 





IP3: If two linguistic stimuli would be reported to represent the same situation when the 
stimuli are presented together, they should yield the same judgements when presented 
separately. 
The problem with IP3 is that presenting two linguistic stimuli together constitutes a 
qualitatively different speech act from that of presenting just one. Therefore, it would not be 
surprising if different information were pragmatically conveyed in each case. This amounts to a 
rejection of the claim made in the 1984 quote from Kahneman and Tversky: we can’t assume 
that the same response should be elicited by alternative frames under joint and separate 
presentation conditions. It also suggests that the data from within-subjects framing studies, 
discussed in chapter 1, provides inconclusive evidence that experimental participants believe 
alternative frames to be equivalent simpliciter.  
In fact, the reference point hypothesis gives us some reason to predict that joint and separate 
presentation contexts should elicit different responses. For example, take sentences (1) and (2) 
again, which tend to convey (3) and (4), respectively: 
(1) This player made 40% of his shots last season. 
(2) This player missed 60% of his shots last season. 
(3) This player made a relatively large proportion of his shots last season. 
(4) This player missed a relatively large proportion of his shots last season. 
The meanings of (3) and (4) are contradictory. Therefore, if hearers are presented with both 
frames (1) and (2) together, they cannot consistently infer both associated pieces of reference 
point information: at least one will need to be discarded (and perhaps both).211 In contrast, 
under separate presentation conditions, the associated reference point information can be 
straightforwardly retained.  
Moreover, assuming that the integration of reference point information may happen below the 
level of consciousness, it is not surprising that hearers typically fail to report that alternative 
frames convey distinct reference point information when presented separately (even if that is 
what’s happening).  
 
211 Thierman (2014) investigates joint presentation contexts (i.e. ‘double framing’). Her results suggest 
that, in these contexts, responses pattern similarly to when only the positive frame is presented. There 
are different ways this could be explained: for example, it might be that the unmarkedness of the positive 
frames used in Thierman’s experiments blocks the inference of reference point information. What is 
important for now is that joint and separate presentation contexts should not automatically be expected 





Once we have the information leakage account on the table, then, we can see how IP3 directly 
begs the question against it. IP3 assumes that the only relevant information frames can convey 
is their context-invariant meaning (which remains constant across joint and separate 
presentation conditions); this is precisely what the information leakage theorists deny.  
Further, it is unclear why we should privilege joint presentation contexts over separate 
presentation contexts. Tversky and Kahneman (1986) describe joint presentation contexts as 
‘transparent’, and separate presentation contexts as ‘non-transparent’. However, these labels 
simply assume, without justifying, the ability of the former to provide better access to the truth. 
Admittedly, there are sometimes good reasons for presenting multiple stimuli to participants, 
rather than just one. Hansen (2014) surveys psychological studies that directly compare 
judgements in joint and separate presentation contexts. He argues, with Hsee, Blount, 
Loewenstein, and Bazerman (1999), that some attributes are difficult to evaluate independently 
of relevant contrastive information. For example, the price one is willing to pay for 7oz of ice 
cream in a 5oz cup (where the amount of ice cream seems generous relative to the size of the 
cup) may fall relative to the price one is willing to pay for 8oz of ice cream in a 10oz cup (where 
the amount of ice cream seems ungenerous relative to the size of the cup) once one is able to 
evaluate both options together. I agree that contrastive information is often necessary for 
evaluation; indeed I will reiterate this point in §6. However, notice that joint presentation of 
alternative frames provides no additional contrastive information, unlike the joint presentation 
of the ice creams. Instead, the same attribute is predicated of the same player using different 
words. Indeed, joint presentation of alternative frames may even end up providing less 
contrastive information than presenting each separately, given that the reference point 
information associated with each frame becomes mutually undermining. Therefore, it is unclear 
why we should expect joint presentation contexts to be more reliable here. 
Likewise, it is unclear why the contexts Kahneman and Tversky describe should be privileged 
over various conceivable others. For example, if participants were invited to reflect on the 
reference point hypothesis, perhaps they would then judge the frames to represent different 
situations. What’s to say that the basic joint presentation context elicits their considered views 
more reliably than this one?  
I suggest, then, that IP3 is not a plausible characterisation of the invariance principle: as with 
the previous iterations, the antecedent of the conditional can obtain independently of the 
consequent. Instead, I propose that we appeal to something along the lines of Frege’s ‘Intuitive 






[T]he thought associated with one sentence, S as its sense must be different from the 
thought associated with another sentence S’ as its sense, if it is possible for someone to 
understand both sentences at a given time while coherently taking different attitudes 
towards them, i.e. accepting (rejecting) one while rejecting (accepting), or being 
agnostic about, the other. (Evans, 1982, pp. 18-19) 
Although this is proposed as a criterion for individuating Fregean senses, the core idea can be 
adapted for the purposes of characterising the principle of description invariance. In particular, 
we can think of two linguistic stimuli as carrying different information if it is possible to 
understand both while coherently responding differently to each. This is reflected in IP4 below: 
IP4: If it is impossible to understand what two linguistic stimuli mean without 
understanding them to represent the same situation, then they should yield the same 
judgements. 
Crucially, if the information leakage account is correct, then alternative frames will not meet the 
condition in the antecedent of IP4: it is possible to understand what they mean while also taking 
them to represent different situations – specifically, situations in which contextual reference 
points take distinct values.212 The information leakage account thus takes an important first 
step in providing a rationalising explanation of framing effects. It suggests that hearers do not 
fall foul of the rational principle of description invariance when they respond differently to 
alternative frames. Instead, they may be displaying a rather sophisticated sensitivity to the 
pragmatic properties of utterances. Keren puts the point nicely:  
Language conveys both explicit (semantic) and implicit (pragmatic) information. The 
fact that participants in experiments are able to decipher and infer some of the subtle 
implicit information contained in a message should perhaps not be used as evidence of 
failure of rational reasoning. The alternative is to incorporate participants’ abilities in 
the description of rationality. One may even argue that failing to use the subtle hidden 
cues concealed in different frames may, by itself, be considered irrational (in the 
broader sense of the term). Thus, contrary to a recent suggestion by Kahneman (2000) 
that “the ubiquity of framing effects demonstrates that the human mind is not assigned 
to achieve coherence” (p. xv), in the alternative view framing effects, rather than 
exhibiting inconsistency, constitute a demonstration of a sophisticated use of language 
that normative accounts fail to take into account. (Keren, 2011, pp. 26-27) 
 
212 Note that this remains consistent with the argument presented in chapter 3. As argued there, the 
distinct interpretations of alternative frames cannot be traced back to conventional meaning. Instead, it is 





It still remains to be seen, though, whether hearers behave rationally, all things considered, in 
responding differently to alternative frames.213 Answering this question will be the focus of the 
remainder of the chapter. Since I will be interested primarily in whether hearers can justifiably 
infer reference point information, I will mainly focus on epistemic rationality, which concerns 
the truth-conduciveness of an individual’s belief-formation process (how likely it is that the 
beliefs they form will track the way the world actually is). I will be less interested, for example, 
in practical or ecological rationality, which concern an individual’s ability to survive and thrive 
in their environment (although presumably these notions are related).214 
3. Defeaters   
The first point to note is that a hearer would be epistemically irrational to infer reference point 
information from a speaker’s use of frame on occasions where the information is explicitly or 
contextually defeated (as discussed in chapter 7). Provided that there are no overriding factors, 
however, hearers are at least justified in attributing to the speaker an intention to communicate 
the reference point information.215 
This way of putting things is a little too simplistic, of course, since it assumes that hearers’ 
inferences must be an all or nothing affair: either they attribute a particular mental state to the 
speaker or they don’t. A more nuanced account would assign hearers’ attributions of mental 
states some degree of probability. Strictly speaking, then, the claim I want to make at this stage 
is that, in the absence of defeaters, the speaker’s use of an attribute frame should increase the 
probability which the hearer assigns to her intending to communicate reference point 
information. Bearing in mind the discussion of markedness in chapter 7, the use of a marked 
frame should increase this probability by more than the use of an unmarked frame. For ease of 
exposition, in what follows I will tend to describe hearers’ inferences as if they were absolute. 
However, this should be understood as shorthand for their assigning greater probability to 
certain states of affairs. 
 
213 Therefore, I think McKenzie and Sher are a little quick when they claim: 
For framing effects to raise normative concerns, they must violate a revised principle of 
description invariance, which states that information equivalent descriptions must lead to 
identical decisions. (McKenzie & Sher, 2008, p. 84, emphasis in original). 
I will argue that various other normative concerns need to be dealt with before framing effects can be 
accommodated within a general theory of rational behaviour. 
214 Bolinger (2017) similarly invokes the notion of epistemic rationality in discussing when hearers are 
justified in taking offense from a speaker’s use of a slur. She argues that they may be so justified, even if 
no offense is intended by the speaker, insofar as the term is commonly associated with derogatory 
attitudes. I will make a similar claim in §4 with respect to frames, arguing that hearers can be rational to 
infer reference point information, even where the speaker did not intend to communicate it. 
215 In the criteria for communicative success listed by Harris (2019), this equates to ‘uptake’: hearers 






4. Communicative Quality 
A second condition for the rational inference of reference point information is that the hearer 
must reasonably presume the speaker to be adhering to something like the Gricean maxims of 
Quality, reproduced below:216  
1. Do not say what you believe to be false. 
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
It would be irrational for hearers to attribute to the speaker a belief in the reference point 
information if they have reasons to suspect the speaker is violating the Quality norms. Instead, 
then, rational inference of reference point information depends on having a reasonable 
expectation that the speaker believes the information to be true, and that she has sufficient 
evidence for it. The notion of a ‘reasonable’ expectation here remains underspecified, of course, 
and there are undoubtedly debates to be had about precisely when a speaker can reasonably be 
expected to be adhering to Quality norms. I will assume that, while the condition may be met in 
many ordinary cooperative exchanges, it is possible to point to clear cases in which it is 
unfulfilled. In the next two subsections, I will consider two such cases: first, where the speaker 
has beliefs that are incompatible with the reference point information, and second where she is 
simply indifferent to its truth or falsity.  
4.1. Disbelief 
Imagine that a speaker utters (2) intending to communicate the reference point information 
captured by (4) (both repeated below) while simultaneously believing that the player in fact 
missed a relatively small proportion of his shots, compared with the salient reference point.  
(2) This player missed 40% of his shots of his shots last season. 
(4) This player missed a relatively large proportion of his shots last season. 
If it is predictable that the speaker will attempt to convey false reference point information (say, 
because she dislikes the player’s team or is known to have provided misleading testimony about 
 
216 Strictly speaking, these maxims apply to what speakers ‘say’. However, I will assume that they 
generalise to other contents communicated by speakers, including what they implicate. I believe this 
remains in the spirit of Grice, who writes: 
I would like to be able to show that observance of the Cooperative Principle and maxims is 
reasonable (rational) along the following lines: that anyone who cares about the goals that are 
central to conversation/ communication (such as giving and receiving information, influencing 
and being influenced by others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable 
circumstances, in participation in talk exchanges that will be profitable only on the assumption 
that they are conducted in general accordance with the Cooperative Principle and the maxims. 





other players) then it would be epistemically irrational for hearers to attribute to her a belief in 
(4). All consequent inferences should then similarly be blocked; so, for example, the reference 
point information in (4) should not be inferred to be true on the basis of the speaker’s utterance, 
nor used in making evaluative judgements.217   
In any scenario like this, where the speaker conveys reference point information insincerely, 
she is at fault: by failing to respect the first maxim of Quality, she violates an important (perhaps 
the most important) communicative norm. Crucially, the fault incurred by the speaker is 
unaffected by whether or not hearers can reasonably expect her to implicate false information. 
In other words, regardless of whether hearers behave in epistemically reckless ways, causally 
contributing to their being misled, that does not in any way mitigate the speaker’s responsibility 
for attempting to mislead.  
This last point is inspired by Saul’s observation that “being partly causally responsible for a 
wrong done to one does nothing to alter the nature of that wrong” (Saul, 2013, p. 83). To 
illustrate, she provides the hypothetical example of a ‘reckless’ victim, who is mugged upon 
entering a part of town he knows to be dangerous. Even though the reckless victim is partly 
causally responsible for being mugged, this does not absolve the perpetrator from fault to any 
degree: his misdeed is equally as bad as that of mugging a ‘careful’ victim in a generally safe part 
of town. By analogy, where a speaker is predictably insincere, the responsibilities of speaker 
and hearer remain independent of one another. Any fault attributed to the hearer is additional 
to that of the speaker. In other words, the overall amount of fault increases, rather than a fixed 
quantity of fault being redistributed.218    
In the case of deliberate misleading considered here, it was stipulated that the speaker did, in 
fact, intend to communicate reference point information while believing it to be false. However, 
in real-world cases, intentions are less transparent and are often difficult to assess. Consider, as 
an example, the following advert for the ‘Natural Cycles’ contraceptive app, which appeared on 
various social media in August 2019: 
 
217 Notice how the case of misleading differs from the earlier case where the reference point information 
was defeated: the misleading speaker intends to convey the reference point information, and does 
nothing to block it, whereas in defeat case, the speaker does not intend to convey the information and 
takes it to have been (implicitly or explicitly) defeated. Of course, she might be wrong about its actually 
having been defeated, leading to inadvertent miscommunication, but this kind of scenario remains 
conceptually distinct from the case of deliberately misleading. 
218 Of course, the wrongs of misleading and mugging differ in nature and severity, and I do not mean to 
suggest that they have the same moral implications. Indeed, it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
consider how we ought to sanction, regulate, or generally respond to cases of insincerity (or unreliability 







The advert makes the following claim:   
(5) Natural Cycles is 93% effective with typical use and 98% with perfect use. 
If the reference point hypothesis is correct, we can expect hearers to infer from the use of (5) 
that the sellers believe the following: 
(6) Natural Cycles is relatively effective with typical use  
(7) Natural Cycles is relatively effective with perfect use. 
In particular, hearers may infer that the sellers believe the following, since the product is 
marketed as an alternative to the oral contraceptive pill:219 
(8) Natural Cycles is more effective than the pill with typical use. 
(9) Natural Cycles is more effective than the pill with perfect use. 
 
219 That this is the intended reference point is apparent from the description of the app as ‘hormone-free’, 
which immediately renders the pill the salient alternative. The pill is also the most common form of 
contraception women receive from doctors and pharmacies in Great Britain: according to data obtained 
by The Guardian under the Freedom of Information Act, almost nine in 10 women who received 
contraception from the GP or pharmacies in 2017/18 were taking either the combined pill or “mini pill”: 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/mar/07/revealed-pill-still-most-popular-prescribed-





According to official published statistics, the contraceptive pill is 91% effective with typical 
use.220 This makes (8) true.221 However, the pill’s effectiveness with perfect use is at least 99%. 
This makes (9) false. 
Presumably, the sellers are aware that (9) is false, since they are marketing the app as a direct 
competitor to the pill. Therefore, it would have been less misleading for them to frame the 
information in terms of the proportion of failures, as in (10), in order to convey the accurate 
reference point information in (11): 
(10) Natural Cycles fails in 2% of cases with perfect use. 
(11) Natural Cycles fails in a larger proportion of cases than the pill with perfect use. 
This is not necessarily a case of deliberate misleading. It is possible that the advertisers had no 
intention to convey (9). Perhaps, instead, they chose the ‘effectiveness’ framing primarily to 
formulate the information about typical and perfect use in a simple and elegant way. It does not 
follow, of course, that the sellers are absolved of all responsibility for hearers inferring false 
reference point information. Arguably, they ought to have taken more care to block that 
information, particularly given the high stakes involved.222 Whatever the correct analysis of this 
particular case, then, the general point is that speakers may still be at fault, even when they 
mislead inadvertently, if it is deemed that they should have been more careful with their 
framing choices. One advantage of bringing to light the information ‘leaked’ by frames is that the 
scope for speakers to escape liability for certain misleading communications may, in time, be 
reduced. After all, once it is widely understood that frames tend to implicate reference point 
information, the use of an inappropriate frame cannot be attributed to mere ignorance. 
4.2. Presupposition Failure 
A different way of using frames misleadingly involves presupposition failure. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, the reference point information conveyed by a frame arguably 
presupposes the existence of a contextual reference point. For example, the use of ‘relatively’ in 
(3) or (4) presupposes the existence of a reference point relative to which the player made or 
missed a relatively large proportion of his shots. Accordingly, one way for a speaker of (1) or (2) 
 
220 UK National Health Service statistics: https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/contraception/how-effective-
contraception/ (accessed on 26th September 2019). 
221 I am assuming that the Natural Cycles statistics are accurate. An investigation by the Swedish Medical 
Products Agency found that the rate of reported unintended pregnancies among Natural Cycles users 
between January and June 2018 was consistent with the 93% figure (full report available at:  
https://lakemedelsverket.se/english/All-news/NYHETER-2018/The-assessment-of-Natural-Cycles-is-
completed/).  






to mislead is to believe that there is no contextually salient reference point. In such a scenario, it 
is not that the reference point information is straightforwardly believed to be false (as in the 
case considered above) but rather it is believed to be infelicitous because of the absence of a 
salient reference point. 
As before, whether or not hearers are justified in attributing to the speaker a belief in the 
existence of a contextually salient reference point will depend on the extent to which the 
speaker can reasonably be expected to mislead. In many cases, even where no reference point is 
salient to the hearer, I suspect that there will be ‘accommodation’, in the sense discussed by 
Lewis (1979). In other words, the hearer will assume that there is some reference point in the 
context, which the speaker considers to be sufficiently salient.  
From the speaker’s perspective, some cases of presupposition failure may be deliberate. To take 
a recent example, in August 2017 the British newspaper, The Telegraph, ran the following 
headline:223  
(12) One in five unemployed people in the UK are migrants, official figures reveal for the first 
time. 
According to the reference point hypothesis, hearers may infer that the writer intends to 
communicate the following: 
(13) A relatively large proportion of unemployed people in the UK are migrants. 
The implicature in (13) does not appear to have been defeated. On the contrary, it is further 
reinforced by the overall content and phrasing of the article, as well as background knowledge 
of the paper’s stance on immigration.  
It is less clear, though, whether the headline writer should be attributed a belief in (13), partly 
because it is unclear what the contextually salient reference point is in this case. As is explicitly 
stated, this was the first release of official figures on migrant unemployment; therefore, the 
reference point cannot be a prior figure. The headline makes two other comparisons salient: 
first, the proportion of employed people in the UK who are migrants (as opposed to the 
proportion of unemployed people).224 Second, the headline may evoke a contrast with the 
proportion of unemployed people who are migrants in other countries (as contrasted with the 
 
223 The full article is available at the following link: 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/16/one-five-unemployed-people-uk-migrantsofficial-
figures-reveal/. Similar headlines appeared in other newspapers, including The Sun and The Daily Mail. 
224 Strictly speaking, the contrast should be with non-unemployed people rather than employed people, 
since some people count neither as employed nor unemployed, say if they are retired or in full time 





proportion in the UK). However, the full article discusses neither of these comparisons. Instead, 
the focus is on the general rise in UK immigration. Plausibly, then, the headline-writer may have 
believed that there was no contextually salient reference point and was therefore being 
deliberately misleading. Alternatively, s/he might merely have been indifferent to the existence 
of a reference point, as will be discussed in the next section. In other cases, presupposition 
failure may be inadvertent, if the speaker did not intend to convey the reference point 
information associated with their frame. However, this seems rather unlikely here. 
In cases like the Telegraph example, there are potentially high stakes associated with the 
communication of reference point information. The idea that relatively many unemployed 
people in the UK are migrants stokes anti-immigrant sentiment, which may lead to increases in 
discriminatory behaviour, the perpetration of hate crimes, and so on. Although the speaker 
bears primary fault for misleading hearers, to the extent that hearers behave epistemically 
recklessly, failing to question which contextual reference point is being presupposed, their 
behaviour may also be subject to criticism. As Langton (2018) has argued, there are instances in 
which accommodating a presupposition can itself be a harmful act. 
4.3. Indifference 
In the previous section, I considered cases where speakers actively believe reference point 
information to be false (or to presuppose something false). However, it is also possible that a 
speaker could intend to convey reference point information while simply lacking any beliefs 
about its truth or falsity. These cases, which are akin to ‘bullshitting’ in the sense of Frankfurt 
(2005), would violate Grice’s second Quality maxim: the speaker does not have adequate 
evidence for her assertion. 
As before, where hearers can reasonably expect the speaker to be bullshitting, it would be 
epistemically reckless for them to infer that the speaker believes the reference point 
information. At the same time, of course, speakers who bullshit are also at fault for violating an 
important communicative norm. As discussed in the previous section, that norm does not apply 
to any lesser degree to a speaker who violates it predictably. Therefore, the fault attaching to the 
speaker will not be mitigated by any epistemic recklessness on the part of the hearer. 
To conclude this section, I have argued that where hearers have reasonable expectations that 
the speaker is adhering to the Quality maxims, it is epistemically rational to attribute to the 
speaker a belief that the reference point information obtains (and not merely an intention to 
communicate that information). Where hearers have reasonable expectations that the speaker 





whenever a speaker violates Quality, her culpability for doing so remains unmitigated by any 
epistemic recklessness on the hearer’s part. 
5. Reliability of Beliefs 
Having considered whether, and when, hearers may rationally attribute to a speaker a belief in 
reference point information, I turn now to consider whether and when they may rationally infer 
that information to be true.225 I will argue that this depends, inter alia, on whether the speaker’s 
belief can reasonably be expected to be reliable – i.e. whether it is likely to track the truth.226 
Broadly speaking, where hearers have reason to think that the speaker’s beliefs will be reliable, 
it is rational to treat the reference point information as true. Conversely, where hearers have 
reason to expect the speaker’s beliefs to be unreliable, that would be irrational. Echoing the 
discussion in §4, there are a couple of ways this might play out, which are discussed in turn 
below. 
5.1. False Beliefs 
In the first kind of case, the reference point information believed by the speaker might turn out 
to be straightforwardly false. For example, a speaker might utter (2) believing and intending to 
communicate (4) whereas, in fact, the player missed only a relatively small proportion of his 
shots. 
(2) This player missed 40% of his shots of his shots last season. 
(4) This player missed a relatively large proportion of his shots last season. 
There could be good reasons for hearers to expect the speaker’s belief to be unreliable – say 
because the speaker is known to be acquiring information from a dubious source. If so, it would 
clearly be epistemically irrational for hearers to infer the reference point information. At the 
same time, the speaker may also be at fault, for example because relying on dubious sources 
contravenes epistemic norms to seek out reliable information. Of course, various factors may 
affect the extent to which we hold speakers culpable for poor epistemic practices: for example, 
as high quality sources become easier to access, the failure to make use of them seems 
increasingly epistemically negligent. It is also possible to imagine cases where the speaker 
exhibits perfectly good epistemic practices while still ending up with false beliefs, due to factors 
outside her control. In these cases, I suggest, the speaker attracts no fault (and hearers need not 
do so either). 
 
225 Harris (2019) describes this step in successful communication as ‘acceptance’. 
226 It will also depend on the prior probability of the reference point information obtaining. However, I 





5.2. False Presuppositions 
In other cases of unreliability, the reference point the speaker has in mind may fail to 
correspond to the one that is salient to the audience.227 To illustrate, consider an exchange that 
took place on Twitter on 9th September 2019. The Scottish Liberal Democrats initially tweeted 
the following: 
 
I will focus on the following statement: 
(14) More than 10% of Scottish pupils are being taught in schools deemed poor or bad quality. 
Plausibly, the author of the tweet believed, and intended to convey, the following reference 
point information: 
(15) A relatively large proportion of Scottish pupils are being taught in schools deemed poor or 
bad quality. 
The reference point which the author had in mind may be the desired situation in which no 
Scottish pupils are being taught in schools deemed poor or bad quality (because all are being 
taught in good schools). However, the Scottish Nationalist First Minister of Scotland, Nicola 
Sturgeon, replied to the tweet by pointing out that the proportion stood at almost 40% when 
the Scottish Liberal Democrats left office in 2007: 
 







One gloss of what is going on here is that Sturgeon recognised the salient reference point to be 
the prior proportion of children being taught in schools deemed poor or bad quality. Thus, she 
took (14) to implicate (16), which is false:  
(16) A larger proportion of Scottish pupils are now being taught in schools deemed poor or bad 
quality than previously (when the Scottish Lib Dems were in office). 
Assuming that Sturgeon is right about which reference point is salient, such that audiences of 
the initial tweet will typically infer (16), the Scottish Lib Dems might be considered to have 
conveyed unreliable reference point information (whether deliberately or inadvertently).228 To 
the extent that they should have known what the salient reference point was they may incur 
some fault for hearers inferring (16). On the other hand, hearers are surely also well advised to 
consider the probable political biases inherent in such communications, rather than taking them 
at face value.  
To conclude this section, if the reliability condition is met, the hearer is epistemically rational in 
coming to believe that the reference point information is true (not just that the speaker believes 
it). If, on the other hand, the speaker’s beliefs can be expected to be unreliable, in one or both of 
the ways described here, the hearer would be epistemically irrational to treat the reference 
point information as true. Nevertheless, I have suggested that the speaker could incur fault as 
well, insofar as her unreliability results from poor epistemic practices. 
 
228 Of course, there are other possible interpretations. For example, both reference points might have 
been equally salient, or Sturgeon’s response could be understood as changing the reference point in order 






Although I have argued that a hearer can rationally represent a situation as being different 
under alternative frames, this doesn’t automatically mean the hearer should respond differently; 
that will depend on whether the difference in the represented situation matters to the task at 
hand. Finally, then, if we are to provide a fully rationalising explanation of framing effects, 
hearers must reasonably take reference point information to be relevant.229 The proponents of 
the reference point hypothesis claim that reference points are typically relevant, writing: 
Whenever considerations of relative state matter (and they usually do), a population of 
rational agents, cognizant of the impact of reference points on frame selection, would 
exhibit a valence-consistent shift. (Sher & McKenzie, 2006, p. 482) 
I will show that the situation is a little more nuanced than is suggested here. I begin by teasing 
out three distinct claims from the quote above:  
i) Reference point information can be relevant for making judgements. 
ii) Reference point information is usually relevant for making judgements. 
iii) It is rational for hearers to respond differently to distinct reference point information. 
As discussed in §2, claim (i) seems clearly right – comparative information can be relevant to a 
judgement task. For example, in evaluating the performance of a basketball player, it is 
necessary to compare that player against others, or against some standard or benchmark.230 
Claim (ii) is harder to assess, since it is an empirical question whether or not reference point 
information is usually relevant. Although I do not believe Sher and McKenzie show that it is, I 
will set the point aside for now in order to focus on claim (iii).  
I want to point out, first, that not all reference points are equally relevant, and therefore it is not 
always rational for hearers to allow reference point information to affect their judgements to 
the same degree. For example, if one is choosing players for a team, information about the best 
player in the pool may be less relevant than information about the average player. Therefore, if 
the best player happened to be the contextually salient reference point (say because s/he was 
 
229 This step corresponds to what Harris dubs ‘influence’, whereby the hearer enters further mental 
states, or takes further actions, partly as a result of accepting the information the speaker intended to 
communicate (Harris, 2019). 
230 At the extremes, some evaluative judgements may be possible without any comparative information: 
for example, it is obvious that a player who makes 100% of his shots can’t count as making a relatively 
small proportion (even if it is not yet possible to tell whether he counts as making a relatively large 
proportion). Conversely, a player who misses 100% can’t count as making a relatively large proportion. 
However, for levels of performance in between the extremes, it is difficult to make a sensible judgement 





recently discussed) a speaker’s use of the ‘missed’ frame (2) to describe another player should 
not necessarily lead the hearer to infer that that player is not good enough for the team.  
A real-word example of relevance failure comes from a beer mat issued by Wetherspoons in 
August 2018:231 
 
Point number 5 here states: 
If the unelected President Juncker and his apparatchiks continue to be obstructive, 
remember that all EU products can be replaced by similar alternatives from the UK – or 
from the 93% of the world not in the EU. 
 
231 The image is taken from the Full Fact website: https://fullfact.org/europe/beer-mat-brexit-do-facts-





I focus here on the following claim: 
(17) 93% of the world is not in the EU. 
According to the reference point hypothesis, (17) will typically convey the following 
information: 
(18) A relatively large proportion of the world is outside the EU. 
The propositions expressed by (17) and (18) are true with respect to the distribution of the 
global population. However, this seems largely irrelevant to the point being made about 
products currently imported from the EU. Whether these products could be imported from 
outside the EU depends on factors like whether the products are being produced there, whether 
the producers are willing to export them, whether they can be imported under existing 
regulations, and so on. In this case, then, hearers would be irrational to place much weight on 
the reference point information in (18) in judging the UK’s trade opportunities post-‘Brexit’. 
The second point I want to make about Sher and McKenzie’s claim (iii) is that it assumes the 
identity of the reference point is held fixed across framing conditions. Consider again frames (1) 
and (2): 
(1) This player made 40% of his shots last season. 
(2) This player missed 60% of his shots last season. 
If we assume that the salient reference point under each frame is the average player in the 
domain, the frames will convey the following reference point information, respectively: 
(19) This player made a larger proportion of his shots last season than the average player. 
(20) This player missed a larger proportion of his shots last season than the average player. 
On that basis, it can certainly be rational for hearers to evaluate the player more favourably 
under frame (1) than frame (2). Things become less clear, though, if each frame invokes a 
different reference point. Consider the following scenario, which is a modified version of the one 
used by Leong et al. (2017): 
Imagine that you are a recruiter for a college basketball team. Your job is to search for a 
promising high school basketball player and try to recruit him to your college. You are 
looking through files for players from local high schools, and you are especially 
interested in players who can score many points. You check in with two recruiters from 





50% of his shots last season. Alex has recruited a player who made 70% and missed 
30% of his shots last season. 
Hearers would then receive one or other of the following framing conditions: 
Framing condition 1.  
You are currently looking at a player’s file. This player made 60% of his shots last 
season. How valuable do you think this player would be to your basketball team? 
Framing condition 2.  
You are currently looking at a player’s file. This player missed 40% of his shots last 
season. How valuable do you think this player would be to your basketball team? 
The vignette makes two reference points available – Sam’s player, who made 50% and missed 
50% of his shots, and Alex’s player, who made 70% and missed 30%. Plausibly, then, the two 
framing conditions could make different players salient.232 After all, the reference point 
information associated with the ‘made’ frame presupposes a salient reference point player who 
made less than 60% of his shots. Therefore, this frame could make Sam’s player most salient, 
giving us the following reference point information:  
(21) This player made a larger proportion of his shots last season than the player recruited by 
Sam. 
In contrast, the reference point information associated with the ‘missed’ frame presupposes a 
salient reference point player who missed less than 40% of his shots. It may thus serve to make 
Alex’s player most salient, giving us the following reference point information: 
(22) This player missed a larger proportion of his shots last season than the player recruited by 
Alex. 
Crucially, (21) and (22) are perfectly consistent with one another. Since they invoke different 
reference points, they do not rationally require the hearer to evaluate the player differently 
under each frame (unlike (19) and (20) which invoke the same reference point). Therefore, 
hearers are not automatically rational in responding differently to (1) and (2) in this context. In 
general terms, they may not be rational to respond differently to alternative frames where those 
frames bring different reference points to salience. 
 
232 Of course, this suggestion stands in need of empirical confirmation. For now, though, I simply want to 





A rationalising explanation is still available, though, even in this scenario. If hearers can 
reasonably expect the speaker to be invoking the most relevant reference point, then it is 
reasonable to allow the reference point information to inform their judgements. For example, in 
the scenario described above, let’s assume that the ‘made’ frame conveys (21), which treats 
Sam’s player as the reference point. If the speaker is presumed to be conveying relevant 
information, then Sam’s player must be more relevant than Alex’s for some reason (perhaps, 
say, because Sam is thought to have more realistic standards than Alex). In this framing 
condition, the target player can be understood to perform better than the relevant reference 
point. Conversely, in the second framing condition, the use of the ‘missed’ frame is assumed to 
convey (22), which treats Alex’s player as the reference point. If the speaker is presumed to be 
conveying relevant information, then this time Alex’s player must be assumed to be the more 
relevant reference point. In this case, hearers may infer that the target player performs worse 
than the relevant reference point, and they are therefore rational to consider him to be a 
relatively poor performer. 
To conclude this section, whether the hearer is justified in treating the salient reference point as 
relevant might depend on whether the speaker can reasonably be presumed to be 
communicating relevantly, adhering to something like Grice’s maxim of Relation. If hearers have 
good reason to doubt that the speaker is being maximally relevant then it would be 
epistemically reckless to make use of the reference point information. In other words, it only 
follows that hearers are rationally relying on reference point information when the salient 
reference point can also be presumed to be the most relevant. Once again, though, we should 
acknowledge that it is not only hearers who can incur fault here. Speakers who (deliberately or 
inadvertently) communicate irrelevant reference point information may also attract some 
blame insofar as they are violating the maxim of Relation. 
7. Returning to Risky-Choice Framing 
I have argued that the information leakage account can provide a rationalising explanation of 
attribute framing effects, at least in some contexts, albeit the picture is rather more complicated 
than Sher and McKenzie acknowledge. Before concluding, I want to consider whether the 
argument generalises to risky-choice framing effects. Let’s reconsider the classic ‘Asian Disease 
Problem’, reproduced for a final time below:233 
 





Imagine the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is 
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been 
proposed. Assume the exact scientific estimates of the consequences are as follows: 
Framing condition 1:  
 If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved 
and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved. 
Framing condition 2: 
 If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. 
If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will die and a two-
thirds probability that 600 people will die. 
According to the reference point hypothesis, the following information will tend to be conveyed 
by the sure options of the ‘be saved’ and ‘die’ conditions, respectively:234   
(23) If Program A is adopted, a relatively large number of people will be saved.  
(24) If Program C is adopted a relatively large number of people will die. 
The reference point information is not obviously defeated, so participants are presumably 
justified in inferring that the experimenters intend to communicate it. Assuming that it is also 
reasonable for participants to presume that the experimenters are communicating sincerely 
and reliably, then it may rationally be inferred that the reference point information is true. 
One might object here that, since the scenario is clearly hypothetical, the presumption of the 
speaker’s cooperativity is suspended, meaning that therefore hearers are irrational to infer the 
reference point information. I don’t think this is quite right, though. First, in order to complete 
the task sensibly, participants must still trust the experimenters to give an accurate description 
of the hypothetical scenario, i.e. a description which would be true if the scenario obtained. Sher 
and McKenzie make a similar point, writing: 
Of course, the signal-selection process in experimental design is very different from 
those that operate in the “natural world”; but the stimulus-selection process in 
experiments is typically concealed from the subject’s view, and in many experiments 
 
234 I take it that reference point information cannot be rationally derived from the risky options, since it 






cooperativeness requires the subject to treat artificial stimuli roughly as they would in 
corresponding natural situations. (Sher & McKenzie, 2011, p. 43)  
Moreover, just because the scenario is hypothetical, it doesn’t follow that everything the 
experimenter communicates should be treated as false. Instead, it can be reasonable for 
participants to treat certain background information as true.235 In particular, I suggest that the 
experimenters are reasonably understood as communicating accurate background information 
about reference points.  
Turning to issues of relevance, the two framing conditions plausibly make different reference 
points salient (similarly to the case discussed in §6). The ‘be saved’ frame intuitively makes 
salient the expected outcome of all 600 people dying. Meanwhile, the ‘missed’ frame makes 
salient the desired outcome of no-one dying. That would explain why the outcome of Program A 
is understood as a gain, whereas the outcome of Program C is understood as a loss.236 Assuming 
that the experimenters are providing the most relevant information to participants, it is 
perfectly rational to represent the outcome of Program A as a gain – it genuinely is a gain, 
relative to the relevant reference point. Likewise, it is rational for hearers to represent the 
outcome of Program C as a loss, since it is a loss, relative to the relevant reference point.  
Crucially, this would effectively reduce the risky-choice framing effect observed under the ADP 
to a mere reflection effect. As discussed in chapter 1, reflection effects concern actual gains and 
losses, whereas framing effects concern merely apparent gains and losses. Of course, the 
reference point hypothesis has nothing to say about whether reflection effects are rational. It 
might still be irrational to be risk-averse in gain situations and risk-seeking in loss situations; 
nothing I have said here bears on that question. The crucial point is that the information leakage 
account can provide a rationalising explanation of that portion of the effect which is attributed 
to framing, i.e. the presentation of prospects using different wording. 
8. Conclusion 
I believe Sher and McKenzie are right to challenge the standard view of framing effects as 
evidence of flawed reasoning on the part of ‘framed’ subjects, given the pragmatic account they 
put forward. If their information leakage account is correct, hearers do not violate the rational 
principle of description invariance. Although I have shown that their justification in inferring 
and using the reference point information will depend on several further conditions obtaining, I 
 
235 Langton and West (1999) make a similar point with respect to fictional accounts. 
236 Alternatively, it is possible that participants simply accommodate the experimenter’s presupposed 






have sought to balance their epistemic responsibilities against the communicative 
responsibilities of speakers.  
Summarising the overall thesis, I have argued that a closer focus on the semantics and 
pragmatics of uttered frames can explain why they are interpreted as describing distinct states 
of affairs and, therefore, why they provoke distinct responses. This answers the question raised 
in chapter 1, of how and why alternative frames induce distinct mental representations. I 
suggest that this is due to the way our choice of words track genuine differences in the states of 
the world. As competent language users, we are sensitive to a very intricate network of relations 
between words and the world.  
Recapping the specific claims, I have proposed that framing effects may be attributable to a 
combination of two factors: lower-bounded interpretations of the quantities denoted by 
number expressions (as discussed in chapter 4) and the inference of reference point 
information (as discussed in chapter 6). Although framing effects cannot be traced back to the 
conventional semantics of the predicate expressions substituted across framing conditions (as 
argued in chapter 3), their use conveys information that can be analysed as a pragmatic 
implicature (as discussed in chapters 7). The proposed analysis has important implications for 
the way in which we think about linguistic effects in philosophy. In chapter 8, I argued that the 
case study of framing supports a broadly Minimalist approach to semantics and pragmatics 
(contributing to the philosophical debate discussed in chapters 2 and 5). There are also 
practical implications. In this final chapter, I have shown how, by applying the theoretical 
analysis to uses of framing in public discourse, we arrive at a more nuanced understanding of 
the responsibilities of speakers and hearers.  
As I have indicated at various points throughout the thesis, the research I have begun here could 
fruitfully be extended in various directions. For example, it would be helpful to refine the 
information leakage account further, to explore its application to risky choice framing, to 
understand how particular reference points are made salient in context, and to clarify the 
relationship between reference point information, lower-bounded interpretations of number 
expressions, and the effects of markedness. Painting with broader brushstrokes, the idea that 
relative state information bears on our understanding of linguistic stimuli is one which may 
turn out to have wider philosophical application, well beyond cases of equivalency framing. By 
bringing the framing literature into closer contact with philosophical debates about the 
semantics and pragmatics of language, I hope to have paved the way for the further integration 
of these, along with related discussions happening in the disciplines of philosophy, psychology, 







Given emerging evidence that the integrity of MTurk-based studies has been compromised by 
‘bots’ or responses from individuals using Virtual Private Servers (VPS) to fake their location, 
the following screening procedures were performed ex post to identify suspicious or low-quality 
responses in all datasets. These procedures made use of a filtering script available at the 
following link: https://osf.io/2uxk9/. 
Using an approach outlined by Dennis, Goodson, and Pearson (forthcoming), MTurk responders’ 
GPS locations were filtered and identical locations were flagged. Any identical GPS locations 
with unique IP addresses were then further analysed. Each IP address was traced (through 
iplocation.net) allowing us to identify whether the response came from an ISP or a VPS 
provider, and whether it came from a server farm. If responses were found to derive from a 
server farm, an open-ended question in each dataset was then screened by the experimenter to 
check the integrity and quality of the response using five criteria adapted from (Dennis et al., 
forthcoming): 
1) Whether the response is completely unrelated to the study  
2) Whether the response is incoherent and/or nonsensical  
3) Whether the response includes a gross misuse of the English language  
4) Whether the response clearly articulates reasoning behind decisions  
5) Whether the response cites case facts  
Using this procedure, in the first experiment, 46 responses in the dataset were flagged. Of these, 
17 had already been screened out for other reasons. Of the remaining 29 responses, 10 were 
removed on the basis of the answers provided to the open-ended question, or because they 
were probable duplicates. 
In the second experiment, 103 responses in the dataset were flagged. Of these, 45 had already 
been screened out for other reasons. Of the remaining 58 responses, 30 were removed on the 
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